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Abstract
Due to a sharp decrease in hardware costs and shrinking form factors, networked sensors
have become ubiquitous. Today, a variety of sensors are embedded into smartphones,
tablets, and personal wearable devices, and are commonly installed in homes and buildings.
Sensors are used to collect data about people in their proximity, referred to as users. The
collection of such networked sensors is commonly referred to as the Internet of Things.
Although sensor data enables a wide range of applications from security, to eciency, to
healthcare, this data can be used to reveal unwarranted private information about users.
Thus it is imperative to preserve data privacy while providing users with a wide variety of
applications to process their personal data.
Unfortunately, most existing systems do not meet these goals. Users are either forced
to release their data to third parties, such as application developers, thus giving up data
privacy in exchange for using data-driven applications, or are limited to using a xed set
of applications, such as those provided by the sensor manufacturer. To avoid this trade-
o, users may chose to host their data and applications on their personal devices, but
this requires them to maintain data backups and ensure application performance. What
is needed, therefore, is a system that gives users exibility in their choice of data-driven
applications while preserving their data privacy, without burdening users with the need to
backup their data and providing computational resources for their applications.
We propose a software architecture that leverages a user's personal virtual execution
environment (VEE) to host data-driven applications. This dissertation describes key soft-
ware techniques and mechanisms that are necessary to enable this architecture. First,
we provide a proof-of-concept implementation of our proposed architecture and demon-
strate a privacy-preserving ecosystem of applications that process users' energy data as
a case study. Second, we present a data management system (called Bolt) that provides
applications with ecient storage and retrieval of time-series data, and guarantees the
condentiality and integrity of stored data. We then present a methodology to provision
large numbers of personal VEEs on a single physical machine, and demonstrate its use with
LinuX Containers (LXC). We conclude by outlining the design of an abstract framework
to allow users to balance data privacy and application utility.
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Thesis Statement
If application hosting and data storage services hosted in the cloud were to be provided to
users, it would be possible to build an ecosystem of data-driven applications that preserves
users' data privacy, provides data consolidation, data durability, data integrity, application
exibility, acceptable application performance, and scales with increasing volume of sensor
data, growing number of devices, and rising number of applications.
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In recent years, networked sensors have shown unprecedented growth in adoption, primar-
ily driven by their decreasing cost and form factor. For instance, homes and buildings
are increasingly outtted with sensors that measure and report temperature, water and
energy consumption, or detect motion, water leaks, open doors and windows [3,122]. It is
estimated that 90 million homes in the US will be equipped with sensors by 2017 [1, 40].
Similarly, smart meters (which can be regarded as sensors that measure energy consump-
tion) have also been widely deployed. Approximately 36 million homes in the US [42] (and
4 million homes in Ontario, Canada [41]) have smart meters installed. Wearable sensors
such as Fitbit [14], that monitor users' health are also being increasingly adopted [101].
Smartphones and tablets have evolved into multi-sensor devices and have various embed-
ded sensors, such as, GPS, accelerometers, gyroscopes, and heart-rate monitors. Analysts
predict that by 2020, 50 billion networked sensors will be deployed across our living envi-
ronments [34], collectively dubbed as the Internet of Things (IoT).
The rapid growth of networked sensors has enabled a wide variety of applications. For
instance, energy data analytics applications use data from smart meters and other in-
home energy sensors to provide users with meaningful insight into their consumption [7,
21, 66, 115, 117, 161, 171, 182, 188, 194]. Other applications process data from smartphones
and wearable sensors to provide healthcare analytics [13, 67, 124]. Data from smartphone-
embedded sensors is also used for many dierent applications that span a wide variety of
user functionality [49,73,123]. Moreover, many applications use data from in-home sensors
to perform intelligent control of actuators and appliances such as home heating, ventilating,
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and air conditioning (HVAC) control [78,81,118,163], and others [56,57,147,171]. We refer
to all such applications that make use of sensor data as data-driven applications.
Although applications use sensor data to provide useful functionality, they can also
misuse the data to reveal private information about the users to application developers.
For instance, data from motion sensors can be used to infer users' home occupancy [98].
Smart meter data can be processed to infer users' appliance usage [138] and TV viewing
habits [93], socio-economic status [52], and many other types of private information [131].
Similarly, data from sensors embedded in smartphones can be used to infer a user's physical
activity [103, 104], driving habits [106, 113, 149], and sleep patterns [67, 100]. Therefore, it
is imperative that, while enabling such applications, data privacy be preserved. We dene
data privacy as the ability of the user to control the extent of any sharing of her sensor
data with any third party [179].
Most data-driven applications today adopt a service provider-centric approach. In this
approach the user is required to provide her data to the service provider in exchange
for using data-driven applications. Typically, data from sensors is uploaded to the ser-
vice providers' servers that host applications including their data processing, inference
algorithms, and other application-specic components. Users are provided with interfaces,
such as web portals, to interact with the dierent applications. Examples include Nest [25],
Dropcam [10], and If This Then That (IFTTT) [20]. However, this approach leads to the
service providers obtaining a copy of the user's sensor data, often along with the rights to
share the data, and hence can share it with unauthorized third parties, such as advertisers.
This threat has already come to pass in the form of unauthorized sharing of users' smart
meter data [15,24].
An alternative approach is to provide users with application executables that they host
in their own compute environments such as PCs, smartphones, and tablets, which also
house their sensor data. This gives the users the ability to prevent applications from re-
laying data to unauthorized third parties, for example, by preventing applications' access
to the Internet. This approach provides better data privacy as compared to the approach
discussed above because data is not transferred out of the user-controlled compute envi-
ronment. However, the task of data warehousing, provisioning computational resources
for applications, and enabling remote access to applications from Internet-enabled user de-
vices, are delegated to users. These tasks put an overwhelming burden on them. Examples
of such application frameworks are HomeOS [76], Beam [172], and Energy Lens [7].
In this dissertation, we propose a new software architecture that does not suer from
the drawbacks of the existing approaches. We posit that users should be provided with
personal compute environments hosted in the cloud that provide (i) persistent storage to
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warehouse their personal sensor data, and (ii) computational resources to run applications
such as those discussed above. Applications can be downloaded from an \application
store", and run within the controlled connes of the user's personal virtual execution
environment (VEE). Hosting applications on users' personal VEEs ensures that, given
suitable mechanisms, no data leaves the connes of the user without her explicit permission.
We describe our vision in greater detail in Section 1.3.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, we identify the
goals that an ideal system for personal sensor data management should achieve. In Sec-
tion 1.3, we lay out the vision of our personal-VEE based architecture and outline the
technical challenges in realizing this architecture. In Section 1.4, we describe the contribu-
tions of this dissertation, and conclude with a summary of the chapter in Section 1.5.
1.2 Goals
An ideal system for personal sensor data management should meet two conicting primary
goals. First, it should enable data use, that is, it should allow applications to access sensor
data since applications provide users with valuable data-driven functionalities. Second,
it should preserve data privacy, that is, it should aord users with complete control over
the data that they share with each application. These two primary goals translate to the
following sub-goals.
Data Consolidation
The system should provide users and applications with a single view into multiple data
streams collected using dierent sensors. For instance, in the case of sensor data concerning
users' energy consumption, the system should allow consolidation of data collected using
in-home sensors and data available from utility-owned web-portals (collected by smart
meters [16]). Data consolidation not only broadens the scope of possible applications by
enabling cross-correlation of data, such as, correlating smart meter data with in-home
sensor data, but also eliminates the need for the user to access and manage a separate
data corpus for each sensor. In contrast, most commodity sensors today, for example,
Fitbit [14], Dropcam [10], and smart meters, provide data access through their separate
proprietary interfaces, preventing consolidation.
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Data Durability
To allow applications to process historical sensor data, the system should guarantee the
durability of sensor data, regardless of its time of origin. For instance, HVAC control
applications [78,81,163] process sensor data from previous days/weeks/months.
Data Integrity
The system should ensure that sensor data is not tampered by an application or a third
party such as a storage provider.1 This requires mechanisms to detect data tampering and
provide tamper evidence.
Data Privacy
The system should allow users to control who gets to access their sensor data. Therefore,
the system must ensure that only the user (the data owner) has access to all data (con-
dentiality), and only the user can determine the scope and granularity of any entity's
access to data (access control).
Application Flexibility
The system should allow a user to freely choose data-driven applications. For instance, the
system should allow application developers to distribute their applications to users.
Application Performance
The system should ensure acceptable application performance, for example, ensure tolera-
ble data retrieval times, data processing times, and application access latencies.
Scalability
The system should maintain application performance, that is, low data retrieval and pro-
cessing times, and low access latencies, despite an increasing volume of sensor data, growing
number of sensors, and rising number of applications.
We now present our proposed approach for achieving these design goals.
1If the user employs cloud storage providers such as Windows Azure [37] or Amazon S3 [4].
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1.3 Our Vision
Today, a wide range of computing and storage services hosted in the cloud are available as
commodity rent-based services. Examples include Virtual Machine (VM) providers (e.g.,
Amazon EC2 [4] and Windows Azure [37]), computing platform providers (e.g., Google
AppEngine), and Blob storage providers (e.g., Amazon S3 [4] and Azure Blob Store [37]).
Application developers rent these services to host their applications and users' sensor data.
Users' sensor data is required to be relayed and stored with these services in order for users
to use the provided applications. In doing so, the user hands over a copy of her sensor
data to application developers, and in many cases the right to process and/or share the
data with third parties. Thus data privacy is lost.
Our work is motivated by the following insight: if certain application hosting and stor-
age services were available to users, it is possible to build an ecosystem of data-driven
applications where data privacy is preserved. Figure 1.1 shows an overview of the applica-










Figure 1.1: Overview of the personal VEE ecosystem.
In this approach, each user owns and controls a virtual execution environment (VEE)
hosted in the cloud, for example, a VM. Users' data is stored reliably and durably using
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commercial cloud storage services. Data-driven applications run within the personal VEE,
and the user retains complete control over the applications, that is, controls the data reads,
writes, and transfers. The personal VEE has mechanisms that (a) preserve data privacy
by providing users with ne-grained access control, (b) prevent applications from leaking
user data, and (c) prevent or detect violation of data integrity by the storage provider or
by an application.
Data from dierent sensors is collected and stored in the VEE's datastore, either di-
rectly, or using a gateway such as an in-home PC. Many in-home sensors, such as passive
infrared (PIR) sensors, currently possess limited communication capabilities or use pro-
prietary communication protocols such as Z-Wave [39]. Thus an intermediate gateway to
collect and coordinate data uploads, for example, by buering during intermittent con-
nectivity, is required. Nevertheless, by providing a unied consolidated view to all sensor
data, our approach streamlines application development because applications can access
any type of sensor data through a uniform API. We believe that, enabling correlation of
dierent types of sensor data can lead to novel applications.
Application developers publish their applications to an application store from which
users can download and run them on their personal VEEs. This maximizes exibility and
application choice.
Users can leverage the elasticity of existing clouds to inate or deate their VEEs,
depending on the resource requirements of the applications, thus ensuring application per-
formance and scalability, without handling the burden of manual resource provisioning.
Users may use their personal VEEs to also host private instances of web, mail, messag-
ing, or other application servers, and exercise greater control over them than employing
commercial providers of such services, such as, Gmail, Dropbox, or GoogleDocs. Similarly
personal VEEs can be used to ooad computation of privacy-sensitive applications from
resource-constrained mobile devices [92, 111,137,184].
Note that, in our approach the personal VEE provider is entrusted with providing
a secure and private execution environment. However, unlike existing approaches, our
approach does not require the user to explicitly hand over the rights to their data in
exchange for using data-driven applications. Recently proposed duciary relationships
between cloud providers and users, if legislated, will also prevent personal VEE providers
from eavesdropping on user data and applications [108].
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1.3.1 Technical Challenges
Many technical challenges need to be addressed to realize our proposed vision. For instance,
several mechanisms need to be designed and implemented to instantiate the framework.
This includes mechanisms to (i) coordinate sensor data uploads with the gateway(s), (ii)
expose data to third party applications via APIs, (iii) prevent applications from leaking
user data, and (iv) provide ne-grained access control to users. Other mechanisms may be
needed to certify and validate applications' behaviour, and to provide users with easy to
understand data access controls.
Sensor data is required to be stored durably. Existing commodity cloud storage providers
such as Amazon S3 [4] or Windows Azure [37], may be leveraged to do so. Although our
approach requires users to trust their personal VEE provider (Section 1.3), users may not
trust cloud storage providers with the condentiality and integrity of the data. Moreover,
users and applications may want to store data across multiple cloud storage providers, and
some applications may also require sharing of data across homes. At the same time, time
taken to retrieve stored historical sensor data should be minimized. Therefore, suitable
sub-systems for storage and retrieval of data need to be built to cater to these requirements.
Our approach requires provisioning one VEE for each user.2 Using existing virtual-
ization solutions to provision large numbers of VEEs will require un-aordably extensive
hardware resources due to relatively small VEE hosting densities of these solutions.3 There-
fore, alternative systems and methodologies to provision large numbers of personal VEEs
in the cloud need to be developed.
Other challenges include simplifying the development of data-driven applications. For
instance, a programming framework can be built such that it provides applications with
programming abstractions and primitives for commonly used inferences such as occupancy.
Applications can directly request their required inferences, while the framework can bear
the onus of running the required data processing; thus greatly simplifying application
development.
1.4 Contributions
This dissertation makes the following key contributions:
2For example, supporting each active Facebook user will require provisioning 1.4 billion VEEs [11].
3Citrix XenServer claims 100-200 VEEs/machine, subject to the VEEs' workload.
7
 We propose a new architecture to enable data-driven applications while preserving
data privacy. With home energy data as the use case, we prototype the dierent
design components and implement three sample applications. We conduct a quali-
tative comparison with existing approaches that provide applications for processing
home energy data, and demonstrate that unlike existing approaches our prototype
achieves the design goals described in Section 1.2.
This work is described in detail in Chapter 3, and has been published in the proceed-
ings of ACM e-Energy 2013 [171].
 We design a storage system (named Bolt) for the ecient storage and retrieval of
time-series data. Bolt builds on top of untrusted cloud storage services such as
Windows Azure [37] and Amazon S3 [4] to provide durability, condentiality and
integrity guarantees for sensor data. We show that, in our test scenarios, Bolt has up
to 40 times lower retrieval time than OpenTSDB [27] (a popular time-series database
system), and requires 3-5 times less storage space.
This work is described in detail in Chapter 4, and has been published in the proceed-
ings of USENIX NSDI 2014 [95].
 We propose a new methodology to multiplex large numbers of personal VEEs on a
single machine at the cost of a small increase in client request latency (called miss
penalty). We present a formal model for the problem and establish a theoretical lower
bound on the miss penalty. We demonstrate the application of our methodology using
LXC [22] and explore the trade-o between VEE density and miss penalty in this
context.
This work is described in detail in Chapter 5, and has been published in the proceed-
ings of ACM VEE 2015 [170].
As we describe in the remainder of this dissertation, these contributions address dierent
facets of our proposed personal VEE vision (Figure 1.1), and combine to form a solution
that achieves the conicting goals of providing data privacy and data use.
1.5 Chapter Summary
Sensors have become ubiquitous. Data collected from sensors is of immense practical
value. At the same time, sensor data can be processed to reveal unwarranted private
information about the user. Therefore, a system architecture that enables applications of
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sensor data while preserving user data privacy is required. We propose an architecture that
provides users with a personal virtual execution environment (VEE) hosted in the cloud,
and enables an ecosystem of third party applications of sensor data while preserving data
privacy (shown in Figure 1.1). However, there are a number of challenges faced in realizing
this proposed approach. Examples include building mechanisms for data collection and
consolidation from sensors, preventing violation of data privacy by applications, ensuring
data integrity and condentiality when using untrusted storage services, providing ecient
storage and retrieval of time-series sensor data, and feasibly provisioning personal VEEs for
a large number of users. Designing systems and methodologies to address these technical




In this chapter we rst describe an overview of existing systems that provide users with
applications to process their privacy-sensitive data (in Section 2.1). We briey describe
their architecture and design, and classify them based on their architectural approach. This
classication enables us to evaluate them based on the design goals described in Chapter 1.
We also survey existing work that has adopted the personal VEE approach for particular
applications such as online social networks, and nd that this approach, when augmented
with suitable mechanisms and subsystems, can achieve our desired design goals. This is
the basis for the system architecture outlined in Chapter 1 and presented in greater detail
in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, we choose home energy data as an example use case, and
design and implement dierent components of the personal VEE architecture such as an
in-home gateway, a personal VEE framework, and a few sample applications.
In Section 2.2, we survey prior work on designing storage systems for user data. We
nd that existing systems either do not address storage and retrieval of time-series sensor
data, or do not ensure data privacy and integrity when storing data using untrusted storage
services. In Chapter 4 we design a storage system to meet these requirements.
In Section 2.3, we categorize dierent virtualization approaches and survey existing
work on increasing VEE hosting density. We identify shortcomings of existing approaches
which prevent them from maximizing personal VEE hosting density. In Chapter 5, we
design a new methodology to alleviate these shortcomings.
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2.1 Providing Data-Driven Applications
Figure 2.1 shows a taxonomy of existing systems for providing data-driven applications
and Table 2.1 compares them on the basis of the design goals described in Section 1.2.
2.1.1 Service-provider Approach
In this approach, each user's data is stored on a logically centralized server, owned and
controlled by a service provider, where it is processed for analytics or for controlling ac-
tuators, or is shared with third-party applications. Most commercial data application
providers today adopt this approach.
For instance, energy companies such as Waterloo North Hydro [36] and San Diego Gas
and Electric [32] allow users to download their energy consumption data that is collected by
utility-owned smart meters, and provide some web-based data analytics services. However,
most energy companies chose to delete the data after a few months of the billing cycle.
In other systems, users have the option of uploading and optionally linking their
data to other web applications. Examples include the Google Powermeter [15], Microsoft
Hohm [24], and GreenButton1 [16] applications such as Home Energy Yardstick [19], Snugg
Pro Energy Audit [33], and Home Energy Saver [18]. Similarly, health-tracking services
such as Fitbit [14] and Withthings [38] warehouse data from the wearable sensors on
their cloud-hosted servers. Users can enable other web-hosted applications to access this
data [13].
These systems do not provide any mechanisms for consolidating data from dierent data
sources. Secondly, the user is responsible for downloading ephemeral data from the central
provider and permanently storing it if they want data durability. Since data is processed
on the service providers' servers, it is vulnerable to intentional or unintentional sharing
with unauthorized third parties; thus endangering data privacy. This was evident from the
Google Powermeter [15] and Microsoft Hohm [24] projects, where energy companies shared
users' smart meter data with third parties (Google and Microsoft respectively), without
explicit user consent. Lastly, no mechanisms for ensuring data integrity are provided to
the user. However, the user can chose whether to link their data to other web-applications,
thus providing a limited degree of application exibility. Service-providers are responsible
for provisioning their systems to ensure application performance and scalability.
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Figure 2.1: Taxonomy of existing systems for providing data-driven applications.
Sensor-oriented Services
O-the-shelf devices such as Nest [25] upload sensor data to the service provider's server.
The server stores the data and processes it to predict home occupancy, which is used to
dynamically adjusts the thermostat's set point. Similarly, the Philips Hue [30] lighting
system uploads data about user preferences and usage to its server, which is processed to
generate user feedback and product advertisements.
These solutions cater only to their respective sensors, and do not guarantee long-term
data storage, thus providing little data consolidation and durability. Since data remains
under direct control of the service provider and not the user, data privacy is lost. Lastly, a
user is limited to using the applications provided by the hardware provider; users cannot
freely choose applications and thus have little exibility.
2.1.2 Home PC-based Approach
In this approach, a user-owned computer, such as a home PC, is used to store sensor data,
run data analytics, and monitoring and actuation applications. This approach is adopted
by HomeOS [76], a platform for applications that use in-home sensors, and Energy Lens [7],
a desktop application that analyzes users' energy consumption data. We now provide an




HomeOS [76,77] is a .NET based platform designed to provide centralized monitoring and
control of sensors and actuators in a home such as switches, thermostats, and cameras.
It provides application developers with homogeneous abstractions to communicate and
control such devices. Figure 2.2 shows an overview of HomeOS. It is comprised of software
modules called \drivers" that communicate with the sensors and actuators. A set of higher
level modules called \application modules" use the driver modules to collect data from the
sensors, and encapsulate algorithms to perform monitoring, actuation, or data analytics.
The platform is responsible for providing (i) resource isolation between modules, (ii) sensor








Figure 2.2: Overview of the HomeOS [76,77] platform.
HomeOS provides data consolidation by enabling applications' to access various sensors
(and other data sources such as web-portals). Since the data is processed on a user-owned
PC, the user can chose which applications to install and control applications' access to
sensors. Thus this solution provides data privacy and integrity, and application exibility
and extensibility. However the user is required to maintain the durability of the data, for
example, using RAID arrays and o-site backups. Applications' performance in HomeOS
is limited by the computational resources of the host computer, and the user must provide
additional computational and storage resources as application demands and data volumes
increase. In contrast, renting cloud hosting and storage services would allow the user to
delegate these tasks to cloud providers.
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Energy Lens
Energy Lens [7] is a desktop application for homeowners and energy auditors that processes
energy data and generates feedback in the form of interactive visualizations. It helps users
in keeping track of when, where, and how much energy is wasted, and progress made in
reducing energy consumption. Similar to HomeOS, it allows users to consolidate and pro-
cess energy data from dierent sources (in-home sensors and smart meters), preserve data
integrity, privacy, and allows extensibility and exibility. However, this approach provides
no mechanisms for maintaining data durability, application performance, or scalability.
2.1.3 Personal Data Storage
In this approach, each user is provided with a personal cloud-hosted storage system in-
stance controlled by the user herself. Users can use their individual storage environment to
consolidate and archive their data, and can chose to share it with third party applications
(hosted elsewhere in the cloud). We now describe existing work that has proposed this
approach.
Personal Container
The Personal Container [139] is a user's personal data storage system instance in the
cloud, a logical single intermediating entity, where data is consolidated from disparate
sources such as various user-owned sensors, and re-exposed to data-consumers such as
applications, subject to the user's consent. Figure 2.3 outlines the Personal Container
ecosystem of users, data sources, and applications.
Elsmore et al. [79] demonstrate the use of Personal Containers for collecting a user's
smartphone GPS data. They system is deployed in an organization that wishes to measure
its employees' travel-to-work carbon footprint, for planning future infrastructure. The
Locker project [35] is an open-source platform that allows users to store information and
create applications that can run inside lockers. Each Personal Container is initialized as a
locker instance running on a Linux Container (LXC) [22], where each user's GPS data is
stored. The organization is then able to access some parts of users' data with their explicit
permission, and oers data-driven applications. Example applications include one that
calculates how much money a user spends using a car, train, or bus during their commute










Figure 2.3: Overview of the Personal Container approach [139].
Personal Containers allow users to consolidate data from dierent sources and durably
store it. Users have a free choice over applications, and application providers are respon-
sible for maintaining application performance and scalability. Users are required to trust
the Personal Container with maintaining the integrity of the data. However, data is always
transferred out of the Personal Container to application servers, albeit with explicit user
permission, thus giving up data privacy even in cases where an application requires to only
access a single user's data. Moreover, existing work [79,139] does not address ecient stor-
age and retrieval of sensor data and provisioning of Personal Containers for large numbers
of users.
Personal Data Vault
Similar to Personal Containers [79, 139], Mun et al. [140] propose Personal Data Vault, a
system to allow users to retain ownership of their data. The proposed solution is to use
secure user-owned data containers to enable user-controlled sharing of data with applica-
tions. This approach uses three mechanisms to facilitate this selective sharing of data with
applications. First, granular access control lists, allow users to dene data sharing poli-
cies that include the type and granularity of data a given application can access. Second,
trace-audit logs record transactions and transformations of users' data performed by appli-
cations. Lastly, a rule recommender pre-calculates constraint values for a set of pre-dened
data sharing policies, and facilitates policy re-conguration. The system is instrumented to
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collect data from users' smartphones for two health monitoring applications: Ambulation
(which logs a user's physical activities) and Walking-survey (which records a user's sleep
cycle information).
Similar to the Personal Container system, this solution achieves all of our design goals
except providing data privacy, since data is shared with the service provider, albeit in a
controlled fashion. Moreover, this work does not address provisioning of Personal Data
Vaults for large numbers of users.
2.1.4 Personal Data Storage With Limited Computation
This approach enhances the personal data storage approach by supporting some trans-
formations of data before sharing with third parties; thus requiring a limited amount of
computation to perform such transformations.
Transmute
Gris et al. [94] propose Transmute, a novel scripting language for writing data parsing
scripts that can be run inside a Personal Data Vault [140]. Transmute scripts or lters
receive raw sensor data streams as input, and output privacy-preserving data streams,
which can be shared with untrusted applications. This reduces the amount of private user
information revealed to the application. For instance, a lter can convert smartphone
GPS data to a more coarse grained data stream such as a ZIP code stream. The authors
also provide tools that can be used to analyze the lters, and provide guarantees about
the transformations they perform on a given input stream. Users are also provided with
access control lists which can be used to grant stream read/write privileges to lters and
applications. Filters are sandboxed to prevent malicious lters from leaking data.
This solution retains the data consolidation, integrity, and durability benets of the Per-
sonal Data Vault approach. In addition, it addresses data privacy using its lter-based data
transformations. However, it precludes applications from using raw data streams without
sacricing users' data privacy. This presents serious limitations for application developers
because they need to design and implement appropriate methods for using transformed
data streams, thus limiting application extensibility and exibility. Moreover, lters need
to be developed and maintained for every sensor type, for example by a trusted lter
provider. Filters need to be continually updated (by a trusted entity) as new algorithms
that reveal unsanctioned private information from transformed data evolve.
16
Data Capsule
Kannan et al. [109] propose Data Capsule, an encapsulation of a specic kind of user data
such as credit card numbers or web-browsing patterns, along with code that implements
a well-dened and open interface for accessing the data, for example, an interface that
debits money from a given credit card. Applications hosted on service providers' servers
can use these interfaces to perform operations using the data, without transferring data
out of the user-owned capsule. The framework includes a policy layer that allows a user to
exercise ne-grained and exible control over how the interface to her data is used. It also
allows users to transform data before it is shared to limit loss of data privacy. The solution
demonstrates a shopping application in which the capsule provides an interface to charge
a credit card without revealing the credit card number to the application. Similarly, in a
second application the capsule stores a user's web-browsing data, and applications query
the capsule interfaces to generate user-targeted advertisements, and the application does
not access the raw data.
Similar to the previous solution, this solution provides data consolidation, integrity,
and durability, and preserves data privacy by regulating applications' access to data using
capsule interfaces. However, it requires development and maintenance of capsule interfaces
for dierent data types, and for dierent data processing operations that applications may
require. This presents a serious limitation to application exibility and extensibility. Lastly,
existing work [109] has not addressed the design of capsule interfaces for sensor data and
its processing.
Data Preserver
Extending the Data Capsule framework [109], Kannan et al. [110] propose Data Preserver,
an entity that encapsulates the user's data with code and policies chosen by the user.
The framework proposes a combination of dierent mechanisms such as administrative
isolation, software-based isolation using virtual machines, and hardware based trusted
platform modules to guarantee that applications interact with the preserver only via the
user-congured interfaces. The solution is similar in nature to the Data Capsule framework,
achieves the same design goals, and suers from similar drawbacks.
2.1.5 Personal VEE
We now describe an approach where each user owns and controls a personal execution
environment hosted in the cloud, such as a virtual machine. As shown in Table 2.1, this
17
Service-provider Sensor-oriented Home PC-based Personal data storage Personal data storage Personal VEE
services with limited
computation
Powermeter [15], Nest [25], HomeOS [76,77], Personal Container [79,139], Data Capsule [109], VIS [59,165,166],
Hohm [24], Hue [30] Energy Lens [7] Personal Data Vault [140] Data Preserver [110], box [126]




Consolidation X X X X
Durability X X X
Integrity X X X X
Data privacy X X X
Flexibility X X X X
Scalability X X X X X
Application
Performance
X X X X X
Table 2.1: Comparison of existing solutions for providing data-driven applications based
on the design goals.
approach meets all our design goals. We now describe existing work that has adopted this
approach and its shortcomings.
Virtual Individual Server
Caceres et al. [59,165,166] identify various problems in using a centralized service provider
approach for applications that process data collected from sensors on users' smartphones
such as GPS data. First, concentrating data from multiple users under one administra-
tive domain leads to the possibility of large-scale data privacy breaches. Second, users are
required to grant service providers with the rights to display and freely distribute their per-
sonal data. The authors posit that a user's interests are best served if her data is uploaded
to a Virtual Individual Server (VIS) for two reasons: (i) VISs are resistant to large-scale
privacy breaches because each VIS runs in its own administrative domain, and (ii) VISs
provide users with control over software and policies that direct all data sharing. They use
this approach to design a location-based online social network application that uses virtual
machines hosted on Amazon EC2 [3] as VISs. Further, they show that the application's
latencies are comparable to that when using a centralized service provider approach. Note
that, users are required to trust the virtual machine providers with maintaining the privacy
of their data.
Unlike previous approaches, VISs do not require any additional interfaces or lters to
be developed and maintained, promoting application extensibility. Users can completely
control applications' data access. By leveraging an elastic utility computing infrastructure,
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VISs ensure that applications have sucient compute resources, thus providing application
performance and scalability. This approach is the foundation that we build upon in our
work.
Note that existing work [59, 165, 166] uses the VIS approach for a single application,
and does not address extending this approach to other possible data-driven applications.
Moreover, it instantiates VISs as virtual machines, uses virtual machines' local disk to
store data, and does not address durable storage of data and ensuring data integrity. Our
work in Chapters 3 and 4 addresses these shortcomings.
box
Box [126] extends the VIS approach by proposing a runtime for smartphone applications
that spans a cloud-hosted execution environment and user devices. However, this work
does not address data consolidation from other user-owned sensors, durable storage of
data, and ensuring data integrity. Nevertheless, it provides mathematical bounds on the
amount of information an application that reports usage statistics to developers' servers
can reveal. This work is complementary to our vision (outlined in Section 1.3), because it
enables data-driven applications running on users' personal VEEs to report usage statistics
to developers.
2.2 Providing Data Storage and Integrity
We rst discuss systems that leverage untrusted remote storage services to provide data
storage with data integrity guarantees (in Section 2.2.1). In Section 2.2.2, we describe
existing systems aimed at personal data storage across user devices. Lastly, in Section 2.2.3
we discuss other storage systems such as OpenTSDB [27] (which we use in Chapter 4 as a
point of comparison).
2.2.1 Leveraging Untrusted Remote Storage
Li et al. [128] build SUNDR, a network le system that uses untrusted remote storage
services to store les and provides integrity and consistency guarantees for stored les.
It employs cryptographic mechanisms such as digital signatures and fork consistency to
protect le system contents and enables clients to detect any unauthorized modications.
The authors show that a malicious user with complete administrative control of a SUNDR
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server cannot cause the clients to read altered contents of stored les. Using example
workloads such as the Concurrent Versions System (CVS), they demonstrate that the
latency overhead of SUNDR is minimal as compared to NFS [157].
Extending the approach in SUNDR [128], SPORC [82] provides a \generic collaboration
service" using a cloud-hosted server running on a VM. The service is used to instantiate
dierent applications such as a key-value store and a collaborative text editor. The design
of the service ensures that the cloud-hosted server only receives encrypted data. It uses
\fork* consistency" and \operational transformation" mechanisms to enable clients to de-
tect unauthorized operations such as additions, modications, deletions, or re-orderings.
The authors use the example workloads to demonstrate that client latency overheads are
negligible.
Venus [168] provides key-value storage using commodity cloud storage services such as
Amazon S3 [4]. It does not require users to rent cloud based virtual machines for server
hosting (as in SPORC [82]). More importantly, it does not require users to trust storage
service providers, provides data integrity and consistency guarantees, and detects any data
tampering by a service provider. Similar to Venus, Depot [134] provides a key-value store
which although using untrusted storage services, provides consistency, staleness, durability,
and recovery properties.
Farsite [45] proposes using a collection of insecure and unreliable desktop computers to
instantiate a reliable virtual le server with limited data integrity guarantees. Chefs [87]
demonstrates content distribution by replication of an entire le system on untrusted stor-
age servers.
Although this body of work demonstrates the use of dierent techniques to leverage
untrusted storage services (including commodity cloud storage services), it does not address
ecient storage and low-latency retrieval of time-series data.
2.2.2 Storing Data Across Devices
Salmon et al. [156] propose Perspective, a semantic le system to help users in manag-
ing their data spread across their personal devices, such as laptops and smartphones. It
provides a uniform abstraction called a view, which is a semantic description of a set of
les. It is specied as a query on le attributes and the IDs of devices on which the les
are stored. Multiple devices interface with each other in a peer-to-peer (P2P) fashion, to
provide the unied view abstraction.
Similar to Perspective [156], HomeViews [89] provides users with a view abstraction,
and also allows secure sharing of views across user devices. It works in a P2P fashion and
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does not require users to manage a centralized account or data protection mechanisms.
Both Perspective [156] and HomeViews [89] target user data such as photos, music, and
documents, stored across user devices.
Goh et al. [91] propose SiRiUS, a system that supplements local device le system stor-
age with untrusted remote storage. It forms an overlay over local le systems and other
network and P2P le systems such as NFS [157] and OceanStore. It provides some data in-
tegrity and condentiality guarantees, however, it does not guarantee the freshness of data
a reader receives. Similarly, VStore++ [111, 112] provides a \virtual store" abstraction,
which is dynamically mapped to suitable user devices or cloud storage.
This body of work addresses many challenges associated with managing data produced
and consumed by applications across user devices. However, it does not specically address
storage and retrieval of time-series data. Moreover, it does not focus on data condentiality
and integrity guarantees for such data.
2.2.3 Other Systems
sMAP [74] explores the design of a RESTful service that mediates data transfers be-
tween sensors (the data sources), and data consumers such as applications. It provides
interpretability of data streams, manages the consolidation and propagation of data from
sensors to a given consumer, and focuses on supporting a wide variety of sensors. However
it does not focus on ecient storage and low-latency retrieval of sensor data.
Stream processing systems also present alternative solutions for housing sensor data.
They enable data to be pushed through a data-processing subsystem, oer straight-through
processing, that is, no modication to incoming data messages, which are then stored.
Examples of such systems include Aurora [62] and Borealis [43]. However, these system
assume that entities such as the data writer, data reader, and storage servers, are in a single
administrative domain. Scenarios where users want to leverage commodity storage services
such as Amazon S3 [4] or Windows Azure [37] are therefore not supported. Specialized time-
series databases such as OpenTSDB [27] (described next) also suer from this drawback.
OpenTSDB [27] is a popular time-series data storage system. It builds on top of
HBase [6] (a column oriented database management system), and exposes a data stream
abstraction for reading and writing sensor data. Applications using OpenTSDB can store
and retrieve data streams by using its HTTP-based web APIs. However, OpenTSDB does
not provide any data integrity guarantees. This leaves data vulnerable to modications by
malicious third parties such as a service provider hosting OpenTSDB instances.
21
Ming et al. [129] propose a framework for storage and retrieval of patient health records
(PHR). The framework divides users into subsets, and provides each subset with a separate
set of cryptographic keys for encrypting data before uploading to a cloud server. Using
attribute based encryption techniques, the authors demonstrate reduction in key distribu-
tion complexity with support for revocation of user access rights. However, this work relies
on cooperation from the cloud hosted server (while assuming it to be non-malicious), and
does not focus on time-series data.
Popa et al. [146] design a cloud storage system which provides users with data integrity
and freshness guarantees. However, they do not address storage of time-series data, and
do not focus on leveraging existing commodity cloud storage services.
2.3 Hosting Large Numbers of Personal VEEs
We rst provide an overview of dierent approaches used to create virtual execution en-
vironments (VEEs) in Section 2.3.1. In Section 2.3.2, we discuss existing work that has
focussed on increasing VEE hosting density, and examine its applicability for creating large
numbers of personal VEEs. Lastly in Section 2.3.3, we identify just-in-time provisioning
of VEEs as a potential approach to increase hosting density, and discuss existing work and
open problems pertaining to this approach.
2.3.1 Virtualization Approaches
Virtualization refers to the combination of indirection and multiplexing to present appli-
cations with the illusion of running on a dedicated physical machine despite sharing the
physical machine's resources with other applications. Many virtualization approaches have
been studied since the mid-1960s and can be broadly classied into three categories: Full,
Para-, and OS-level virtualization. Table 2.2 shows example virtualization solutions for
these categories.
Full Virtualization
In this approach, a single physical machine simultaneously hosts multiple unmodied op-
erating systems by trapping and redirecting requests to the underlying hardware resources,
including the CPU, interrupts, and the memory subsystem. Well known examples include
22
IBM's zServer, and VMWare Server. This approach places the most demands on the phys-
ical machine, and therefore has the least potential VEE hosting density, but provides the
best fault and performance isolation.
Para-Virtualization
This approach presents the same interface to applications as full virtualization, but makes
small modications to the hosted operating systems to reduce their resource demands.
This technique was rst introduced in the Xen [51] virtualization solution. This approach
provides the same fault and performance isolation as full virtualization and achieves a
greater potential density, but at the cost of requiring OS modications.
OS-level Virtualization
This approach virtualizes the API between an application and the OS, and makes a single
instance of an OS appear like multiple OS instances. The key idea is to tag a set of
processes with an identier and to mutually hide processes with diering tags from each
other at every level of the operating system. By running a single instance of the OS,
this approach greatly reduces resource demands and increases hosting density. However,
this density improvement is at the cost of requiring OS modications, and reduced fault
isolation, in that a kernel failure may simultaneously crash all virtual OS instances. A
widely used solution that has adopted this approach is Linux Containers (LXC) [22].
Type Solutions
Full Virtualization VirtualBox, VMWare Player, VMWare ESX, LPAR, QEMU, MoL
Para-Virtualization Xen, KVM, Lguest, rhype, UML, L4Linux, z/VM, PHYP, lv1, BEAT
OS-level Virtualization OpenVZ, Linux-VServer, LXC
Table 2.2: Examples of existing virtualization solutions.
The VEE hosting density of a given virtualization solution directly depends on its
resource overhead. Therefore, to maximize VEE hosting density, it is imperative to under-
stand and compare the resource overheads of the dierent virtualization approaches.
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Resource Overhead Comparison of Virtualization Approaches
Para-virtualized approaches have been shown to incur lower resource overhead than fully
virtualized approaches [51], thus they can be hosted with greater density. OS-level virtual-
ization incurs even lower overhead than para-virtualization and therefore allows even higher
VEE density. Soltesz et al. [173, 174] use benchmarks such as lmbench, Operf, DBench,
Postmark, OSDB, IPerf, and SPECWeb99, to demonstrate that the OS-level virtualized
VServer approach incurs lower resource overhead than the Xen paravirtualized approach.
Other researchers comparing OS-level virtualization solutions with para-virtualized ap-
proaches report similar ndings [64,65,145,177]. Therefore, for a given workload, OS-level
virtualization solutions can potentially yield higher VEE density.
Moreover, the resource overheads of competing OS-level virtualization solutions is simi-
lar. For example, VServer and OpenVZ show similar resource overheads, and hence similar
VEE hosting densities [61].
2.3.2 High Density Hosting
An ideal virtualization solution for provisioning personal VEEs should meet the following
goals.
 It should allow users to freely run multiple applications on their personal VEEs.
 It should minimize any impact on the performance of applications hosted on personal
VEEs, for example, minimize any increase in latency of clients accessing application
servers hosted on a VEE.
 It should maximize VEE density, that is, the number of personal VEEs co-hosted on
a single machine.
In light of these goals, we now discuss existing work on increasing VEE hosting density.
The Denali isolation kernel [183] was one of the rst attempts to create a high density
VEE hosting solution. It achieved an astonishing 10,000 VEEs per machine. However,
each VEE may only host a single application run on behalf of a single user. Moreover, it
requires both the guest OS and applications to be modied, thus requiring modications
with the release of each application update. Therefore, this approach is not suitable for
mass hosting of personal VEEs.
24
The Honeyfarm approach [180] modies Xen so that a VEE is dynamically spawned
whenever a client request (for a server hosted on the VEE) arrives, and is terminated
when the request is fullled. This work proposes two key improvements to Xen: (i) ash
cloning, which is a mechanism to quickly instantiate new VMs by copying and modifying a
reference VM image, and (ii) delta virtualization, which is a copy-on-write scheme for VM
main memory. This approach demonstrates VEE density of 10,000 VEEs per machine.
However, it does not allow data persistence across client invocations: all VEE state is
lost on the termination of the client request, making it unsuitable for hosting personal
applications, such as data analytics. Consequently, this approach is unsuitable for hosting
personal VEEs. Nevertheless, as we see next in Section 2.3.3, the idea of just-in-time
provisioning of VEEs (used in this approach) greatly helps in improving VEE hosting
density.
2.3.3 Just-in-time Provisioning of VEEs
Traditionally, VEEs provisioned on a machine are thought of as always being in a booted
state, and thus utilizing the host's CPU, memory, and disks [72, 105, 125, 192]. How-
ever, many VM workloads exhibit frequent, often long, and uncorrelated idle periods.
Examples include personal VEE workloads, some web-hosting [120] and cyber-foraging
workloads [160]. When multiple VEEs with such workloads are co-hosted on a machine,
decreasing the resource footprint of idle VEEs allows for a much denser VM packing, thus
reducing hosting costs for both VEE renters and VEE providers.
It is possible to reclaim resources from an idle VEE by transitioning it to an inactive
state(s), where its resource footprint is reduced, and activating it at the end of its idle
period, for example, on the arrival of a client request for a server hosted on the VEE. The
increase in VEE density comes at the cost of an increase in client request latency, called
the miss penalty.
Inactive States
Table 2.3 shows inactive states proposed or supported in a few virtualization solutions.
Recent work has introduced inactive states for VEEs to reduce their resource footprint,
albeit for dierent reasons, such as, for reducing VEE activation time. Wang et al. [181]
propose stateful in-memory substrates which are less resource-intensive than a running
VEE, and have small activation times. Knauth et al. [119] propose a fast-resume state
which leverages lazy disk reads to lower VEE activation time. Likewise, Twinkle [193]
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demonstrates the use of dierent optimizations to lower VEE resume (from suspended)
times, such as, working set estimation, demand prediction, and free page avoidance .
Virtualization solution Inactive states
LXC [22] Frozen(stock) [135], Shutdown (stock)
Xen Suspended, Shutdown (stock), Substrates [181]
VMWare ESXi Suspended, Shutdown (stock), Fast-resume [189,190]
KVM Suspended, Shutdown (stock)
Table 2.3: Proposed and natively supported (denoted \stock") inactive states for a few
virtualization solutions.
Increasing VEE Density
Existing work has explored the use of a single inactive state for hosting idle VEEs, and
increasing VEE hosting density. DreamServer [120] demonstrates the use of a suspended
state [119, 189, 190] for just-in-time provisioning of VEEs for web-hosting workloads ex-
hibiting idle periods. The authors demonstrate that hosting density can be increased by
up to 50% by transitioning idle VEEs to the suspended state, and activating them on the
arrival of client requests. Similarly, Ha et al. [96] explore just-in-time provisioning for VEEs
that run computations ooaded from resource-constrained mobile devices. This body of
work suers from two main drawbacks.
First, existing work uses an on-demand policy for managing idle VEEs. That is, a
VEE is transitioned to the booted state only when a client request for it is received, thus
incurring the maximummiss penalty. However, miss penalties can potentially be minimized
by leveraging better policies for managing idle VEEs, for example, by proactively activating
a VEE in anticipation of client requests. Unfortunately, existing work has overlooked the
design of such policies, and their impact on miss penalties.
Second, existing work leverages only a single inactive state. This limits VM density to
the maximum number of inactive VEEs that can co-exist in that particular state. However,
since inactive states dier in their resource requirements, VEE density can be further im-
proved by multiplexing idle VEEs across multiple inactive states. Unfortunately, existing
work has overlooked this potential avenue for increasing VEE density, which presents sig-
nicant density improvements for workloads with high idle periods such as personal VEEs.
We address these two drawbacks of existing work in Chapter 5.
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In using such a just-in-time provisioning approach, two key mechanisms are required:
 Determining when a VEE has become idle, so that it may be transitioned to an
inactive state.
 Detecting when a VEE needs to become active, so that it can be transitioned into
the booted state, for example, on the arrival of a client request.
We now describe prior work in these two areas.
Determining VEE Idleness and Activeness
The amount of time a VEE is idle depends entirely on its workload. For instance, if a
VEE hosts application servers, it may be classied as idle once it has no outstanding client
requests. Existing work has shown how such rules to determine VEE idle time can be
created. For instance, in case of client-server workloads such rules can use the number of
connected TCP clients [169], or the VEE's CPU and memory utilization [186]. Example
mechanisms to implement such rules include VEE introspection [102,186] or a reverse-proxy
server running on the host machine [120].
Some of these mechanisms can also be used to trap client requests and activate re-
spective VEEs on request arrival. Existing work has demonstrated that this can be ac-
complished using a reverse-proxy server [120]. Other possible mechanisms (overlooked in
existing work) include deploying a kernel module on the host machine which uses the
destination IP address in a request to identify and activate the target VEE.
An alternative solution is to use a customized DNS server. Most client requests are
likely to use TCP, along with using the target VEE's domain name to address it. Therefore,
a DNS server running on the host machine can be used to trap client requests and activate
the target VEE. VEE introspection can then be used to monitor a VEE's active client
connections and detect when a VEE becomes idle, that is, it has no established client
connections. Moreover, this mechanism can also be used to multiplex a small pool of IP
address among a comparatively larger number of VEEs [169].
2.4 Chapter Summary
Upon comparing dierent approaches for enabling data-driven applications, we nd that
existing approaches do not meet our desired design goals. However, a careful analysis of
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prior work suggests that an approach that provides each users with her own personal VEE
in the cloud can potentially meet all the desired design goals. To realize this approach
for a large number of users, it needs to be supplemented with several subsystems. This
includes an in-home gateway for collecting sensor data, building a framework for hosting
data-driven applications on personal VEEs, and providing data access control. Our work
in Chapter 3 addresses the design and implementation of such mechanisms.
A suitable data storage system for ecient storage and retrieval of time-series data also
needs to be designed. Commodity storage services may be leveraged to do so. However,
they may not be trusted with maintaining the condentiality and integrity of the data.
Existing approaches to build storage systems for user data either do not focus on time-
series data, or do not provide the required data condentiality and integrity guarantees.
Nevertheless, many techniques used for interfacing with untrusted storage services can
potentially be leveraged to build a storage system for time-series sensor data. We address
this problem in Chapter 4.
Similarly, provisioning personal VEEs for a large number of users requires suitable
virtualization solutions and methodologies to be developed. Existing work has proposed
a just-in-time VEE provisioning approach for increasing VEE density. In this approach
the resource footprint of idle VEEs is reduced by transitioning them to an inactive state.
VEEs are activated on-demand, for example, upon the arrival of a client request. The
VEE density improvement thus is at the cost of an increase in client latency. However,
existing work has overlooked venues for further improving VEE density by multiplexing
VEEs across multiple inactive states. Also, the increase in client latency can potentially
be lowered by using dierent policies for managing idle VEEs across inactive states. Our
work in Chapter 5 addresses these drawbacks.
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Chapter 3
Leveraging Personal VEEs for
Energy Data Analytics
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, existing approaches for enabling data-driven applications do
not meet the design goals described in Chapter 1. We also observe that the personal
VEE approach, when supplemented with appropriate mechanisms, can potentially meet
the design goals. In this chapter, we design and implement the required mechanisms
to instantiate the personal VEE architecture, determine if our proposed system meets
the design goals, and thus examine the feasibility of our approach for enabling privacy-
preserving data-driven applications.
The variety of areas in which data-driven applications are employed today is extremely
wide, ranging from healthcare, safety, convenience, to energy eciency. To avoid being
overwhelmed by domain-specic details, we choose home energy as an example use case,
and build a prototype implementation of the personal VEE architecture that hosts users'
home energy consumption data. We choose home energy data as our example use case
because of the following observations.
 Smart meters are being increasingly deployed in homes across the world [41,42], thus
providing users with whole-house energy consumption data.
 The availability and adoption of commodity home energy sensors and actuators have
grown tremendously in recent years [3], thus enabling easy instrumentation of home
appliances for monitoring and control.
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 Home energy data can be used to provide users with meaningful and actionable
insight into their consumption habits [7, 21, 66,115,117,161,171,182,188,194].
 Suitable processing of home energy data can reveal private information about the
users, such as their appliance usage habits [138], TV channel being viewed [93],
socio-economic status [52], and other private details [131].
We believe that these recent trends speak to the applicability, value, and potential impact
of our work.
We note that a large body of recent work has focused on designing theoretical schemes
for analyzing smart meter data in a privacy-preserving fashion. Example approaches in-
clude obfuscation [44, 116], aggregation [154, 155, 167], homomorphic encryption [88, 127],
and other schemes [138, 150]. Other work has quantied the utility and privacy of smart
meter data, and has modelled the trade-o between them [148]. This body of work further
motivates us to focus on the domain of home energy data.
In this chapter we present the design and implementation of the dierent components
of the personal VEE architecture outlined in Chapter 1 (illustrated in Figure 1.1). These
include (a) an in-home gateway for relaying sensor data and control commands, (b) a
personal VEE framework, called VHome, which warehouses home energy data, exposes it
to third-party applications via APIs, and provides data access control, and (c) sample home
energy applications that run within an instance of VHome. Our VHome implementation
also enables applications to securely and privately control home appliances, when permitted
by the user.
Our key contributions in this chapter are:
 The architecture of a system that allows users to own and control access to their home
energy consumption data, and freely use data-driven applications of their choice.
 A prototype implementation of the proposed architecture on modern commodity
cloud computing platforms, along with four sample home energy applications.
 A qualitative evaluation of the prototype implementation with respect to data privacy
and data use.
This work has been published in the proceedings of ACM e-Energy 2013 [171].
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. We describe the system architec-
ture, prototype implementation details, and a qualitative evaluation in Sections 3.2, 3.3,
and 3.4 respectively. We present a discussion of this work in Section 3.5 and conclude with
a summary of the chapter in Section 3.6.
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3.2 System Architecture
Figure 3.1 shows an overview of our system architecture. It has four main components
(a) in-home gateway (labelled Gateway), (b) the VHome framework running on a per-
sonal VEE in the cloud, (c) native applications running within a VHome instance, and
cloud-based applications (CBAs) hosted in the cloud by respective providers, and (d) User
interfaces (labelled Remote UIs) that enable accessing VHome services from a connected
device.





















WS : Web Services  
ACM : Access Control Mechanism 
PPM : Privacy Protection Mechanism
          Secure communication 
Figure 3.1: Overview of the proposed system architecture.
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3.2.1 Gateway
The gateway is an in-home and user-controlled service that serves two main purposes.
First, it collects data from in-home sensors and relays it over a secure connection to the
cloud-based VHome instance. Second, it provides an interface that applications (and hence
users) can use to control devices in the home.
The gateway interacts with appliances, either directly (in case of smart appliances), or
using add-on sensors such as network-enabled power strips. This communication typically
uses one or more types of channels such as USB, Zigbee, Ethernet, WiFi, or Z-Wave [39].
Usage data is uploaded from the gateway to the VHome over a secure communication
channel, where it is warehoused to be accessed and processed by applications. The gateway
also authenticates remote users and accepts control commands. These control commands
either congure the gateway, request data uploads, or request actions to be taken by
appliances and devices such as turning an appliance o. A gateway may be a dedicated,
networked hardware device, or integrated into other in-home hardware such as a cable
modem or set-top box, or may be software deployed on a household computer.
3.2.2 VHome
VHome is a software framework that is hosted on a personal VEE and is comprised of a set
of services, described next. A VHome instance (a) receives data relayed from the gateway
and stores it (either using a local datastore, or using commodity cloud storage services),
(b) implements a set of APIs to access the data, (c) hosts a runtime for executing third-
party applications that process sensor data, (d) implements a set of trusted web services
for interaction with the gateway, and user devices, and (e) implements access control and
data transformation mechanisms (explained below). A VHome instance is controlled and
congured by the user who is the owner of the personal VEE.1 A personal VEE could be
a virtual machine [51] or a virtual container [173, 174], provisioned by cloud providers. In
Figure 3.1, the VHome is shown as a dashed outline of a home.
We classify data-driven applications into two categories: Native applications, and
Cloud-based applications (CBA). Native applications run on the VHome-provided run-
time, and are certied to be \safe" using an approach described in more detail in Section
3.2.3. In contrast, cloud-based applications transfer sensor data out of the VHome. Since
this may violate user data privacy, data accesses by a CBA are mediated by privacy protec-
1We discuss the participation incentives for the user and the personal VEE providers in Section 3.5.
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tion mechanisms (PPMs) that pre-process data before it is transferred out of the personal
VEE.
PPMs can implement privacy models such as obfuscation [44, 116], noise addition, ag-
gregation [154, 155, 167], and homomorphic encryption [88, 127]. An example PPM is one
that adds random noise values to smart meter readings, with the amplitude of the noise
decreasing with reading granularity, so that monthly readings may have little or no added
noise, but per-second readings have relatively larger amounts of added noise. In addition,
access control mechanisms (ACMs) allow users to restrict and revoke CBA access to the
APIs by scope and duration. For example, an ACM may allow a CBA to access only hourly
smart meter readings for a specied day of the year. Moreover, this access may expire after
one day.
In addition to native applications, a VHome also hosts special-purpose trusted Web
Services (WS). Being a trusted component, these services have free access to the APIs
and hence to the sensor data. They periodically accept data batches uploaded from the
gateway and store it in the VHome datastore. They also fetch real-time data from the
gateway when requested by the user. This allows data to be uploaded in a single batch
(e.g., once a day), while providing real-time data access when required. Moreover, they
provide a control interface to the user for various administrative tasks, such as downloading
and running native VHome applications, conguring ACMs and PPMs, requesting VHome
software updates, migrating or deleting data, and conguring gateway actions.
3.2.3 Applications
We now discuss native and cloud-based applications in greater detail. Note that, the
main dierence between native and cloud-based applications is that native applications
execute on a tightly-controlled runtime. Moreover, if applications are written in a managed
language such as Java or C#, their bytecode is available for analysis. This allows the
system to limit the privacy leakage that is possible due to these applications. In contrast,
cloud-based applications cannot be tightly controlled. Therefore, the only way to preserve
privacy when transferring data to these applications is to modify the data itself, which is
accomplished using the PPMs.
We envision that both classes of applications would be developed by third-party de-
velopers, much like those who participate in the Apple App Store or Google Play Store.
Developers would use the VHome APIs (described in the next section), to access sensor
data. Users can either download native applications to the VHome which run on the
VHome runtime, or can use ACMs to give cloud-based applications access to their data
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(after processing by PPMs). Applications can provide user interfaces (UIs) to enable their
invocation from PCs, smart phones, or other connected devices.
Native Applications (NAs)
In our prototype implementation, native applications must be written in Java and are
not allowed to invoke native APIs. The leakage of sensor data from native applications
can be restricted using one of the following approaches. In the rst approach, a native
application's bytecode is scanned to ensure that the application is incapable of network
communication. Therefore an application cannot leak data out of the personal VEE, thus
guaranteeing data privacy. Our thinking is that, an application can be certied as safe
if its bytecode does not use the Java.Net API (and does not use any native APIs). This
can be easily checked either at application installation time or when it is submitted for
publication to the application store.
The second approach is used for native applications that need to use network APIs to
access remote hosts, such as to scrape user's smart meter data from an energy company's
website. To handle such applications, network communications from a native application
are restricted to a specic IP address (or host name). For instance, a native application
could be restricted to communicate only with the host name corresponding to the energy
company's server. Moreover, read or write access from a native application to the database
can also be restricted. In the case of the energy data scraping application, it can be
restricted to only write the scraped data, with no privileges to read other types of sensor
data. As we show in Section 3.3, these restrictions on data access are easy to accomplish
in our prototype implementation. Similarly, we can also restrict the set of web services
that a native application can access.
Certied native applications are suitable for data mining, analytics, visualization, ap-
pliance control and home automation. Native applications can also obtain users' smart
meter data from energy companies and store it in the datastore, making them ideal for
data consolidation.
Cloud-Based Applications (CBAs)
Unlike native applications, cloud-based applications are hosted using third parties' hosting
services. The main purpose of a cloud-based application is to allow sharing and compari-
son of sensor data between dierent VHome instances. ACMs provide ne-grained access
control over time-series sensor data, thus allowing users to choose which part(s) of her
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data are shared with a CBA, and the time instant(s) at which it is shared, for example,
periodically. The challenge lies in preserving privacy while allowing meaningful computa-
tions and comparisons. While certied native applications can be given access to raw data,
data given to a CBA must be pre-processed using techniques that ensure that privacy is
preserved. These actions are implemented by and congured using the PPMs (as explained
above). Similar to native applications, CBAs can be published on the application store,
and VHome owners can provide CBAs with their VHome URL and explicit authorization
to read required parts of their data.
3.2.4 User Interfaces
The gateway, the VHome's web services (WS), and cloud-based applications all allow user
interaction. These interactions are mediated using user interfaces implemented on a user
device, such as a web browser, a smartphone application, or other mediums like e-mail or
SMS. User interfaces serve to simplify the management and control of a VHome instance.
Examples include user interfaces that are used to install native applications, to congure
the permissions granted to a CBA, and to control appliances in the home.
3.3 Implementation Details
This section presents details of dierent components of our prototype of the proposed
architecture.
3.3.1 Gateway
We implement a software-based gateway using the Microsoft HomeOS [76, 77] platform.
As described in Section 2.1.2, HomeOS is a .NET based platform designed to provide
centralized control of devices in the home such as light switches, thermostats, cameras, and
televisions. HomeOS provides developers with homogeneous programming abstractions to
orchestrate such devices. We use these features for monitoring and controlling appliances
and to enable the uploading of data to the VHome. Figure 2.2 shows an overview of
HomeOS. HomeOS is comprised of software modules called drivers that communicate with
devices to allow higher level application modules to actuate the devices. In addition, a
platform module manages and coordinates all other modules. To instantiate our gateway,
we extend HomeOS by enriching it with a few additional modules, described next.
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Driver Modules
Each driver module monitors and controls an individual appliance using a sensor. We
implement driver modules for the Aeon appliance sensor [2] and the CC Envi [8] power
and temperature sensor. The Aeon sensor is installed in-series with an appliance and com-
municates the power consumption of the appliance to the gateway over Z-Wave [39]. The
module is invoked by the coordinator module (described next) for polling data or control-
ling the sensor, and transmits the respective Z-Wave frames to the desired sensor. The
Envi sensor measures the active power from a home every 6 seconds using a Hall-eect
transducer. The transducer can be clipped around the split-phase wires of an appliance,
or to those at a home's main electricity supply. Measurements are transmitted wirelessly
to the Envi console which is connected via a USB cable to the gateway machine (an inex-
pensive netbook in our prototype). The netbook caches data on local disk and transmits it
periodically (e.g., daily) to a VHome. Figure 3.2 shows the netbook running the gateway
software, and the Envi device.
Communication Module
This module provides communication between the VHome and the gateway. We use
XMPP [176], the protocol underlying the Jabber chat client, as our transport protocol
because it uses a simple RPC mechanism that is secure, extensible, and provides real-
time communication. Most importantly, XMPP ensures seamless communication from the
VHome to the gateway despite the presence of NAT devices, rewalls, and intermittent
disconnections at the home gateway.
Coordinator Module
This module records and processes energy data generated by the sensors' driver modules
and caches it temporarily on the gateway. Periodic data uploads are received by the
VHome's web services and are robust to intermittent losses of connectivity. To facilitate
coordination of sensor data and control between the gateway and the VHome, each sensor
is assigned a class ID and an object ID. Sensors of the same type are assigned the same
class ID, but distinct object IDs. This allows a VHome instance to identify each sensor
using the fclass ID, object IDg tuple. The coordinator module uses the communication
module to listen for commands from the VHome (to control sensors). For example, if Aeon
sensors have the class ID 1, and the one interfaced with the electric heater has an object
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 Figure 3.2: Gateway and Envi device.





The gateway performs the required action and responds with the sensor's new status as an
acknowledgement. Other actions, for example, dimming lights and managing AC temper-
ature setpoints, are performed in a similar fashion.
3.3.2 VHome
In our prototype, all VHome sub-components { the APIs, Web Services (WS), Access
Control Mechanisms (ACMs), Privacy Protection Mechanisms (PPMs), and Native Ap-
plications, are implemented as separate Java Web Applications (or webapps) using the
Java API for Representational State Transfer (REST) [151] Web Services (JAX-RS frame-
work) [58]. As a result, they can be deployed in a Java Web Container. We use Apache
Tomcat as the web container, which is deployed on a virtual machine using the Amazon
EC2 cloud [4]. For data storage, we use MySQL as the relational datastore running on
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the virtual machine's local disk. Our choice of Java was motivated by our desire to ensure
VHome portability across virtual machine OSes.
Similar to the data format used for sensors (described in Section 3.3.1), sensor data is
organized into classes where each class describes a type of data stream and has a unique
class ID, a class name (e.g., heating), a descriptor (e.g., space heaters in the home), and
a rating (e.g., 500 W). Data streams can either originate from the sensors at home or can
be external (e.g., smart meter readings from an energy company's website). Particular
streams of a class are identied as objects using a unique object ID within their class,
and have an object name (e.g., master bedroom heater), a descriptor (e.g., installed on
01/01/2011) and a granularity (e.g., 60, indicating data is produced every 60 seconds).
Privacy Protection Mechanisms (PPMs) are also implemented as webapps and access a
data stream or streams via APIs. They can create new privacy-preserving streams, which
can then be shared with cloud-based applications (CBAs). For instance, we implement
aggregation as an example PPM where energy consumption time-series data, such as that
produced every few seconds, is aggregated to compute daily or weekly consumption values
which are less revealing in nature.
The webapp backend for the VHome APIs implements them as a set of TLS-Secure
REST [151] URIs, which are used by native and cloud-based applications to access data,
control sensors and actuators. Table 3.1 provides a brief overview of the API that native
and cloud-based applications invoke using HTTP GET or POST requests. Results are
returned using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON). Applications can add or modify data
streams subject to the Access Control Mechanisms (ACMs). Applications can potentially
compute a hash of a data stream (e.g., MD5) and sign it (e.g., using user's private key) to
ensure data integrity.
The ACM webapp regulates applications' access to all or a subset of APIs, congured
using the VHome Web Services (WS). By default all APIs are regulated and therefore,
require a valid access token to return results. The ACMwebapp implements OAuth 2.0 [99],
a token based authentication and authorization standard for securing API access. It uses
the VHome datastore to store data concerning access controls (e.g., tokens, access lists,
and more), and this data is only accessible to the ACM webapp.
Figure 3.3 illustrates this access process for a cloud-based application (CBA) hosted as a
web portal. To access any API, the CBA is rst required to obtain a one time authorization
grant from the ACM webapp by providing its identity (identier, name, or host-URL) and
a list of APIs that it requires access to and the parameters to the APIs. For instance, a
CBA requiring access to the bedroom space heater consumption data (e.g., with class ID




where TS indicates time-series data, and 1325394000 and 1333252799 are the epoch times-
tamps at 01-01-2012 00:00:00 and 31-03-2012 23:59:59, respectively.
This allows restricting the scope of data access to certain data streams and/or certain
segments of a stream's time-series dened using timestamp and/or data values. The ACM
webapp then redirects the user to the Web Services (WS) webapp so as to authenticate
the user as the VHome owner. After authentication, the scope and nature of the requested
access is described to the user, and her authorization for the access is requested. The WS
implements this as a simple notication in a web-browser, which can be relayed to other
remote UIs such as email, SMS, or mobile application notication. An example of such a
notication from an application named \EXAMPLE" is:
The application named EXAMPLE is requesting
access to bedroom space heater data
for Jan 1 to Mar 31, 2012.
Allow or Deny ?
The CBA is then required to exchange the one time authorization grant (before it
expires) to obtain an access token and an (optional) refresh token. The access token
permits a CBA to use the corresponding APIs until the token expires, after which a new
access token must be obtained using the refresh token. All tokens are valid for periods
congured by the user. By matching the CBA's credentials (e.g., URL) to those registered
while issuing the authorization grant, the ACM validates each API access and prevents
use of stolen access tokens. Further, if at any point the user decides to revoke (or pause)
a CBA's access to data, she can simply revoke the access token and the refresh token for
that CBA.
Our prototype implements the authorization grant, access token and refresh tokens
in the form of randomized 128-bit MD5 codes, where the webapp maintains a lookup
table that stores their scope and expiry times. Avoiding the encapsulation of scope and
duration within the token circumvents token processing overhead for each API access. The
authorization grant and access token issuing endpoints are published as GET/POST URIs
by the VHome, and use JSON for token and error-message exchanges with CBAs. Our
prototype implementation assumes one user per VHome. We defer the management of
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Figure 3.3: API access for a cloud-based application.
The Web Services (WS) webapp implements a number of backend components and
allows users to congure them. First, it coordinates periodic data uploads from the gateway
over XMPP and symmetrically transmits control commands to the gateway's coordinator
module. Second, it provides the user with a control portal to install native applications
on the VHome. Native Applications, being JAVA web applications, are then proled by
the WS webapp for use of the JAVA.net interface and for the VHome APIs they require.
The user can restrict the applications' ability to read from and write to the database by
disallowing or restricting the scope of the APIs. Likewise, users can congure ACM settings
such as token formats and expiry periods, and chose which APIs it permits. In a fashion
similar to native applications, certied PPMs can be added to the VHome through this
portal which can be run to create additional data streams. Lastly, the WS webapp allows
users to purge native applications or data, and revoke access tokens of any CBA.
Our prototype VHome implementation is open source and can be found at https:
//vhome.codeplex.com while the gateway implementation using HomeOS is hosted at
http://homeos.codeplex.com.
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Function (regulated by default) Description
ListAllClasses Returns all attributes of all classes of data in the VHome DB
ListClass/param/value Returns all attributes of classes that match the specied pa-
rameter values
param: class ID, class name or rating
ListObject/param1/value1/param2/value2 Returns all attributes of objects that match the specied pa-
rameter values
param1 : class ID, class name or rating
param2 : object ID, object name or granularity
AddClass/className/x/descriptor/y/rating/z Adds class with name x, descriptor y, and rating z
AddObject/classID/w/objectName/x/descriptor/y/granularity/z Adds object with given class ID w, object name x, descriptor
y, and granularity z
AddStream/classID/x/objectID/y/ Adds time-series data to the given data stream with class ID
x and object ID y
GetStream/classID/x/objectID/y/ Returns the complete time-series data stream with class ID x
and object ID y
GetStream/classID/x/objectID/y/TS/t1/t2 Returns the time-series with class ID x and object ID y be-
tween timestamps t1 and t2
GetStream/classID/x/objectID/y/Val/v1/v2 Returns the time-series with class ID x and object ID y be-
tween data values (or Val) v1 and v2
GetStatus/classID/x/objectID/y Returns the current power consumption of device with class
ID x and object ID y
SetStatus/classID/x/objectID/y/status/p Sets the power consumption of device with class ID x and
object ID y to p
Table 3.1: VHome API used by applications to access data.
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3.3.3 Sample Applications
We have created a sample application store as a web portal where users can browse for
native applications. It transfers the selected applications' executables to the VHome's web
services (WS) which installs them on the VHome, and can then be accessed using remote
UIs. We now describe four applications that we have built using our system which, without
our architecture, cannot be implemented in a privacy-preserving form without burdening
the user with maintaining computation and data storage resources for applications.
Data Scraper
This application obtains users' smart meter data from the energy company. It is imple-
mented using the JAVA DOM interface as a VHome native application. Our prototype
application runs on the VHome, scrapes data from an energy company's web portal and
stores it in the datastore. At installation time, the application requests users to provide
it with their access credentials to access the energy company's portal (Waterloo North
Hydro [36] in our prototype). The application also allows users to set automated periodic
data scraping actions to ensure that data is obtained before it is discarded by the utility
company's portal (e.g, after three months) and the user is relieved of manually retrieving
the data. The application allows the data to be retained by the user even after it is no
longer available on the energy company's portal. The data is stored as a data stream in
the Smart Meter class which can then be accessed by other applications through APIs.
Access to historical smart meter data provides opportunities for data analytics. For in-
stance, it allows applications to account for seasonal climate changes when examining the
consumption history.
Interactive Monitoring and Control
This native application interfaces with the VHome web services to monitor and control
home appliances in real-time from an Internet-enabled device. Note that native applica-
tions have no network access and can only be viewed by invoking the trusted VHome we-
bapp container. We implement an Android smartphone application that invokes a VHome
native application and provides a smartphone application GUI. This means users can use
VHome native applications via web-browsers or with applications installed on their mobile
devices such as smartphones and tablets.
Figure 3.4 shows snapshots of dierent panels in our Android smartphone application.
Screenshot-1 (on the left) shows the home monitor, which allows users to view current
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conditions of the home as reported by the Envi sensor. In addition, the consumption data
stored at the VHome is used to compute and display the day's and week's consumption.
Screenshot-2 (in the center) shows the control panel which allows users to turn on or
turn o dierent appliances connected to Aeon Z-Wave sensors and displays their current
consumption. Further, it allows users to share the amount of energy they conserve by
turning o appliances, on social networks such as Facebook and Twitter and to compete
with their friends. Screenshot-3 (on the right) shows a past trend of aggregate energy
consumption measured using the Envi sensor. This trend data can be used by users to
better understand abnormal consumption notications (described below). Our prototype
implements SMS, E-Mail and mobile application notications. Since the VHome runs on
a cloud virtual machine, energy data can be processed and accessed using any connected
device with relatively low latency.
Figure 3.4: Screenshots of our Android smartphone application.
Abnormal Energy Consumption Detection
This VHome native application informs users about abnormalities in their energy consump-
tion. For instance, consider a scenario where users forget to turn o a high-risk appliance
such as an oven. Using the VHome APIs, this application periodically obtains the energy
consumption values from the gateway, measured by the Envi sensor. It then compares the
values to a predicted value computed using an Auto-Regressive Moving Average model.
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If the measured value is higher than the predicted value by a threshold (e.g., 1 kW), the
application sends the user a notication message via e-mail, SMS, or the Android smart-
phone application. The user can then either use the Android application (described above)
or reply to the email or SMS to take appropriate action.
Energy Data Analytics
In many parts of the world the price of electricity depends on the time of the consumption.
In Ontario, a day is divided into peak, mid-peak, and o-peak hours, each with dierent
rates [26]. We implement a VHome native application that processes a home's electricity
consumption measured using the Envi sensor to determine how much energy is consumed
during dierent hours of the day, its corresponding cost under the pricing scheme, and the
total cost. It uses smart meter data obtained and stored by the data scraper application
to verify a user's monthly energy bill. Such simple analytics also provides the user with
meaningful insight into her hourly and daily consumption patterns, warns her of potential
errors in their energy bills, and can help her to time shift non-critical consumption.
3.4 Evaluation
We compared our architectural approach to other approaches in Section 2.1 (Chapter 2).
In this section, we compare our prototype to dierent existing widely deployed (i.e., non-
research) systems for home energy applications. Table 3.2 compares the dierent systems
based on our design goals (Section 1.2).
Commercial software solutions such as Google Powermeter [15] and Microsoft Hohm [24],
being centralized web services are scalable but provide a xed set of analytics with no data
consolidation and little data privacy. Both services are now defunct, thus leaving users de-
prived of their energy data. Energy companies' web portals act similarly and share/discard
the smart meter data at their discretion but ensure integrity of that data. The GreenBut-
ton [17] initiative has standardized energy data formats, so that users can access their
data and analyze it themselves (denoted \GreenButton (Self)") by using desktop tools
such as Energy Lens [7]. This allows users to choose analytics tools, ensure data integrity,
and provides data privacy, but it burdens them with data hosting. Alternatively, users
can delegate the data retrieval and maintenance to third parties (denoted \GreenButton
(Third Party)"). Third parties can manage, analyze and host users' energy data, but such
unconditional access to raw data provides little data privacy.
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Our prototype implementation of the proposed architecture meets the design goals for
a user-centric, privacy preserving system for energy data analysis as explained below.
Hohm [24], Energy companies GreenButton [17] (self) GreenButton [17] VHome
Powermeter [15] web portals [32,36] Energy Lens [7] (third party) prototype
Data Consolidation X X X
Data Durability *
Data Integrity * X *
Data Privacy X X
Application Extensibility X X X
Application Performance X X X X
Scalability X X X X
Table 3.2: Comparison of existing solutions for home energy data applications, * denotes
a partial solution.
 Data Consolidation: VHome native applications, such as the data scraper appli-
cation (Section 3.3.3), can read data from any data source and store it in the VHome
database. This allows users to easily consolidate data from multiple sources by using
one native application per data source. User-owned sensors can be directly interfaced
with the gateway, in a fashion similar to that described in Section 3.3.1.
 Data Durability: Instead of relying on a single computer in the user's home to store
data, and relying on the user to back up that data, for example, by making o-site
backups, data is stored in the VHome datastore. The VHome prototype is hosted on
a user-owned virtual machine (VM), and uses its local disk to warehouse the data.
However, dierent cloud providers provide varied guarantees on the durability of data
stored on VMs' local disks [4, 37]. For instance, VMs on Amazon Elastic Compute
Cloud (EC2) may lose local disk data in case of hard drive failures. Therefore, our
current prototype provides only a partial solution to data durability. In Chapter 4,
we address this problem by leveraging commodity cloud storage services for storing
sensor data, since they provide stronger data durability guarantees with lower storage
cost than VM local disks.
 Data Integrity: Native applications can implement mechanisms to ensure the in-
tegrity of data stored directly into the VHome datastore, such as sensor data up-
loaded from the gateway. Example mechanisms include storing signed hashes of data
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streams. However, our current prototype does not include such native applications.
We address this problem in detail in Chapter 4.
Moreover, in cases of data procured from external sources, such as smart meter
data from energy companies' servers, applications have to rely on the respective
sources such as energy companies, for preserving integrity of the data. Similarly, our
prototype assumes that the VEE and VHome-software providers do not tamper with
data in the VHome datastore.
 Data Privacy: The current prototype uses several mechanisms to ensure data pri-
vacy. First, data within a VHome instance is not accessible by entities outside the
VHome, eliminating many types of privacy violations. Privacy leakage from native
applications is prevented by certifying native applications, by checking Java byte code
submitted to the application store to ensure that they are either not using network
APIs, or when they need to, are only communicating with the specied hosts. The
details of this process are described in Section 3.2.3. Privacy leakage from cloud-
based applications is mitigated, to some extent, by aggregation or obfuscation and
other privacy preserving mechanisms (PPMs). Note that, these protections of data
privacy assume that the VEE and VHome-software providers are trusted.
 Application Extensibility: Users can freely choose to extend their set of VHome
native applications by installing them from the application store. Users can also
chose to transfer their data to other cloud-based applications for analytics and other
services.
 Application Performance: Personal VEEs in the cloud provide VHome appli-
cations with more computational resources such as memory, CPU time, than are
available on a typical user's home machine. Moreover, hosting data and applications
in the cloud minimizes remote access latencies as compared to typical home access
links which have lower bandwidths.
 Scalability: In contrast with home-based computers, cloud-based personal VEEs
allow for easy scaling of both data set sizes and computation, by suitable provisioning
and re-sizing of the VEEs.
Thus, our prototype addresses all of our design goals, and demonstrates the feasibility





In some sense, ensuring that smart meter data remains private is moot, because energy
companies today collect this data and share it arbitrarily with third parties of their choice
(e.g., Google PowerMeter and Microsoft Hohm), without seeking users' explicit permission.
However, this situation is likely to change in the future due to two reasons. First, we
anticipate that many jurisdictions, following the lead set by the province of Ontario (in
Canada), will place severe restrictions on the sharing of smart meter data with third
parties, thereby freezing innovation in data analytics and customized recommendation
applications. Although this is being countered by proposals such as the GreenButton
initiative [17], which release smart meter data back to users, users are not capable of
performing their own data analytics, and are loathe to share this data with third parties
due to privacy concerns. Second, besides smart meter data, users are likely to generate
many other equally private data streams including health-monitoring data, especially with
the widespread adoption of health-tracking devices such as Fitbit [14]. Our prototype
implementation can be extended to applications that analyze and process other such data
streams, thus balancing data privacy and application innovation in those domains.
An alternative approach for handling smart meter data is one where a home's data
is transferred directly from the smart meter to a homeowner's personal VEE. A VHome
native application can then use the data to compute the monthly or yearly bill which is
relayed to the energy company. Existing work on zero-knowledge proofs [138] and trusted
computing platforms [132], may be leveraged to guarantee the authenticity and validity of
the bill to the energy company, which has no access to the raw privacy-sensitive data.
Incentives
Our current prototype caters to home energy data, and involves ve stakeholders{ energy
companies (that collect smart meter data), users, personal VEE providers, VHome software
providers, and application developers. We now describe the incentives each stakeholder has
for participating in the system.
 Energy Companies: Energy companies are under great pressure from legislatures
to release smart meter data to the users, as evidenced by the GreenButton initia-
tive [17]. They also benet from users' adoption of energy conservation applications,
in that it reduces their need for costly generation capacity upgrades. For instance,
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energy companies often have to provision additional power plants to serve their peak
electricity demands, even though such demand levels occur rarely.
 Users: Users are increasingly becoming aware of the costs of the world's rampant
energy consumption. In some cases users are motivated to better understand and
reduce their consumption to limit their carbon emissions, and its disastrous con-
sequences such as global warming and climate change. In other cases, users are
motivated to reduce their energy bills. Users currently lack the infrastructure and
tools to understand how they can achieve these reductions without giving up their
data privacy.
 Personal VEE providers: VEE providers are paid by users for hosting and main-
taining their services, and thus have a monetary incentive for participation.
 VHome software providers: We believe that VHome software providers can be
compensated for their development and maintenance eorts in two ways. First, some
user may wish to pay for purchasing VHome software, so that they can receive in-
telligent recommendations for their electricity use. This is akin to those users who
pay a monthly fee for services such as DropBox. Second, vendors of energy-ecient
appliances could subsidize the cost of VHome software, because applications' recom-
mendations for the use of their products, such as energy-ecient air conditioners,
washing machines and LED lights, will lead to increased product sales.
 Application developers: Application developers receive a mass audience for their
applications, and can choose to either sell them directly, or use built-in advertise-
ments; similar to applications on application stores such as the Apple App Store and
Google Play. Some applications may also be commissioned by equipment vendors,
as discussed above.
Key Aspects
Our proposed architectural approach may appear to be obvious, merging cloud-hosted data
and execution environments with sensor data streams, an approach already implemented
by data management systems such as Pachube [29]. However, there are three aspects of our
work that are not obvious. First, we show how to use virtualized execution environments,
in conjunction with an object-level framework, to provide a practical solution for the
seemingly conicting requirements of ensuring data privacy while fostering application
development. Second, our approach enables the development of an ecosystem of energy
management applications in much the same way as Google Play and the Apple App Store
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provide an ecosystem for the development of smartphone, tablet, and desktop applications.
Third, our approach is diametrically opposed to the service-provider centric view that is
widely prevalent in the Smart Grid community, and commonly used by energy companies.
Instead of designing an architecture that caters to the needs of energy companies, our
approach places control rmly in the hands of the users.
Limitations
Our prototype is limited to dealing with sensor generated time-series data and does not
support other potential forms of user data, such as photos, videos, or document les.
Secondly, since our approach provides users with greater control over their data than
existing approaches, hence the user is faced with an increased number of decisions. How-
ever, such cognitive overload may be eased by learning users' preferences from user studies
to help make decision-making simple and intuitive for the user.
Our prototype does not include mechanisms for ensuring integrity of data streams.
Although, as explained in Section 3.4, these mechanisms are fully realizable in our ar-
chitecture. Moreover, such mechanisms are particularly important if commodity cloud
storage services are used for long-term data storage. Similarly, our prototype uses an ex-
isting relational database system (MySQL) to store the sensor data. This means that some
applications' latencies may be impacted by the database's retrieval latencies. However, it
may be possible to improve retrieval latencies by leveraging the nature of data queries that
are typically issued by applications. We explore these possibilities in Chapter 4.
Lastly, our approach also requires a trusted certication mechanism to certify applica-
tions and requires VHome software and personal VEE providers to be non malicious.
3.6 Chapter Summary
The work in this chapter investigates the feasibility of the personal VEE approach for
enabling an ecosystem of privacy-preserving data-driven applications. To do so, we choose
home energy data as an example use case because of its widespread potential impact. We
build a prototype implementation of our proposed architecture that helps users manage
home energy data and its applications. We identify, design, and implement the dierent
components of the architecture. We also demonstrate how existing work, both in energy
data privacy and home device management can be leveraged to enrich some architectural
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components, such as an in-home gateway and privacy protection mechanisms that trans-
form sensor data to be less revealing. Our prototype consolidates and stores users' home
energy data, and exposes it to third party applications while ensuring that users have
complete control over their data. It addresses all of our design goals, and demonstrates the
feasibility of our personal VEE architecture using existing hardware, software, and cloud
infrastructure. We conclude the chapter by presenting a discussion of smart meter data
with regards to our architecture. We also outline the incentives for dierent stakeholders in




A Storage System for Sensor Data
4.1 Introduction
In our prototype implementation of the personal VEE architecture (described in Chapter 3)
we provided native and cloud-based VHome applications with RESTful APIs to read and
write sensor data. We implemented a few example applications to demonstrate the use of
these APIs. However, our prototype suers from two main drawbacks.
First, many applications require richer data manipulation capabilities than those sup-
ported by our prototype data storage system. For instance, PreHeat [163] is an application
that infers home occupancy by processing in-home motion sensor readings, and uses his-
torical inferred occupancy values from specic time windows to predict future occupancy
which is used to control home heating to reduce home energy consumption. Similarly, Dig-
ital Neighbourhood Watch (DNW) [57,69] is an application that stores information about
physical objects seen by in-home cameras, and shares this information with neighbouring
homes when requested, allowing users to gather image and video evidence of criminal ac-
tivities in the neighbourhood. We describe these applications in detail in Section 4.2.1.
Building these applications as native or cloud-based VHome applications will require de-
velopers to design and implement suitable data retrieval and sharing mechanisms, thus
increasing development eort.
The second drawback of our prototype storage system is that it only uses a VEE's local
storage. However, users and applications may also want to use commodity cloud storage
services such as Windows Azure [37] or Amazon S3 [4] to lower storage costs or obtain
better reliability. This requires application developers to not only design mechanisms
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to store sensor data using these services but also to provision additional mechanisms to
prevent storage providers from accessing users' private data.
We aim to simplify the management of data from in-home sensors by designing a
suitable data management system that replaces our prototype storage system. To do so,
we survey existing and proposed home applications and determine the key requirements
for such a system. We now briey summarize these requirements and describe how they
are derived in detail in Section 4.2.
 The system should support time-series sensor data and should allow arbitrary tags
to be assigned to values. This is because tags provide applications with a exible
way to assign application-specic semantics to time-series values. For instance, the
DNW application may use \car" as a tag for a given data record.
 The system should enable user-controlled sharing of data across VHome instances
because many applications need to access data from multiple homes. For instance,
an application that correlates energy data across homes to provide users with a com-
parison of their energy consumption with other similar homes in the neighbourhood.
 The system should support cloud storage providers and should allow applications to
freely specify storage providers. This is because applications are in the best position
to prioritize storage metrics such as cost, reliability, location, and latency.
 When using cloud storage, the system should protect data against eavesdroppers in
the cloud or in the network because of the privacy-sensitive nature of sensor data.
Unfortunately, existing systems (described in detail in Section 2.2) do not meet all of
these requirements.
Therefore, we design and implement Bolt, a data management system that meets these
requirements to provide storage, retrieval, and sharing of sensor data with low resource
overheads. Bolt abstracts data as a stream of (timestamp; tag; value) tuples, and builds
indices on these tuples to enable applications to issue data queries based on timestamp and
tag values. It uses cloud storage as a seamless extension of local VEE storage, presenting
applications with a uniform programming abstraction, and allows applications to prioritize
storage across providers. Cloud storage is also used to facilitate the sharing of data across
VHome instances. Bolt encrypts sensor data before uploading it to cloud storage services,
and maintains metadata on a trusted server (a native VHome application) to manage data
sharing and provide data integrity guarantees.
Our key contributions in this chapter are:
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 A formulation of data management requirements of in-home data-driven applications.
 The design and implementation of Bolt, a system for the storage, retrieval, and
sharing of in-home sensor data that meets the design requirements.
 A performance evaluation of Bolt using three sample applications showing that Bolt
has up to 40 times lower data retrieval time and incurs 3{5 times less storage space
than OpenTSDB [27].1
This work has been published in the proceedings of USENIX NSDI 2014 [95].
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. We survey existing applica-
tions and formulate the design requirements in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 describes the data
guarantees Bolt provides and gives an overview of the key elements of Bolt's design. We
describe the design in detail in Section 4.4 and our current Bolt implementation in Sec-
tion 4.5. We evaluate Bolt in Section 4.6 and present a discussion of potential extensions
of Bolt in Section 4.7. We conclude with a summary of the chapter in Section 4.8.
4.2 Design Requirements
To determine the design requirements for our storage system, we surveyed several ap-
plications that process in-home sensor data, including example applications described in
Chapter 3. We rst briey describe three such applications chosen because of their diver-
sity in the type of data they manipulate, their data access patterns, and their potential
implementations as native and cloud-based VHome applications. We then formulate the
design requirements in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Example Applications
PreHeat
PreHeat [163] correlates readings from motion sensors in a home to infer users' home
occupancy. It records the occupancy values, and uses past occupancy patterns to predict
future occupancy, which it uses to turn a home's heating system on or o to reduce the
amount of energy consumed for heating the home. PreHeat divides a day into 15-minute
1A popular time-series data management system, discussed in Section 2.2.3.
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time slots (i.e., 96 slots/day), and records the occupancy value at the end of a slot: 1 if the
home was occupied during the preceding slot, and 0 otherwise. At the start of each slot,
PreHeat predicts the slot's occupancy value, using the slot occupancy values for past slots
on the same day and corresponding slots on previous days. For instance, for predicting the
occupancy of the nth slot on the dth day, PreHeat rst retrieves occupancy values for slots
1    (n 1) on the dth day. This is called the partial occupancy vector (denoted as POV nd).
In addition, PreHeat also uses POV nd 1, POV
n
d 2, : : : , POV
n
1 . From this set of past POVs,
PreHeat selects K POVs which have the least Hamming distance to POV nd . An average of
these top K POVs is computed, then it is compared with a threshold value to obtain the
predicted occupancy value and the heating system is turned on or o accordingly. Since
PreHeat only requires sensor data from a single home, it can be implemented as a native
VHome application in our personal VEE architecture.
Energy Data Analytics (EDA)
Recall that the sample EDA application we considered in Chapter 3 processed energy
sensor data values to determine how much energy is consumed during dierent hours of a
day and the energy costs under a time-of-day based pricing scheme. However, recent work
has proposed improved data analysis techniques for energy data. For instance, techniques
that identify the energy consumption of dierent appliances, user activities, and energy
wastage [55,85,121,142].
A specic EDA application that we consider is a cloud-based application, for example,
hosted by an energy company, that presents an analysis of the monthly energy consumption
to users [55]. It disaggregates hourly home energy consumption values, such as smart meter
readings, into dierent categories which include: baseline consumption, user activity driven
consumption, consumption of heating or cooling systems, and others. For each home,
the variation in consumption level is analyzed as a function of ambient temperature by
computing the median, 10th, and 90th-percentile home energy consumption levels for each
temperature value. These values are then compared with other homes in a neighbourhood
or city, and are reported to the user with appropriate graphics.
Digital Neighbourhood Watch (DNW)
DNW helps neighbors jointly detect suspicious activities, for example, an unknown car
cruising the neighbourhood, by sharing security camera images [57, 69]. It can be im-
plemented as a combination of a native and cloud-based VHome applications. A DNW
instance in each VHome monitors the footage from security cameras in the home. When
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it detects a moving object, it stores the object's video clip and generates its summary
information, such as:





Feature Vector :{114, 117, ... , 22}.
This summary includes the inferred object type, its location, and its feature vector, which
is a compact representation of its visual information. The example above shows the feature
vector for a sample human subject.
When a user deems a current or past object suspicious, the DNW instance in her
VHome queries neighbouring homes' instances to query if they have also seen the object
around the same time. A DNW \coordinating endpoint", implemented as a cloud-based
application, could be used to perform such queries. In response to such a query, each
neighbour home instance extracts all objects that it saw in a time window (e.g., an hour)
around the time specied in the query. If the feature vector of an object is similar to the
one in the query, it responds positively and optionally shares the video clip of the matching
object. Responses from all the neighbours allow the original instance to determine how
the object moved around in the neighbourhood and if its activity is suspicious.
Other Applications
Other applications we surveyed include Digiswitch [60], which allows elders and their dis-
tant caregivers to share real time home activity information. We also surveyed commercial
systems such as Kevo (which interface with in-home connected door locks) and other home
energy applications that we implemented in Chapter 3 including: abnormal consumption
detection, interactive monitoring and control, and smart meter data scraper. The require-
ments, which we describe next, also cover those placed by these applications.
4.2.2 Data Management Requirements
We formulate the requirements of the applications (described above) into four categories.
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1. Support Time-series, Tagged Data
Most in-home sensor applications generate time-series data and retrieve it based on time
windows. For instance, as described above in Section 4.2.1, PreHeat stores continuous
home occupancy values, and retrieves them based on multiple time windows (called POVs).
Similarly, EDA accesses hourly energy consumption values, and object summaries in DNW
are also time-series data. Moreover, applications also sometimes tag the data, so that it
can be queried at a later time using application-specic tags. For instance, object type
\car" is a possible tag in DNW and \home heating consumption" is a possible tag in EDA.
Applications can specify such tags to retrieve the required values.
We also observe other commonalities in the data manipulation patterns of applica-
tions. First, time-series data in these scenarios has a single writer. Second, writers always
generate new data and do not perform random-access updates or random record dele-
tions. Third, readers typically fetch multiple proximate records by issuing temporal range
queries for sliding or growing time windows. Note, however, that traditional databases
incorporate transactions, concurrency control, and recovery protocols that incur unwanted
resource and latency overheads [164]. Unfortunately, lesystem storage oers inadequate
query interfaces for such applications.
2. Support Policy-Driven Storage
Dierent types of time-series data have dierent storage requirements for location, access
latency, cost, and reliability. A DNW application may record in-home images locally (e.g.,
on a personal VEE's local disk) and can delete them once it has extracted and stored
the summaries of objects in them. The application may want to store these on a remote
server to enable correlation with images captured by neighbouring homes, for example, to
detect a suspicious car moving in the neighbourhood. Alternatively, the raw images may
be stored on cheaper archival cloud storage. We believe that applications are in the best
position to prioritize storage metrics and should be able to specify the policies that govern
the storage of data (that they generate) across providers.
3. Ensure Data Condentiality and Integrity
Applications may also use remote storage infrastructure to simplify data management and
sharing, improve reliability or lower cost, but may not trust the storage services with main-
taining the condentiality or integrity of data. Data processed by applications may reveal
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immensely private information about the user: occupancy and energy data in PreHeat and
EDA respectively, can reveal when residents are away, which can be exploited by attackers.
Therefore, a data management system for in-home sensor data should guarantee the con-
dentiality and integrity of stored data. The system should also support ecient changes
in access policies, without requiring, for instance, re-encryption of large amounts of data.
4. Eciently Share Data Across Homes
Many applications require access to data from multiple homes. In our personal VEE
architecture, these are either VHome native applications that need to share data with
other VHome instances or are cloud-based applications which correlate data from multiple
VHome instances. Both DNW and EDA are examples of such applications, which share
object summaries and energy consumption values across homes respectively. Existing data
storage and sharing services, such as Dropbox or OneDrive, can simplify cross-home sharing
but they will unnecessarily synchronize large quantities of data. Applications may want
to access only part of the data produced by a sensor. For instance, in DNW, it would be
wasteful to access an entire day's video data if the search for suspicious objects needs to
be conducted only over a time window of few minutes.
Designing a storage system such that it meets all the requirements described above,
presents many design choices. For instance, storing all data locally facilitates condentiality
but inhibits ecient sharing and reliable storage in the cloud. Similarly, storing data in the
cloud provides reliable storage and sharing but untrusted storage servers can compromise
condentiality. Sharing data by synchronizing large amounts of data is inecient, whereas
navely storing encrypted data on untrusted cloud storage servers inhibits ecient sharing.
As described in detail in Section 2.2, existing systems either provide inecient shar-
ing and query abstractions for time-series data [82, 87, 128], assume partial or complete
trust on the storage servers [129], or store data locally while ignoring application storage
policies [89]. In the following sections we describe the design of Bolt, which meets the
requirements discussed above.
4.3 Design Overview
Bolt provides applications with a stream abstraction, where each stream is a collection
of records, and each record has a timestamp and one or more tag-value pairs, that is,
<timestamp, <tag1,value1>, [<tag2, value2>, ...]>. Streams are uniquely identied by the
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three-tuple: <VHomeID, AppID, StreamID>. Bolt allows retrieval and ltering of streams'
records using time ranges and tags. We rst explain our design assumptions and Bolt's data
guarantees followed by a description of key design elements in Section 4.3.2. Highlighting
the key design elements enables us to describe the design in detail in Section 4.4.
4.3.1 Security Assumptions and Guarantees
Bolt does not trust the cloud storage servers to maintain data condentiality or integrity.
It assumes that the storage infrastructure is capable of performing unauthorized reads or
modications to stream records and can return old data when queried. By building on
top of this untrusted storage infrastructure Bolt provides the following three data security
guarantees:
1. Condentiality: Data in a stream can be read only by an application to which the
owner, that is, the writer, grants access. Once the owner revokes access, the reader
cannot access data stored after revocation.
2. Tamper Evidence: Readers can detect if data has been tampered with by anyone
other than the owner. However, Bolt does not defend against denial-of-service at-
tacks, for example, where a storage server deletes all data or rejects all read requests.
3. Freshness: Readers can detect if the storage server returns stale data, that is, data
is older than a given owner-congurable time window.
4.3.2 Key Techniques
We describe the four main techniques that allow Bolt to meet these design requirements.
Chunking
Bolt stores data records in a log per stream called the DataLog, which enables low-latency
append-only writes. Streams have an index into the DataLog to support ecient lookups,
ltering on tags, and temporal range and sampling queries. A contiguous sequence of
records within a log constitutes a chunk. A chunk is the basic unit of transfer for storage
and retrieval. Data writers upload chunks instead of individual records. Bolt compresses
chunks before uploading them, which lowers transfer time and storage space required.
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Readers also fetch data at the granularity of chunks. Although, this may obtain more
records than are needed for answering a given query, the resulting ineciency is partially
mitigated by the fact that applications, such as the ones surveyed in Section 4.2.1, are
often interested in multiple successive queries rather than a single query. Delay incurred for
common queries with temporal locality is improved by fetching chunks instead of individual
records because it avoids additional round trip delays.
Note that typical sensor data, when packed into chunks, has high compression ratios
that lowers the fraction of bytes transferred when fetching chunks for serving data reads.
Chunks can be compressed using existing compression techniques such as GZip and delta
encoding of timestamps and values of records within a chunk, which will further improve
storage and transfer eciency. These techniques do not have a signicant impact on re-
trieval time because chunks can be uncompressed and decoded, in parallel, using a pipeline.
Separation of Index and Data
Bolt maintains an index for each stream. The index stores information about the location
of dierent records stored in the stream's log. When answering queries for data stored
remotely, Bolt rst fetches and stores the stream index on a local disk. This separation of
the index and DataLog, enables two key properties.
First, when answering read queries for data stored remotely, the index (fetched and
stored locally) can be used to determine the chunks that should be fetched from remote
servers. A dedicated computation endpoint, such as a query processing engine hosted in
the cloud, is therefore not required, thus reducing storage and retrieval costs. This allows
Bolt to use existing storage servers that only provide get and put APIs.
Second, this separation allows Bolt to relax its trust assumptions for storage servers,
supporting untrusted cloud providers without compromising data condentiality by en-
crypting data. The data can be encrypted before storing and decrypted after retrievals,
while the storage provider does not need to support any data semantics. Using untrusted
cloud providers is challenging if the provider is expected to perform index lookups on the
data.
Segmentation
Since applications only append new data and do not perform random writes, stream Dat-
aLogs can grow very large over time. Bolt allows archiving of contiguous portions of a
stream, that we call segments, while still allowing ecient querying. The storage location
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of each segment can be congured independently, enabling streams to be stored across mul-
tiple storage providers. Hence, streams may be stored either locally, remotely on untrusted
servers, replicated for reliability, or striped across multiple storage providers for cost eec-
tiveness. This congurability allows applications to prioritize their storage requirements
of space, latency, cost, and reliability. Bolt currently supports local disk, Windows Azure
storage, and Amazon S3 as storage providers.
Decentralized Access Control and Signed Hashes
To maintain condentiality when using untrusted storage servers, Bolt encrypts the stream
with a secret key generated by the owner, that is, the writer. Our design supports encryp-
tion of both the index and data, but by default we do not encrypt indices for eciency,2
though in this conguration some information may be leaked through data stored in indices.
We use lazy revocation [107] for reducing computation overhead of cryptographic op-
erations. Lazy revocation prevents evicted readers from accessing content stored after
revocation, because any content stored before revocation may have already been accessed
and cached by such readers. From the dierent well-known key management schemes that
support lazy revocation, we use hash-based key regression [86] for its simplicity and e-
ciency. It enables the owner to share only the most recent key with authorized readers,
based on which the readers can derive all previous keys to decrypt any content encrypted
using those keys.
We use a trusted metadata server to store and distribute keys. It runs on a user's
personal VEE. Once an application has opened a stream, all its subsequent reads and
writes occur directly between the storage server and the application. This prevents the
metadata server from bottlenecking read or write operations. In addition to keys for
encrypted data streams, the metadata server also stores additional per-stream metadata,
which we describe in detail in Section 4.4.4.
Encryption provides condentiality of data. However, a remote untrusted server storing
part of a stream may modify data records or could return old copies of the data. Therefore,
we incorporate data integrity and freshness checks into each stream. To facilitate integrity
checks on data, the writer generates a hash of stream contents, which is veried by the
readers. To enable freshness checks, similar to SFSRO [87] and SiRiUS [91], we include a
freshness time window as a part of a stream's integrity metadata (denoted MDint). This
time window denotes the time up to which a stream's data can be deemed fresh; it is
2Index decryption and encryption is a one time cost paid at the start and end of a session of queries
respectively (called stream open and close), and is proportional to the size of the index.
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based on the periodicity with which writers expect to generate new data, since typical
writers periodically append new values to streams. Writers update and sign this time
window periodically, which is used by readers to verify records when they open a stream
for reading.
4.4 Bolt Design
This section describes the design of Bolt in greater detail.
4.4.1 APIs
Table 4.1 shows the dierent stream APIs oered by Bolt. Applications, identied by the
tuple (VHomeID, AppID), are the principals that read and write data. Table 4.2 shows the
stream properties that applications specify when performing a stream create or a stream
open operation. These properties dene the stream's type, storage location, encryption,
and sharing requirements. The stream type can be a ValueStream, which can be used to
store relatively small data values such as temperature readings, or a FileStream, which is
used for relatively large data values such as images or videos. As we detail below, the two
types of streams organize data in dierent ways on disk.
Each stream has one writer (owner) and one or more readers. Writers add time-tag-
value records to the stream using the append operation. A single record in a stream can
have multiple tag-value pairs. Similarly, a record can also have multiple corresponding to a
single value. Tags and values are application-dened types that are required to implement
specic contracts, which allows Bolt to hash, compare, and serialize them. Lastly, writers
can grant and revoke the read access of other applications. Readers can lter and query
data using tags and time, using the dierent get operations. Our prototype implementation
supports querying for the latest record, the latest record for a tag, temporal range and
sampling queries, and range queries on tags. Range queries return an iterator, which
fetches data on demand.
4.4.2 Writing Stream Data
To write data to a stream, an owner rst creates a new Bolt stream and appends data
records to it. Figure 4.1 shows the data layout for a stream. A stream consists of two
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Function Description
createStream(name, R/W, policy) Create a data stream with specied policy properties (see Table 4.2)
openStream(name, R/W) Open an existing data stream
deleteStream(name) Delete an existing data stream
append( [tag, value] ) Append the list of values with corresponding tags. All values get the same timestamp
append( [tag], value ) Append data labelled with potentially multiple tags
getLatest() Retrieve latest tuple < time; tag; value > inserted across all tags
get(tag) Retrieve latest tuple < time; tag; value > for the specied tag
getAll(tag) Retrieve all time-sorted tuples < time; tag; value > for the specied tag
getAll(tag, tstart, tend) Range query: get all tuples for tag in the specied time range
getAll(tag, tstart, tend, tskip) Sampling range query
getKeys(tagstart, tagend) Retrieve all tags in the specied tag range
sealStream() Seal the current stream segment and create a new one for future appends
getAllSegmentIDs() Retrieve the list of all segments in the stream
deleteSegment(segmentID) Delete the specied segment in the current stream
grant(appId) Grant appId read access
revoke(appId) Revoke appId's read access
Table 4.1: Bolt stream APIs: Bolt oers two types of streams: (i) ValueStreams for small
data values (e.g., temperature readings) and (ii) FileStreams for large values (e.g., images
and videos).
Property Description
Type ValueStream or FileStream
Location Local, remote, or remote replicated
Protection Plain or encrypted
Sharing Unlisted (private) or listed (shared)
Table 4.2: Properties specied by applications when performing a stream create or open
operation.
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parts: a log of data records (called DataLog) and an index that maps a tag to a list of data
item identiers. Item identiers are xed-size entries and each list of item identiers in the
index is sorted by time, enabling ecient binary searches for range and sampling queries.
The index resides in memory and is backed by a le; records in the DataLog are on disk
and retrieved when referenced by the application. The DataLog is divided into xed-size






















































Figure 4.1: Data layout of a ValueStream. A FileStream's layout diers only in that the
values in the DataLog are pointers to les that contain the data records.
As large numbers of values are appended to a stream, the index can consume consid-
erable amounts of memory. To reduce the memory footprint of the index, streams in Bolt
can be archived. As described in Section 4.3, each stream is divided into segments, where
each segment has its own DataLog and corresponding index. Hence, each stream is a time
ordered list of segments. If the size of the stream's index in memory exceeds a congurable
threshold (indexthresh), the latest segment is sealed, its index is ushed to disk, and a new
segment with a memory resident index is created. Writes to the stream always go to the
latest segment and all other segments of the stream are read-only entities. The index for
the latest segment is memory-resident and is backed by a le (Figure 4.1). As shown in
Figure 4.2, all other segments are sealed and store their indices on disk with a compact
in-memory index header. The index header consists of the tags, the timestamp for the rst






























































Figure 4.2: Data layout of a sealed segment in Bolt.
4.4.3 Uploading Stream Data
In Bolt, each reader or writer (identied by the <VHomeID, AppID> pair) is associated
with a private-public key pair. Each stream in Bolt is encrypted with a secret key (denoted
Kcon) generated by the owner. When a stream is closed, Bolt ushes its index to disk,
partitions the segment DataLog into chunks, compresses and encrypts these chunks, and
generates the ChunkList (CL). The per-segment ChunkList is an ordered list of all chunks
in the segment's DataLog and their corresponding hashes. This operation is repeated for
all mutated segments, that is, new segments generated since the last close, and the latest
segment, since it may have been modied due to data appends. All other segments in a
stream are sealed and are immutable.
Bolt then generates the stream's integrity metadata (MDint). For a stream with n
segments, its MDint is computed as follows:
MDint =SigKownerpriv [H[TTLjjH[Ii]jj...jjH[In]jjH[CLi]jj...jjH[CLn]].
The TTL is a writer-specied consistency period which is used by readers to ensure that
any data fetched from a storage server is no older the specied period, thus guaranteeing
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freshness of the data. For instance, when closing a given stream at 2013-09-23 10:10:00,
a writer may specify TTL=(2013-09-23 10:10:00, 2013-09-23 10:20:00), implying that any
stream data retrieved from the storage server is considered fresh until 2013-09-23 10:20:00,
that is, the writer expects to write at least one value every 10 minutes. Other writers
may similarly choose suitable TTL values while incorporating their expected write rate
and maximum durations of any disconnections they expect.
As described in Table 4.3, MDint is a signed hash of the TTL and the per-segment
index and ChunkList hashes. For all mutated segments, Bolt uploads the chunks, the
updated ChunkList, and the modied index to the storage server. Chunks are uploaded
in parallel and applications can congure the maximum number of parallel uploads. The
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Bolt uploads the stream metadata (described in the next section) to the metadata
server. In our prototype implementation, the trusted metadata server (running on a per-
sonal VEE) stores the stream metadata so as to prevent unauthorized updates. We discuss
potential solutions to relax this assumption in Section 4.7 .
4.4.4 Granting and Revoking Read Access
In addition to maintaining the mapping of readers and writers to their public-keys, the
metadata server also maintains the following metadata for each stream: (i) a symmetric
content key to encrypt and decrypt data (Kcon), (ii) readers that have access to the data
(including the owner) represented using their public keys, (iii) the storage location of the
stream's integrity metadata MDint, for example, Windows Azure, and (iv) per-segment
location and key version. Kcon values are stored in an encrypted form, one entry for each
reader that has access to the stream, encrypted using the respective readers' public keys.
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To grant read access to applications, the owner updates stream metadata with Kcon
encrypted with the reader's public key. To revoke read access the owner removes the appro-
priate reader from the accessor list, removes the encrypted content keys, and rolls forward
the content key and key version for all valid principals by following the key regression pro-
tocol [86]. The key regression protocol allows readers with version V of the key to generate
keys for all older versions 0 to V {1. As described in detail by Fu et al. [86], the protocol
uses a chain of hash function computations to generate keys for older key versions from a
given key. Therefore, each additional version only incurs the latency penalty of performing
one xed-size hash computation on the readers.
Upon a read revocation, Bolt seals the current segment of the stream and creates a new
segment. All chunks in a segment are encrypted using the same version of the content key.
4.4.5 Reading Stream Data
Figure 4.3 illustrates the steps3 for reading a stream with StreamID S1, by an application
with AppID A1, running in VHome with VHomeID V 1. Each stream is identied by the
tuple <V1,A1,S1>. In step 1, Bolt opens a stream and fetches the stream metadata. It
then uses the MDint's location information in the stream metadata to fetch MDint from
the remote untrusted storage server. After verifying MDint's integrity using the owner's
public key, and data freshness using the TTL in MDint, the reader fetches the index and
ChunkList for every segment of the stream (step 2), and veries their integrity using the
respective hash values in MDint (step 3).
Owners can append data records to a stream after they have veried the integrity
of index data. In case of reads by non-owners, once the index and ChunkList integrity
verications for all segments are complete (step 3), Bolt uses the index to identify chunks
that need to be fetched from one or more remote storage locations to satisfy an application's
get requests.
Chunk level integrity is checked \lazily", that is, when the respective chunk gets down-
loaded for handling a query. Their integrity is veried by using the segment's ChunkList.
Bolt decrypts and decompresses the veried chunk and caches these chunks in a local
disk-based cache for subsequent reads.
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Figure 4.3: Steps followed during a read operation in Bolt.
4.5 Implementation
We have implemented Bolt using C# over the .NET Framework v4.5. Our implementation
is integrated into the HomeOS [76] platform and can also be used as an independent library.
In addition to the applications we evaluate in the next section, several other HomeOS
applications have been ported by others to use Bolt. The client-side code is 6077 lines
of code, and the metadata server is 473 lines. The current implementation is publicly
available at http://labofthings.codeplex.com.
Our client library uses Protocol Buers [12] for data serialization and can currently
use Windows Azure and Amazon S3 for remote storage. It uses their respective libraries
for reading and writing data remotely. On Windows Azure [37], each segment maps to
an Azure container, the index and DataLog each map to an Azure blob, and individual
chunks map to parts of the DataLog blob (called blocks). On Amazon S3 [4], each segment
maps to an S3 bucket, the index maps to an S3 object, and chunks of the DataLog map to
individual objects. The communication between the clients and the metadata server uses
the Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) framework.
4.6 Evaluation
We evaluate Bolt in two ways: (i) using microbenchmarks, which compare the performance
of dierent Bolt stream congurations to the underlying operating system's performance
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(Section 4.6.1), and (ii) using applications, which demonstrate the feasibility and perfor-
mance of Bolt in real-world use cases (Section 4.6.2). Table 4.4 summarizes the main
results of the evaluation.
All Bolt microbenchmark experiments (in Section 4.6.1) are conducted on a virtual
machine on Windows Azure, with a 4-core AMD Opteron Processor, 7 GB of RAM, one
SATA hard disk, and uses the NTFS lesystem. The system runs the Windows Server 2008
R2 operating system. Similarly, all application workload experiments (in Section 4.6.2) are
conducted on a physical machine with an AMD-FX-6100 6-core processor, 16 GB of RAM,
one SATA hard disk with the NTFS lesystem, which is running the Windows 7 operating
system. The metadata server also runs on the respective machines in the two cases.
Finding Section
Bolt's encryption overhead is negligible, making its secure streams
a viable default option.
Section 4.6.1
By using chunking, Bolt improves read throughput by up to 3 times
for temporal range queries.
Section 4.6.1
Bolt segments are scalable: querying across 16 segments incurs only
a 3.6% overhead over a single segment stream.
Section 4.6.1
Three applications (PreHeat, DNW, EDA) implemented using Bolt
abstractions.
Bolt performs 40 times faster than OpenTSDB for PreHeat while
analysing 100 days of data.
Section 4.6.2
Bolt is 3 times more space ecient than OpenTSDB in storing 1000
days of PreHeat data.
Table 4.4: Summary of Bolt's evaluation.
4.6.1 Microbenchmarks
Setup
In each microbenchmark experiment a dummy application issues 1,000 or 10,000 write
or read requests for each of the three Bolt stream congurations: (i) using local disk
as the storage location (denoted \Local"), (ii) using a remote storage provider (denoted
\Remote") but with no data encryption, and (iii) using a remote storage provider with
68
data encryption enabled (denoted \RemoteEnc"). We use Windows Azure as our example
remote storage provider for all experiments.
The dummy application writes or reads data values of size 10 B, 1 KB, 10 KB or 100
KB. The chunk size for these experiments is xed at 4 MB (unless otherwise specied).
We also study the impact of varying chunk size later in this section. We measure Bolt's
throughput in operations per second for dierent value sizes. For write operations, we also
measure Bolt's storage overhead for dierent value sizes.
As a point of comparison for Bolt's local write performance, we conduct a separate set
of experiments where data is written directly to the disk. We refer to this experiment as
DiskRaw. For comparisons with Bolt's ValueStream, the DiskRaw write operations are to a
single local le, and for comparisons with Bolt's FileStream, the DiskRaw write operations
are to multiple les, one for each data value.
For data read operations, that is, Get(tag) and GetAll(tag, timestart, timeend)
queries, we compare Bolt's read performance to data read directly from a single local le (in
the case of ValueStream), data-values read from separate les (in the case of FileStream),
and data read by downloading an Azure blob (in the case of remote ValueStream). All
throughput values are reported as the mean of 20 repetitions with 95% condence intervals.
Write Performance
We rst present the microbenchmark results for ValueStreams (local and remote) followed
by those for FileStreams (local and remote).
I. ValueStreams: Figure 4.4 compares the throughput of append operations (measured
by the dummy application) for three dierent data-value sizes: 10 B, 1 KB, and 10 KB.
We observe that the throughput of Bolt ValueStreams (marked Local, Remote, and Re-
moteEnc) is lower than that of DiskRaw because the overhead of additional sub-tasks that
Bolt has to perform: (i) index update/lookup, (ii) data serialization, (iii) writing index and
DataLog to disk, (iv) uploading chunks and index (in the case of Remote and RemoteEnc),
and (v) encrypting chunks (in the case of RemoteEnc).
Table 4.5 shows the percentage of time taken to perform these sub-tasks in a sample
experiment of 10,000 append operations of 10 byte values. We nd that the time taken to
perform the additional sub-tasks (i), (ii), and (iii) described above, in the case of Remote
and RemoteEnc is similar to that in case of local ValueStreams. However, in the case
of Remote and RemoteEnc, a high percentage of the total time is spent uploading the





















































Figure 4.4: Write throughput for ValueStreams shown using a linear scale in (a) and a
logarithmic scale in (b).
to perform uploading of the DataLog while uploading the index consumes approximately
3% of the total time. Uploading data chunks involves six main components: (i) reading
chunks from the DataLog and computing the hash of their contents, (ii) checking the
chunk's existence on the remote storage server (as an Azure Blob) and creating one if not
present, (iii) compressing and encrypting chunks (if enabled), (iv) uploading individual
chunks to blocks in an Azure Blob, (v) committing the new block list reecting the new
changes to Azure's storage servers, and (vi) uploading the new chunk list containing chunk
IDs and their hashes. Also note that, in the case of RemoteEnc, the time taken to encrypt
the data chunks is less than 1% of the total time.
Component Local Remote RemoteEnc
Lookup, update Index 6.8 % 2.7% 0.9%
Data serialization 15.2 % 2.6% 1.9%
Flush index 42.5 % 11.3% 11.5%
Flush DataLog 35.4 % 8.3% 11.8%
Uploading chunks - 72.0% 70.2%
Encrypting chunks - - 0.7%
Uploading index - 3.1% 3.0%
Table 4.5: Percentage of total experiment time spent in various tasks in a sample experi-
ment of 10,000 append operations (of 10 byte values) to a ValueStream.
In Figure 4.4, we also observe that the measured throughput for both Bolt and DiskRaw
decreases with increasing data value sizes. This is because the increasing data value size
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increases the amount of data written to the local disk per second which saturates the local
disk write throughput and decreases the throughput of append operations.
Table 4.6 shows the storage overhead of ValueStreams as compared to DiskRaw for
data value sizes of 10 B, 1 KB, and 10 KB. We dene storage overhead as the amount
of additional disk space used by a ValueStream as compared to DiskRaw, expressed as
a percentage. Note that, in the case of DiskRaw, tag-value pairs and timestamps are
appended to a le on local disk. Bolt incurs storage overhead due to its storage of osets
in the index, and additional data for serializing and de-serializing the index. As described in
Section 4.4.2 (Figure 4.1), Bolt stores each unique tag only once in the index, thus beneting
streams with relatively large tags. Bolt's storage overhead decreases with increasing value
sizes but remains constant with increasing number of data records for a given value size.
Value size Percentage overhead
10 B 30.6  0.0
1 KB 0.86  0.0
10 KB 0.09  0.0
Table 4.6: Storage overhead of local ValueStreams as compared to DiskRaw.
II. FileStreams: Figure 4.5 compares the write throughput for 1000 appends for three
dierent data-value sizes (1 KB, 10 KB, and 100 KB). The time taken for an append
operation in a FileStream is dominated by two main sub-tasks: (i) writing each data value
to a separate le on disk, and (ii) uploading each le to a separate Azure blob (in the case
of remote FileStreams).
We observe that in the case of a local FileStream the write throughput is comparable
to that of DiskRaw. In the case of remote streams, time taken to create a new Azure blob
for every data value dominates the time taken for a write operation and in our experiments
accounts for 80% of the total time for an append operation.
We also observe that, similar to ValueStreams, encryption overhead in the case of
remote-encrypted FileStreams is approximately 1% of total time. Lastly, the storage over-
head in the case of FileStreams is approximately the same as that of ValueStreams with
a value size of 10 bytes. This is because FileStreams store pointers (each 8 bytes) to data
















































Figure 4.5: Write throughput for FileStreams shown using a linear scale in (a) and a
logarithmic scale in (b).
Read Performance
We rst present the microbenchmark results for ValueStreams (local and remote) followed
by those for FileStreams (local and remote).
I. ValueStream: Figure 4.6 compares the read throughput for three dierent data-value
sizes (10 B, 1 KB, and 10 KB) for the dierent ValueStream congurations. The dummy
application issues 10; 000 Get(tag) requests with a uniform randomly selected tag for each
request. In the case of DiskRaw, the values are read from random parts of the DataLog.
Despite random disk read operations issued both in DiskRaw and ValueStreams, we believe
that the le system cache aects throughput measurements in both cases.
We observe that local ValueStreams have a lower read throughput than DiskRaw. This
is because each read operation in a ValueStream incurs a latency overhead due to index
lookup and data deserialization. For instance, for 1 KB sized data values, we nd that
local ValueStreams use 5% of the total time for index lookup, 60% of the total time
for reading records from the DataLog (which matches DiskRaw), and 30% of the total
time for deserializing data. In case of remote ValueStreams, remote reads' latency (and
hence throughput) are dominated by the time taken for downloading DataLog chunks from
Azure and storing them in the local chunk cache (approximately 90% of the total time for
Get(tag)).
Eect of Chunk Size on Temporal Range Queries: To demonstrate the eect of
chunking on query latency and throughput of remote ValueStreams we present two example
range queries. The rst query retrieves a window of 10 records whereas the second query















































Figure 4.6: Read throughput with randomly selected tags for ValueStreams shown using
a linear scale in (a) and a logarithmic scale in (b).
from the time range of data stored. We choose an example stream with 10,000 data values
of 10 KB each.
Figure 4.7 shows the read throughput with increasing chunk size. We observe that
chunking reduces latency of reads and hence improves read throughput because it batches
transfers and prefetches data for range queries with locality of reference. We observe higher
read throughput at relatively large chunk sizes because of the reduction in the number of
chunk downloads because chunks are cached locally. For a given chunk size the 100-record
query has slightly higher throughput than the 10-record query. This is because the queries'
start times are uniform randomly selected and hence wider queries benet more from the
local chunk cache when answering queries, thus causing relatively few chunk downloads.
On the other hand, narrow queries are comparatively dispersed across the DataLog, hence
causing relatively more chunk downloads, which increases query latency and decreases
throughput.
Eect of increasing number of ValueStream Segments: Figure 4.8 shows the eect
of increasing the number of segments for a local ValueStream on the time taken to open
the stream (one time cost), index lookup, and reading data records. Each segment has
10; 000 keys, and 10; 000 Get(tag) requests are issued for uniform randomly selected keys.
The time taken for opening a stream is dominated by the time to build the segment index
in memory and it increases signicantly with the increasing number of segments. The
time taken for index lookup and reading the data records also increases with the number
of segments because all segments except the last have a compact memory-resident index
header, and as explained in Section 4.4.2, require additional disk reads for index lookups.



















Figure 4.7: Read throughput for remote ValueStreams with varying chunk size for two
















Read records from disk
Figure 4.8: Open, index look-up, and DataLog record retrieval latencies (on the logarithmic
scale) with increasing number of segments of a local ValueStream, measured by issuing
10; 000 Get(tag) requests for randomly selected keys.
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sizes (10 B, 1 KB, and 10 KB) for the dierent FileStream congurations. Recall that, in
the case of FileStreams, individual data values are stored in separate les on disk and are













































Figure 4.9: Read throughput with randomly selected tags for FileStreams shown using a
linear scale in (a) and a logarithmic scale in (b).
As compared to DiskRaw, FileStreams incur the additional latency overhead of index
lookup, downloading individual blobs from remote storage, and reading each data record
from its individual blob. These additional operations signicantly impact the read through-
put of FileStreams. In the case of remote FileStreams, a large fraction of the read time
(approximately 99%), is spent downloading the individual blobs from remote storage. It
may be possible to improve the read throughput of FileStreams by storing multiple data
values (which are stored in separate les on local disk) using a single blob on the remote
storage server (as in the case of ValueStreams). Lastly, we also nd that, similar to Val-
ueStreams, in the case of remote-encrypted FileStreams, the time taken to decrypt data is
less than 1% of the total get-operation time.
4.6.2 Applications
We instrument the three real-world applications described in Section 4.2.1 using Bolt,
and measure their query latencies. For comparison we also evaluate the query latencies
of these applications using OpenTSDB [27], which is a popular time-series data storage
and analytics system. It is written in Java and uses HBase to store data. Unlike Bolt's
library that is loaded into the client application program, OpenTSDB only allows querying
only over HTTP endpoints. Moreover, unlike Bolt, OpenTSDB provides neither the data
security guarantees nor the exibility of policy-driven storage across providers.
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We now present detailed results for each application. All latency values are reported
as the mean of 20 repetitions with 95% condence intervals, using Windows Azure as the
remote storage provider.
PreHeat
Recall that PreHeat [163] is a system that enables ecient home heating by recording
and predicting occupancy information. We describe PreHeat's algorithm in Section 4.2.1.
To implement PreHeat's data storage and retrieval using Bolt we identify each slot by its
starting timestamp. A single local unencrypted ValueStream thus stores the (timestamp,
tag, value) tuples where the tag is a string (e.g., \occupancy"). We built two dierent
PreHeat implementations that either seek to minimize the amount of data stored on disk
or data-retrieval time and hence store dierent data values:
Nave + ValueStream: In this implementation, the value stored for each 15-minute
slot is simply the slot's measured occupancy (0 or 1). Therefore, for computing predicted
occupancy for the nth slot on day d, POVs are obtained by issuing d temporal range queries
(using getAll(k, ts, te)).
Smart + ValueStream: In this implementation, the value stored for each 15-minute
slot is its POV concatenated with the measured occupancy value in that slot. As described
in Section 4.2.1, computing the predicted occupancy for the nth slot on day d requires
obtaining POV nd , POV
n
d 1, : : : , POV
n
1 . Thus, under this scheme, these required POVs can
be obtained by issuing: (i) one get(tag) query for the (n   1)th slot on day d to obtain
POV nd , and (ii) (d   1) temporal range queries that obtain the values stored for the nth
slot on days (d   1), (d   2), : : : , 1, thus obtaining the values of POV nd 1, POV nd 2, : : : ,
POV n1 respectively. Therefore, in this implementation, the range queries present in the
nave implementation are replaced with simple get queries that obtain values stored for
particular slots. However, the storage overhead incurred with this approach is larger than
the nave approach but the retrieval latency is reduced due to the reduced number of disk
reads.
Nave + OpenTSDB: We implement the nave PreHeat approach to store and re-
trieve data locally from OpenTSDB. It groups occupancy values spanning an hour into
one row of HBase (OpenTSDB's underlying datastore). That is, four PreHeat slots are
grouped into a single HBase row. OpenTSDB's usability is limited by values being re-
stricted to real numbers. Bolt allows byte arrays of arbitrary length to be stored as values.
Consequently, an analogous implementation of the smart PreHeat approach is not feasible
using OpenTSDB.
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Of all the 96 slots in a day, the 96th (last slot) has the maximum retrieval, compu-
tation, and append time since POV d96 is longest POV
d
i ;8i 2 [1; 96]. Therefore, to com-
pare the Nave+ValueStream, Smart+ValueStream, and Nave+OpenTSDB approaches,
we use the retrieval times for the 96th slot of each day. Figure 4.10 shows the time
taken to retrieve data for the 96th slot for Nave+ValueStream, Smart+ValueStream, and
Nave+OpenTSDB.
We observe that as the number of days increases the retrieval latency for both the
nave and smart approaches grows due to the increasing number of range and get queries.
However, the smart implementation incurs lower latency than the nave implementation
because it issues fewer random disk reads.
When comparing the Nave+ValueStream and Nave+OpenTSDB implementations for
retrieving 100 days of data, we observe that Bolt performs approximately 40 times faster.
As expected, the time taken to perform the occupancy prediction computation after re-

























Figure 4.10: Time to retrieve past occupancy data with increasing duration of a PreHeat
deployment.
the storage space required by the dierent implementations for 1000 days of operation. We
observe that the smart approach uses approximately 8 times the space compared to nave
because it also stores the slots' POVs in addition to their occupancy values. Using Bolt's
compressed streams, we observe that the nave scheme reduces the storage overhead by a
factor of 1.6 and the smart scheme reduces the storage overhead by a factor of 8, when
compared to their uncompressed stream counterparts. OpenTSDB requires a 3 times larger
disk footprint than its corresponding implementation using Bolt with compression turned
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o. We believe that row key duplication in HBase is the potential source of this storage
ineciency.
Conguration Naive Smart
ValueStream 2.38 MB 19.10 MB
ValueStream using GZip 1.51 MB 3.72 MB
ValueStream using BZip2 1.48 MB 2.37 MB
OpenTSDB 8.22 MB Not feasible
Table 4.7: Storage space required for a 1000-day deployment of PreHeat.
Digital Neighbourhood Watch (DNW)
As described in Section 4.2.1, DNW helps neighbours detect suspicious activities (e.g.,
an unknown car cruising the neighbourhood) by sharing security camera images [57].
We implement DNW's data storage, retrieval and sharing mechanisms using Bolt and
OpenTSDB. Due to Bolt's (timestamp, tag, value) abstraction, objects can be stored
(and retrieved) in a single remote ValueStream (per home), with each object attribute
in a separate tag, such as, type, ID, and feature-vector, all bearing the same timestamp.
Queries proceed by rst performing a getAll(feature-vector, ts, te) where the time
window (w)=[ts,te], and then nding a match among the retrieved objects. In contrast,
with OpenTSDB, each home's objects need to be recorded using specialized OpenTSDB
tags (called \OpenTSDB metrics"), which also store the object attributes. As described
in Section 4.2.1, we simulate DNW as a cloud-based VHome application. Therefore, in our
DNW experiments, we run OpenTSDB remotely on a virtual machine on Windows Azure
and the DNW client applications run on a physical machine (described above). Similarly,
in the case of Bolt, the DNW client applications run on the physical machine and use
remote ValueStreams (with Windows Azure as the storage provider).
To evaluate DNW, we instrument a scenario where each home (i.e., a client applica-
tion) records an object every minute. After 1000 minutes, one randomly selected client
application queries all other homes for a matching object within a recent time window w.
We measure the total time for retrieving all object summaries from ten homes for window
sizes of 1 hour and 10 hours.
Figure 4.11(left) shows the retrieval time for DNW with increasing chunk sizes (for
Bolt) for time windows of 1 hour and 10 hours. We observe that, in the case of Bolt,
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larger chunk sizes reduce retrieval time by batching transfers for the windows size of 10
hours. For queries that span multiple chunks, Bolt downloads data chunks on demand
since range queries return an iterator to the application (Section 4.4.1). When applications
use this iterator to access a data record, Bolt checks if the corresponding chunk for the
data record is present in the cache and if not it is downloaded. Hence, queries that span
multiple chunks require multiple round trips as chunks are downloaded on-demand, thus
increasing the overall retrieval time. Example queries include one where DNW runs for
10 hours with a 100 KB chunk size. This can be improved by pre-fetching chunks in
parallel, in the background, without blocking the application's range query. In the case
of large chunk sizes, fewer chunks need to be downloaded (shown in Figure 4.11(center))
resulting in fewer round trips which reduces the overall retrieval time for the 10-hour query.
Note that OpenTSDB does not implement chunking. Hence OpenTSDB retrieval times in













































































Figure 4.11: Retrieving object summaries in DNW from 10 homes for time windows of 1
hour and 10 hours using Bolt and OpenTSDB. Retrieval times for OpenTSDB are inde-
pendent of chunk size.
In the case of Bolt, we also observe that when chunk size becomes large enough, a large
amount of additional data fetched in the chunk does not match the query. Consequently,
the decrease in retrieval time that is obtained by batched transfers becomes relatively low
at large chunk sizes. Moreover, since chunk boundaries do not necessarily line up with
the time window specied in queries, data records that do not match the query may be
fetched even for small chunk sizes. Figure 4.11(right) shows that as chunk size increases,
the percentage of data records in chunks downloaded that do not match the query's time
window w also increases. Bolt allows applications to choose chunk sizes to match their
workloads by trading this overhead for retrieval time. Lastly, Table 4.8 compares the
storage footprint of DNW using Bolt with OpenTSDB. As is the case with PreHeat, we
observe that Bolt incurs a 3 times smaller disk footprint than OpenTSDB.
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Storage system DNW EDA
Bolt 4.64 MB 37.89 MB
OpenTSDB 14.42 MB 212.41 MB
Table 4.8: Storage space used for 10 homes in DNW for 1000 minutes, and 100 homes in
EDA for 545 days.
Energy Data Analytics (EDA)
As explained in Section 4.2.1, we study a scenario where a cloud-based application presents
consumers with an analysis of their energy consumption by comparing their consumption
with other homes in the neighbourhood, or city, within a given time window such as one
month.
In the implementation using Bolt, we use a single remote ValueStream per home which
stores the smart meter data. For each hour, the energy consumption value is appended
to the ValueStream with the mean ambient temperature value of the hour (rounded to
the nearest whole number) as the tag. This allows us to easily retrieve all energy con-
sumption values for a given temperature using a single get(tag,tstart,tend) query. In the
OpenTSDB-based implementation, we need to create one tag (called \OpenTSDB met-
ric") for each temperature value, for each home; that is, a record home-n-T stores values
recorded at temperature T for home n. For each home we retrieve data in the time interval
[ts; te] for each temperature T between -30
 C and 40 C (the range of observed ambient
temperatures in the dataset). The retrieved data is used by the application to compute
the median, 10th, and 90th percentile energy consumption values for a home which is then
compared with all the other homes being considered. Data for multiple homes is retrieved
sequentially.
Figure 4.12 shows the time taken to retrieve data as we increase the number of homes,
for two time windows of 1 month, and 1 year. We use an actual home energy consumption
dataset from a utility company in Ontario, Canada. Retrieval time for Bolt and OpenTSDB
increases proportionally at approximately 1.4 seconds per home and 11.4 seconds per home
respectively, for a one month window. In the case of a one year window the retrieval time
for Bolt and OpenTSDB increases at approximately 2.5 seconds per home and 12 seconds
per home respectively. This is because of more data being fetched in case of a 1 year
window query than that in a 1 month window query. Bolt's retrieval time outperforms
OpenTSDB by an order of magnitude, primarily due to prefetching data in chunks, which






























Figure 4.12: Time taken to retrieve smart meter data for multiple homes for time windows
of 1 month and 1 year.
As described in Section 4.4, Bolt stores data records in a time-sorted DataLog and the
index maps each tag (in this case, each temperature value) to osets into the DataLog.
The DataLog is then partitioned into chunks and all data transfers to and from remote
storage servers happen on a chunk basis. Therefore, the set of data chunks downloaded
for answering a range query for a given tag such as 10C in the case of EDA, will often
overlap with that required for handling a range query for an adjacent temperature value
tag such as 11C. This is because hourly ambient temperature values typically do not vary
signicantly over time, for example, never more than 2C in our dataset. Therefore, Bolt
is able to eectively leverage its local chunk cache when answering successive range queries
for a set of tags such as f-30C, -31C, . . . , 40Cg, and thus incurs a lower retrieval time
than OpenTSDB. However, it may be possible to improve the retrieval time for OpenTSDB
by extending it with a caching mechanism on the client-side.
Finally, as shown in Table 4.8, we observe that OpenTSDB incurs a 5 times larger disk
footprint than its corresponding implementation using Bolt.
4.7 Discussion
We discuss two ways to extend Bolt to reduce its reliance on the trusted metadata server
assumptions and improving Bolt's sharing exibility, and discuss our deployment experi-
ence.
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Relaxing the Assumption of the Trusted Key Server
Bolt's current design includes a trusted metadata server to: (i) prevent unauthorized
changes to the mapping of readers and writers to their public-keys, and (ii) prevent unau-
thorized updates (rollback) of the key version for each segment of a stream. Unauthorized
changes to the public-key mappings may trick the owner of a stream to grant access to a
malicious reader. Similarly, unauthorized updates of the key versions may cause the owner
to use an invalid content key to encrypt data, potentially exposing the newly written
content to readers whose access has been already revoked.
Bolt also relies on the metadata server to distribute the keys and the stream metadata.
However, a few extensions can be built to minimize this trust dependency. One approach
is to replicate the information stored at the metadata server at 2f + 1 servers and use a
majority to tolerate up to f malicious servers. An alternate solution would be to employ
a Byzantine quorum system, to tolerate up to a third of the servers being compromised at
any given time.
Supporting Fine-Grained Sharing
In our current prototype, readers are granted access to the entire stream. Once their
read access has been revoked they cannot access any new segments of the stream created
since the revocation, although they could still access all the previous segments. Bolt can
potentially support ner-grained read access by creating a dierent key for each segment.
This approach trades o metadata storage space for segment-level sharing.
Deployment Experience
As a part of the HomeOS platform [76], Bolt is used by researchers for data collection and
management in various eld trials. These include a testbed of networked furniture [75] and
an Electric Vehicle testbed [48]. The feedback we received from the researchers helped us
in extending Bolt's APIs (e.g., the sampling range query shown in Table 4.1) and xing
software bugs in our implementation.
4.8 Chapter Summary
Our prototype storage system in Chapter 3 suers from two main shortcomings. First,
many applications require richer data manipulation capabilities than those supported by
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our prototype data storage system. Second, our prototype storage system only uses local
VEE storage, while users and applications may also want to use commodity cloud storage
services, for example, to lower storage costs or obtain better reliability. Therefore, our
goal is to simplify the management of data from in-home sensors and build a suitable
data management system that replaces our prototype storage system. To do so, we survey
a range of home applications and formulate the requirements they place on the storage
system. We nd that existing systems (such as OpenTSDB [27]) do not meet all of these
requirements. Therefore, we design Bolt, a data management system for such applications.
It provides applications with a timestamp-tag-value stream abstraction for storing and
retrieving data, allows application instances to easily share data, allows applications to
control storage of data across commodity storage providers such as Windows Azure and
Amazon S3. At the same time, Bolt provides data condentiality guarantees and data
integrity by providing evidence of data tampering and freshness guarantees. We evaluate
our current Bolt implementation using microbenchmarks and three example applications.
We observe that in our sample applications Bolt has up to 40 times lower data retrieval
latency and incurs up to 3-5 times lower storage space when compared to OpenTSDB [27].
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Chapter 5
Provisioning Large Numbers of
Personal VEEs
5.1 Introduction
Our personal VEE architecture (introduced in Chapter 1) requires provisioning one VEE
for each user, thus requiring large numbers of VEEs to be provisioned. For instance, if every
home with a smart meter was to be provided with an instantiation of this architecture,
36 million VEEs in the US [42] (4 million in Ontario, Canada [41]) would have to be
provisioned. Similarly, providing every active Facebook user with data-driven applications
using this architecture will require 1.4 billion [11] VEEs.
In our prototype instantiations in Chapters 3 and 4, we used virtual machines (VMs)
from cloud providers, such as Windows Azure to realize personal VEEs. Most cloud
providers use commodity virtualization solutions (described in Section 2.3.1; Table 2.2) to
provision such VMs. Moreover, they employ VM consolidation methods [72, 105, 125, 192]
that allow them to pack multiple VM instances running on underutilized physical machines
into fewer machines, enabling some machines to be turned o to obtain energy savings.
Typical VM consolidation methods use VM migration and simply re-pack VMs into
fewer physical machines based on the pre-congured resource capacities of the VMs. There-
fore, the VM density (average number of VMs/machine) such methods yield is bounded
by the maximum number of VMs that can be co-hosted on a single machine. For instance,
Citrix XenServer claims to provision 100-200 VMs/machine.1 Provisioning large numbers
1 Using a particular hardware conguration, and subject to VM sizes and workloads.
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of VMs (e.g., 1 billion) using this approach will require un-aordably large amounts of
hardware resources (e.g., 5 million machines for 1 billion VMs).
However, many VM workloads exhibit frequent, often long, and uncorrelated idle pe-
riods. Personal VEE workloads are an example of this type of workload. This is because
applications hosted on personal VEEs typically cater to a small set of users, VEE-hosted
jobs are either user-initiated, such as data analytics and sharing applications [79, 139], or
are periodic with relatively large idle periods (on the order of seconds), such as periodic
data batch uploads and data pre-processing. Other such example workloads include some
web-hosting [120] and cyber-foraging workloads [160].
When multiple VMs with such workloads are co-hosted on a machine, decreasing the
resource footprint of idle VMs allows for a much denser VM packing, thus reducing the
required hardware resources and hosting costs for both users and cloud-providers. For
such workloads, it is possible to reclaim resources from idle VMs by transitioning them
to inactive state(s) and activating them on the arrival of client requests. This leads to
increased VM density at the cost of an increase in client request latency (which we dene
as the miss penalty). Such a consolidation eort is compatible with existing migration-
based consolidation methods since it incurs little network overhead. Moreover, this type
of consolidation is able to leverage transient idle periods to reclaim resources (to increase
VM density) whereas conventional VM migration-based consolidation methods rely solely
on long idle periods.
As described in Section 2.3.3, many inactive states have been proposed or are supported
in existing virtualization solutions (shown in Table 2.3). Recent work [96,120] has explored
the use of one inactive state for managing idle VMs. In doing so, VM density is limited
by the maximum number of VMs (per machine) that can be simultaneously hosted in
that inactive state (e.g., substrate [181], fast-resume [189, 190]) on a machine. If more
than one such inactive state, which are heterogenous in their resource requirements, were
used to host the idle VMs, VM density can be further increased. Unfortunately, due to
dierences in their design and resource requirements, dierent inactive states have varying
VM activation and deactivation times and vary in the number of VMs that can be placed
in each state (we refer to these as VM capacities). Consequently, miss penalties for idle
VMs in dierent inactive states vary signicantly. This leads to the following questions.
1. Given a single physical machine, how should idle VMs be transitioned across dierent
inactive states? In other words, when a VM becomes idle which inactive state should
it be transitioned to?
2. Subsequently, when should an idle VM be transitioned to other state(s) in anticipa-
tion of client requests?
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It is clear that a policy that governs the transitions of idle VMs across inactive states
is needed. Ideally, such a policy should minimize the miss penalties and maximize VM
density. We refer to these policies as idle VM management policies. Existing mechanisms
(such as those discussed in Section 2.3.3) can then be used to implement such policies, by
determining VM idleness and activeness and dynamically transitioning VMs between the
active and various inactive states.
In this chapter we study the eect of dierent idle VM management policies on VM
density and miss penalties. To do so, we formally model the problem of multiplexing idle
VMs across multiple heterogenous inactive states. We divide the policy space into two
parts, (i) demand-based (or reactive) policies, and (ii) proactive policies. Using our model
formulation, we provide a lower-bound on the miss penalty incurred by demand-based
policies. Then, by nding similarities between this problem and the problems of page
replacement and multi-level cache management, we propose SlidingWindow, a proactive
policy which leverages inter-arrival time prediction to reduce miss penalties. We measure
the model parameters for Linux Containers (LXC) [22], a widely used OS-level virtualiza-
tion solution. We then use the measured parameters for LXC to evaluate dierent reactive
and proactive policies using some example personal VEE workloads.
Our key contributions in this chapter are:
 A formal model for analyzing idle VM management policies and a lower bound on
the miss penalty of reactive policies.
 A measurement of model parameters using microbenchmarks with LXC [22] as our
example virtualization solution.
 A study of a few representative VM management policies quantifying their miss
penalties using a simulation-based evaluation and providing insight into their be-
haviour.
This work has been published in the proceedings of ACM VEE 2015 [170].
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. We formally model the problem
in Section 5.2 and derive a lower bound on miss penalties of reactive policies. We present
the measurement of model parameters for LXC [22] using microbenchmarks in Section 5.3.
We describe our setup for comparing dierent policies and our example workloads in Sec-
tion 5.4. We evaluate dierent policies using simulations in Section 5.5 and present a
discussion of our work in Section 5.7. We conclude with a summary of the chapter in
Section 5.7.
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5.2 Problem and Model Formulation
Typical cloud environments today exhibit a great deal of VM heterogeneity. That is,
VMs have varying resource requirements, serve disparate workloads, and have varying
service level agreements (SLAs) with their cloud providers. As a starting point in this
work, we study scenarios where VMs have relatively homogeneous resource requirements
and workloads, such as VMs used as personal VEEs. Moreover, we focus on providing a
\best eort" allocation of a machine's computational resources (e.g., CPU and memory)
to VMs instead of a pre-dened per-VM SLA. We defer the study of scenarios in which
VMs have heterogeneous resource requirements and pre-dened SLAs (potentially varying
across applications hosted on a given VM) to future work.
Consider a VM that is provisioned on a given physical machine and is initially in the
booted state. Once such a VM becomes idle it can either be left in the booted state, or it
can be transitioned (either immediately or at a suitable later time) to one of the inactive
states, depending on the VM management policy in place. Since dierent inactive states,
due to dierences in their design and resource intensity, have dierent transition-to-booted
times, the policy's actions can signicantly aect miss penalties for subsequent requests
for this VM. Similarly, because the maximum number of VMs possible in each state is
limited (typically by a specic system resource), the policy's actions may also aect miss
penalties for other VMs depending on which state it chooses to place them in. Due to such
implications on miss penalties, it is important to choose a VM management policy that
minimizes miss penalties across all VMs while maximizing VM density.
To better understand and reason about dierent possible policies, we formulate a simple
mathematical model of the problem. Such a formulation provides a sound theoretical
foundation for the problem, and as we show, can be used to provide a lower bound on the
miss penalty incurred by any demand-based policy. In Section 5.4, we study the behaviour
of dierent demand-based policies which have been used for other applications such as page
replacement, and therefore we adopt the notation for page-replacement models, proposed
by Aho et al. [47].
Let S1; S2 : : : Sn (as shown in Figure 5.1) be the n inactive states. In addition let S0
be the booted state, and Sn+1 be the shutdown state. Similarly, let V1; V2 : : : Vv be v VMs
provisioned on a machine. Let the maximum number of VMs feasible in state Si be Bi.
Let matrix T(n+2)(n+2) be the time to transition VMs between two states, that is, ti;j is
the time to transition from state Si to state Sj where i; j 2 f0; 1; : : : n; n+ 1g. We realize
that in practice, the transition times may be stochastic variables (associated with some
distribution), for example, depending on the number of VMs in dierent states at any
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point. Our model can be viewed as a mean value analysis and can be extended to conduct
a stochastic value analysis. We view Bi as a soft bound, that is, if the number of VMs in
Si exceeds Bi, transition times (8j, ti;j and tj;i) may degrade. To simplify the notation in
a later proof, let t0i be the time to transition from Si to S0 (booted), that is, t
0
i = ti;0 for
i 2 f0; 1; : : : n; n+ 1g.
Let VM requests received over any xed period of time T be denoted as a string !
comprised of tuples:
! = r1; r2 : : : rj!j
where ri = (Vj; ti; di), ti denotes the time at which the request ri arrives for the target
VM Vj, and di denotes the duration for which VM Vj remains active to service ri. We
refer to ! as the request string. For a given !, let P(!) denote the total miss penalty
incurred by VM management policy . Thus for an optimal VM management policy ,
8!8; P(!)  P(!).
Policies can be divided into two classes: (i) reactive (or demand-based) policies,
and (ii) proactive policies. We now address each class separately and describe how VM
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Figure 5.1: Hierarchy of booted, shutdown, and n inactive states.
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5.2.1 Reactive Policies
Reactive policies congure, transition, or provision a system resource, such as a memory
page, only when a demand for that resource is received, and are also referred to as demand-
based policies. Examples include the widely used demand-based page replacement policies
such as LRU, FIFO, Clock, and others [71]. Another prominent example is multi-level
cache management policies such as DEMOTE [185]. Belady's OPT algorithm [53], which
simply evicts the page referenced furthest in the future, is provably the optimal demand-
based policy for single-level caches [47, 90] (e.g., page replacement). However the optimal
demand-based policy for multi-level caches remains unknown [90]. We believe that nding
the optimal demand-based policy for exclusive multi-level caches [90] can help uncover the
optimal demand-based policy for idle VM management.2
Note however that idle VM management diers from page replacement and cache man-
agement in a few ways. For example, page replacement policies are able to leverage locality-
of-reference; in contrast, each VM has a separate tenant with little locality-of-reference
across VMs. Each VM request must guarantee that the target VM remains in the booted
state at least for the duration of the request; page references require no such guarantees.
Nevertheless, we build upon existing results from page replacement and caching policies
and formulate a lower bound on the miss penalty P(!) incurred by any demand-based
VM management policy . Policies can be either online, which only use information about
the past, or oine, which also use information about the future. Our lower bound assumes
knowledge of future arrivals and cannot be implemented in an online fashion. It serves as a
theoretical lower bound to benchmark the miss penalties of other demand-based policies. In
the same way that Belady's OPT algorithm [53] is of interest for studying page replacement
policies.
For any given !, a VM management policy  is a demand-based policy if  transitions
a VM Vk to the booted state at time t (if not already booted) only when
9rj 2 !;
where rj = (Vk; tj; dj), for a given VM Vj, some time instant tj, and some duration dj.
For any given ! and , we dene hi; i 2 f0; 1; : : : n; n + 1g, to be the number of requests
rj 2 !, such that the target VM (i.e., Vk) was in state Si on arrival of the requests. Note
that,
Pn+1
i=0 hi = j!j.
2Section 5.6 presents an alternate mathematical formulation of the problem, and quanties the space
of possible idle VM management policies.
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As an example, consider a scenario where three VMs { V1, V2, and V3 { are provisioned
on a machine with three VM states S0, S1, and S2. Let all three VMs be initially in state
S2 (shutdown), and let ! = r1; r2; r3, where r1 = (V1; 0; 100), r2 = (V2; 100; 100), and
r3 = (V3; 200; 100). In this case, h2 = 3 and h0 = h1 = 0, since the target VMs for requests
r1, r2, and r3 are in the state S2 upon arrival of the requests, and
Pi=2
i=0 hi = j!j = 3.
Upon the arrival of the request rj = (Vk; tj; dj), its target VM Vk is transitioned to the
booted state from its current state. Since the maximum number of VMs in each state is
limited (by Bi), this step may require additional transitions for: (a) transitioning other
VMs that are currently idle and are in the booted state to inactive states, and (b) for
transitioning other idle VMs from one inactive state to another. Even if all transitions are
conducted in parallel, these additional transitions, depending upon their duration, may
contribute towards increasing the miss penalty. For instance, an additional transition may
take more time than the time to transition the target VM to the booted state. Thus, for







Lower bound on demand-based policies
Gill et al. [90] propose a demand-based multi-level cache management policy which provides
the lowest average response time and lowest inter-cache bandwidth. Along the same lines,
we dene a VM management policy  such that
8; 8!;Min(!) Min(!);
and hence, 8;Min(!)  P(!). That is Min(!) forms a lower bound on the total
miss penalty for any demand-based VM management policy , for any request string ! of
length j!j.
We now compute the lower bound Min(!). First, consider a state hierarchy which
consists only of the booted and shutdown states (S0 and S1 with n = 0). Consider the
application of Belady's OPT algorithm on this hierarchy for managing VMs, that is, when
a VM needs to be transitioned to the booted state and the number of booted VMs equals
B0, the booted idle VM which will receive a request farthest in the future is transitioned
to the shutdown state. Using this algorithm on a two-state hierarchy, for any given !, let
the optimal number of hits hOPT (!;B0) be the number of requests in ! such that the
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target VM is in the booted state (S0) on arrival of the request, where B0 is the maximum
number of VMs possible in the booted state.
Let  be a demand-based VM management policy which, for a reference string !, for
each state Si (i 2 0; 1; : : : n), exhibits hi (number of hits to state Si), such that,







We show that for all demand-based policies,  minimizes Min(!), and hence Min(!)
forms the lower bound on the total miss penalty of any demand-based policy.
Lemma I
Among all demand-based policies, policy  maximizes
Pk
i=0 hi;8k 2 f0; 1 : : : ng.
Proof : Summing (5.1) over the range i = 0; 1 : : : k we get,
kX
i=0




This is the same as operating Belady's OPT algorithm on a hierarchy with just two
states { booted and shutdown, with the maximum possible number of VMs in booted equal
to
Pk
j=0Bj: Since Belady's algorithm is known to be the optimal demand-based policy on
a two-state hierarchy,
Pk
i=0 hi is maximized.
Lemma II
For any !, no other demand-based policy  has Min(!) < Min(!).
Proof : We prove by contradiction. Let b be a demand-based policy (with respective bhi),



























bhi = Pn+1i=0 hi = j!j,
nX
i=0







































Since the nth term in the summation on either side is zero, we get,
n 1X
i=0




n   t0i): (5.3)
In reducing (5.2) to (5.3), the summation reduces from n to (n  1). Since,
8j 2 f1; : : : ng; t0j 1  t0j:
Therefore, these steps can be repeated until the summation reduces to n = 1. That is,bh0:(t01   t00) > h0:(t01   t00);
which implies bh0 > h0, which contradicts Lemma I (which states that  maximizesPk
i=0 hi; 8k 2 f0; 1; : : : ng).
Note that the lower bound Min(!) assumes future knowledge and cannot be imple-
mented in an online fashion. Nevertheless, it serves as theoretical lower bound for com-
paring with other demand-based policies. In Section 5.5, we compare a few widely used
demand-based policies with the lower bound and compare them with proactive policies.
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5.2.2 Proactive Policies
Proactive policies congure, transition, or provision a system resource prior to a demand for
it being received. They have previously been explored in the context of page replacement,
with the goal of producing lower page faults than demand-based page replacement. Existing
work [178] has shown that Belady's OPT algorithm is the optimal demand-based policy
that minimizes the number of page fetches but does not minimize the number of page
faults, because it does not prefetch pages. Trivedi et al. [178] explored the use of proactive
policies to lower the number of page faults, and proved that DPMIN [178] is the optimal
pre-paging algorithm. DPMIN proceeds as follows: at the time of a page fault, DPMIN
scans the future page reference string and fetches the rst m pages that will be referenced
in the future (including the page that caused the page fault), where m is the number of
memory page frames. For the purposes of this work, we dene proactive policy as any
policy that is not a demand-based policy (as dened in Section 5.2.1).
SlidingWindow
We extend the technique used in the DPMIN algorithm to dene the SlidingWindow pol-
icy for managing VMs across dierent states. Our rationale is that, since VMs can be
transitioned in parallel, provisioning VMs in anticipation of requests (e.g., when servicing
another VM's request) should reduce average miss penalties.
SlidingWindow proceeds as follows: whenever a request rt 2 ! is received such that
the target VM is not in the booted state, it computes a new state conguration for all
VMs. To compute this new conguration, SlidingWindow scans the future reference string
(illustrated in Figure 5.2). All VMs that are currently active are retained in their booted
state in the new conguration. If A is the number of currently active VMs, the rst
(B0  A) VMs that will be requested in the future (and are currently idle) are placed into
the booted state (S0) in the new conguration (illustrated as a time windowW0). Similarly,
the B1 VMs that will be requested next are placed into S1 (illustrated as time windowW1).
This process continues up to state Sn (time window Wn) and the remaining (v 
Pn
i=0Bi)
VMs are placed in the shutdown state. After the new conguration is computed, VMs are
transitioned from their existing to this new conguration.
When VM Vi becomes idle, SlidingWindow re-scans the future reference string to com-
pute tnext, that is, the time at which Vi will be requested next. If tnext falls in the time
windowWj it transitions Vi into Sj, and one VM from Sk to Sk 1 (the one that is referenced
the soonest) 8k 2 fj; j   1; : : : 1g. In eect, it slides the windows W0;W1 : : :Wj 1 to the
right. If tnext falls in the window W0, Vi remains in the booted state.
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Similar to DPMIN, our SlidingWindow policy assumes knowledge of the future refer-
ence string, and cannot be implemented in an online fashion. Therefore, in addition to the
oine implementation of the policy, we provide an online implementation (called Sliding-
Window+ARMA) which uses a predictor to estimate tnext, and uses the predicted value to
perform its proactive VM provisioning. We describe SlidingWindow+ARMA in detail in







Figure 5.2: Proactive idle VEE management using the SlidingWindow policy.
5.3 Obtaining Model Parameters
Our formal model (described in Section 5.2) relies on a few input parameters, namely
the matrix of transition times (T(n+2)(n+2)) and the maximum number of VMs that can
be simultaneously hosted in each state (Bi). We use LXC [22], a widely used OS-level
virtualization solution, as an example virtualization solution, and conduct an experimental
analysis to obtain these model parameters. Note that we continue to refer to execution
environments created using LXC as VMs, since our formal model (Section 5.2) is applicable
to any virtualization solution. We now describe our methodology in detail and justify our
choices.
5.3.1 LXC as a Case Study
OS-level virtualization approaches have been shown to incur 40-50% lower virtualization
overhead than other approaches such as Xen paravirtualization [145, 174], thus promising
potentially higher density. Example OS-level virtualization solutions include LXC [22],
OpenVZ [28], and VServer [23]. We choose LXC as our example virtualization solution for
several reasons:
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(i) it is open source, allowing easy analysis of its implementation,
(ii) it is in production use and is part of the mainstream Linux kernel,
(iii) it oers a low-latency inactive VM state called \frozen",
(iv) it is being used in other projects which can benet from increased VM density, such
as Docker [9] (to provide \frozen in state apps"), and Condential Commuting [79]
(to provide per-user private VEEs).
As noted, in addition to the booted (S0) and shutdown state (S2), LXC implements a frozen
state (S1) which forms a middle ground between booted and shutdown states. When an
idle VM in the booted state is transitioned to the frozen state, it retains its memory and
disk footprint, while relinquishing CPU cycles. In addition, frozen-to-booted transition
times are signicantly smaller than shutdown-to-booted transitions. Thus, LXC provides
us with a three-state hierarchy with the booted, frozen, and shutdown states. Menage [135]
provides a detailed description of the implementation of the frozen state.
5.3.2 Experimental Setup
We use LXC [22] (v.0.8.0) to create VMs. VMs are hosted on a machine that has four Intel
Xeon processors with six 3.46 GHz cores each and 128 GB of RAM. It contains a 7200
RPM 1 TB SATA hard disk that we use to store VMs' OS images. All experiments are
repeated 50 times and all results are reported using averages with 95% condence intervals.
VMs in an OS-level virtualization solution, such as LXC, share the host kernel's process
pool, data structures, and devices. Therefore, when increasing VM density, some host
kernel parameters need to be increased. For instance, since all processes of all LXC VMs
share the host kernel's pool of open le descriptors (FD) the total number of open FDs
allowed by the host kernel limits the number of VMs. Similarly, the kernel's maximum
allowed process identier (PID) (set to a default of 32,767), and the number of Unix98
pseudoterminals (set to a default of 4,096), also limit the number of VMs. For conducting
our experiments we increased these values to 14,000,000, 65,535, and 8,000 respectively.
5.3.3 Quantifying Density
We rst determine the maximum number of booted, frozen, and shutdown VMs that can
be supported in our testbed.
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Shutdown VMs
The only system resource consumed by shutdown VMs is disk space. It is required for
storing their OS image, applications, and libraries. In our testbed, each VM consumes
476 MB of disk space. Thus, 2,000 VMs can be created on a 1 TB disk, using the EXT4
lesystem.
Booted VMs
To determine the maximum number of booted VMs (B0) we conduct a simple experiment
where the number of booted but idle VMs on the machine is gradually increased, while
all other VMs are shutdown. VMs are transitioned from shutdown to booted sequentially,
with a delay of 30 seconds between successive VMs to ensure that the system reaches a
steady state; essential for recording system measurements. Measurements are recorded
using vmstat.
We observe that the system memory consumption increases steadily with increasing
number of VMs. This is because each additional VM consumes approximately 42 MB of
memory for initializing its processes (such as its SSH server, and other daemons). Figure 5.3
shows the CPU system time (time spent running kernel code), and CPU idle time averaged
over all 24 cores on the server machine, as the number of booted idle VMs is increased.
We observe that up to 250 VMs the CPU is largely idle. This is because idle VMs do
not perform any signicant computation and only a few VM processes (such as udevd,
and other daemons) are running, this slightly decreases the CPU idle time, while other
processes remain blocked. Note that, all VM processes are in user space. However, beyond
250 VMs, we observe an increase in CPU system time, eventually reaching 100% at 450
VMs. At this stage, no additional VMs can be booted as all 24 cores are completely busy.
We believe that this is because of the inability of LXC's cgroup handler [135] to scale with
the increasing number of processes. LXC uses the cgroup handler for the bookkeeping of
resources used by processes of dierent VMs and to enforce isolation. As a result, this
limits the number of booted idle VMs to approximately 250.
Frozen VMs
We determine the maximum number of frozen VMs (B1) by conducting a simple experiment
where the number of frozen VMs on the machine is gradually increased. Each VM is booted,
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Figure 5.3: CPU utilization versus the number of booted VMs.
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booting, we use netcat to detect if the VM's SSH server has started. We measure the time
taken to boot-up the VM and start its SSH server. All other VMs remain in the shutdown
state.
We observe a steady increase in the system memory consumption (at approximately 42
MB per VM). This is because processes in a frozen VM retain their memory footprint (due
to the absence of memory pressure). Moreover, we observe that the time to transition a
VM from shutdown to booted (before transitioning to frozen) increases considerably as the
number of frozen VMs on the machine increases. This is because many system calls used
by LXC for booting a VM, such as fork, wait, and open, take more time to complete,
as the number of frozen VMs increases. As described in Section 5.3.4, this increase in
transition time eventually limits the number of frozen VMs (to approximately 300 frozen
VMs).
5.3.4 Impact of Density on Transition Time
We study the eect of VM density in each state on the transition times. We vary the
number of booted VMs and measure the dierent state transition times (while keeping the
number of frozen VMs at zero). Similarly we vary the number of frozen VMs and measure
the transition times (while keeping the number of booted VMs at zero).
Varying the Number of Booted VMs
The number of booted VMs is increased in steps of 50. At each step the dierent transition
times are measured (for a given VM). All other VMs are in the shutdown state.
Figure 5.4a shows the shutdown-to-booted (denoted t02) and frozen-to-booted (denoted
t01) transition times. We observe that up to 250 VMs, the shutdown-to-booted transition
time remains largely constant. However, beyond 250 booted VMs we see a considerable
increase in boot time. This is due to a surge in CPU system time at 300 VMs and beyond
(as explained in Section 5.3.3, Figure 5.3), which reduces available CPU time to zero.
Figure 5.4b shows the frozen-to-booted transition time (denoted t01 in Figure 5.4a), with
a magnied time axis. We observe that frozen-to-booted transition times increase only
slightly with increasing number of booted VMs and is considerably smaller than shutdown-
to-booted transition time. This is because frozen-to-booted is a comparatively faster and
less resource-intensive transition. The abrupt rise beyond 300 booted VMs, is attributed
to the surge in CPU system time, as explained in Section 5.3.3. Along the same lines
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(b) Transition times for Frozen-to-Booted (t01).
Figure 5.4: Transition times with increasing number of booted VMs.
while increasing the number of booted VMs. However, we do not observe any signicant
variation in these transition times, remaining constant at averages of 640 ms and 0.15 ms
respectively.
Varying the Number of Frozen VMs
In a similar fashion to the previous experiment, the number of frozen VMs is gradually
increased and the dierent transition times are measured.
Figure 5.5a shows the shutdown-to-booted (denoted t02) and frozen-to-booted (denoted
t01) transition times. We observe that the time for a shutdown-to-booted transition increases
only slightly up to 300 frozen VMs and is considerably larger beyond that point. This is
because, as discussed in Section 5.3.3, system calls used by LXC for booting, require
more time to complete when the number of frozen VMs increases, leading to increased
transition times. Figure 5.5b shows the frozen-to-booted transition times (denoted as t01 in
Figure 5.5a) with a magnied time axis. We observe that below 300 VMs, the transition
time is largely constant. However, beyond 300 frozen VMs, the transition time increases
considerably. This is because LXC's cgroup freezer mechanism [135] begins consuming
more time for unfreezing a VM, and hence does not scale. Therefore, the number of
frozen VMs is limited by this increased transition time, to approximately 300. As in
the previous experiment, we nd that the booted-to-shutdown (t0;2) and booted-to-frozen
(t0;1) transition times do not change signicantly with the number of frozen VMs. These
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transitions times are measured at averages 642 ms and 0.17 ms respectively, which is nearly













Number of Frozen VMs
Transition to Booted
6005004003002001000














Number of Frozen VMs
Frozen-to-Booted (t’1)
(b) Transition times for Frozen-to-Booted (t01).
Figure 5.5: Transition times with increasing number of frozen VMs.
5.3.5 Deriving the Model Parameters
We now describe how we derive the parameters for our model (in Section 5.2) using the
experimental analysis (described above).
Due to the increase in the transition times as the number of booted VMs is increased
(as explained above using Figures 5.3 and 5.4), we dene the maximum number of VMs
possible in the booted state (B0) to be 250. Similarly, given the variation in transition
times as the number of frozen VMs is increased (Figure 5.5), the maximum number of
VMs possible in the frozen state (B1) is 300. Note that both B0 and B1 values are derived
from limitations in LXC's design and implementation (described above). While it may be
interesting to explore these limitations in greater detail (and alleviate them), such work
lies outside the scope of our current work.
We compare the shutdown-to-booted (t02) and frozen-to-booted (t
0
1) transition times in
the two sensitivity analysis experiments (i.e., Figure 5.4a and Figure 5.5a). Interestingly, we
nd that within the operating range of up to 250 booted VMs, and up to 300 frozen VMs,
the respective transition times in either experiments dier insignicantly. For instance,
shutdown-to-booted transition time when varying only the number of booted VMs (up
to 250 booted VMs, Figure 5.4a), is comparable to shutdown-to-booted transition time
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when varying only the number of frozen VMs (up to 300 frozen VMs, Figure 5.5a). Other
transitions times (frozen-to-booted t1;0, booted-to-frozen t0;1, and booted-to-shutdown t0;2)
exhibit similar behaviour. Thus, we believe that within this operating range (up to 250
booted and 300 frozen VMs) all transition times remain largely constant, regardless of the
number of booted and frozen VMs. We therefore represent the average transition times
(within the operating range) using the transition matrix T33 shown in Table 5.1, where
ti;j=time to transition from state Si to Sj. Note that to transition a frozen LXC VM to
shutdown (and vice versa), it must rst be transitioned to booted.
PPPPPPPPPFrom
To
Booted (S0) Frozen (S1) Shutdown (S2) Bi
Booted (S0) 0.00 ms 0.17 ms 641.64 ms 250
Frozen (S1) 4.43 ms 0.00 ms - 300
Shutdown (S2) 802.16 ms - 0.00 ms 2000 (Disk limited)
Table 5.1: Transition matrix (T33) and state capacity (Bi) values for LXC.
5.4 Policy Comparison Setup
Using the parameters obtained above we study the eect of dierent policies using a
simulation-based analysis, which makes exploring a large design space feasible.
In this section, we rst discuss the design and implementation of our simulator, fol-
lowed by the description of the policy implementations in Section 5.4.2, the personal VEE
workloads we use for comparing policies in Section 5.4.3, and our evaluation metric in
Section 5.4.4.
5.4.1 Simulator Design and Implementation
Our simulator consists of a policy module, a cost-model module, and a workload module.
The cost-model module encapsulates the VM hierarchy parameters (Bi and T33). The
policy module encapsulates all logic pertaining to a particular policy and maintains any in-
memory state required for implementing that policy such as any per-VM bookkeeping. The
workload module encapsulates all logic required for simulating the VMs' workloads, such as
distributions for request inter-arrival times and request durations. Such modularity allows
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us to easily extend the simulator to study dierent workloads, dierent VM management
policies, as well as dierent VM hierarchies, by simply implementing the respective module.
The simulator maintains the current state assignment for each VM. In addition, it contains
a single time-sorted event queue and a single thread which processes events in this queue.
Events are either of type VMrequest or VMidle.
At initialization time, the workload module generates the simulated VMrequest events
for the required number of VMs and populates the event queue. When processing a VMre-
quest event, the simulator passes the current state assignment, the request event, and event
queue to the policy module, and receives the updated state assignment. It then compares
the updated state assignment with the current one and computes a list of required VM
transitions. It then computes the time required to perform the transitions, updates the
state assignment, and enqueues a VMidle event with a later timestamp (derived using the
request duration in the VMrequest event) into the event queue. Note that all invocations of
the policy module are serialized. For instance, if a VMrequest event occurs while the policy
module is computing the updated VM state assignment, it is processed after the policy
module nishes its computation. Lastly, when computing the time taken to perform a set
of transitions, the simulator assumes that dierent VMs' transitions take place in parallel.
This assumption is justied because in doing so we are able to measure the best case behav-
ior of any policy. Any additional overhead in the system in performing parallel transitions
would only serve to increase the transition times, and the miss penalty so obtained would
still be bounded by that in the best case scenario. VMidle events are processed in the
same fashion as VMrequest events. However, some policies (e.g, demand-based policies)
may choose to not take any action when a VM becomes idle.
Implementation
We have implemented the simulator using C# over the .NET v4.5 framework. We have
implemented policy modules for dierent reactive and proactive policies, the workloads
described in the next section, and a cost-model module for LXC. We validate the simulator
using sample deterministic workloads and state hierarchies. The implementation is publicly
available at http://github.com/rayman7718/VMSim.
5.4.2 Policy Implementations
We implement the following idle VEE management policies.
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LRU
Least Recently Used (or LRU) [71] is a policy that is widely studied for page replacement.
We apply it to idle VM management in a cascaded fashion. For each VM, it maintains
the timestamp of the last request (tr). All VMs are initially in the shutdown state. As
requests for dierent VMs arrive, they are transitioned to the booted state. Eventually,
as the number of VMs in the booted state (i.e., including active and idle VMs) reaches
the limit B0, for each VM transitioning into booted thereafter, LRU chooses to transition
the booted VM with the minimum tr into the frozen state. In eect, for each VM it uses
the time since the last request to estimate the likelihood that it will be requested again.
Similarly, as the number of VMs in the frozen state reaches B1, for each VM transitioning
into frozen thereafter, the frozen VM with the minimum tr is shut down. Note that,
unlike traditional implementations of LRU (e.g., in page replacement) where all timing
information of the resource is deleted after its eviction, we maintain tr for each VM after
eviction in order to apply it across multiple states.
Cascaded Belady's OPT
This policy is simply an extension of Belady's OPT algorithm to multiple states applied
to idle VM management. That is, when number of VMs in any state Si exceeds Bi, the
VM that is referenced the furthest in the future is transitioned to Si+1. This version of
Belady's OPT algorithm is known to be suboptimal [90]. However, we implement it in
order to compare it with demand-based policies that have no future knowledge (e.g., LRU)
and the lower bound Min(!). To the best of our knowledge such a comparison has not
been conducted in previous work.
Lower Bound on demand-based policies
As explained in Section 5.2.1, Min(!) forms the lower bound on demand-based policies.
We rst obtain the h0, h1, h2 values for LXC as per Eq. 5.1 for the dierent workloads
we study (i.e., dierent ! values). For each !, we obtain h0 = hOPT (!;B0), h1 =
hOPT (!;B0 +B1)  hOPT (!;B0), and h2 = j!j   h0   h1. We then determine the lower









As explained in Section 5.2.2, our SlidingWindow policy requires knowledge of the future.
Therefore, we implement the oine version of SlidingWindow which uses knowledge of the
future (called SlidingWindow+GroundTruth).
SlidingWindow+ARMA
We also provide an online implementation of the SlidingWindow policy (called SlidingWin-
dow+ARMA) which attempts to predict the inter-arrival time for each VM and updates
the prediction model at the time of each request for that VM. We employ the widely-
used auto regressive moving average (ARMA) time-series model [136] for predicting the
inter-arrival times. To nd the order of the ARMA model we employ Bayesian information
criterion [162] and at each model update we perform a maximum likelihood t on the inter-
arrival times. The policy then uses the predicted inter-arrival time for each VM to perform
its proactive actions. Therefore, its miss penalty depends directly on the prediction error
of the ARMA model.
5.4.3 Workload Analysis
We analyze personal VEE workloads by categorizing them into three categories based on
the requests' inter-arrival and duration times. We believe that such categorization (as
opposed to a mixed workload) allows us to better understand the behavior of dierent
policies.
Fixed Inter-arrival Time, Fixed Duration
A common use of personal VEEs is to periodically upload a xed amount of data from
in-home sensors (e.g., from energy sensors, as described in Chapter 3) or a user's smart-
phone [79, 139]. In these scenarios, requests have relatively xed inter-arrival times and
durations. For such requests both the arrival and departure of requests are highly pre-
dictable and form an interesting point of comparison between proactive and reactive poli-
cies. Similarly tasks involving periodic pre-processing of data [160,171] also fall under this
category.
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Stochastic Inter-arrival Time, Fixed Duration
Users can also use their personal VEEs to host private instances of common application
servers such as web, mail, the Bolt metadata server (described in Chapter 4), and other
servers [59, 165, 166]. Due to the user-facing nature of these application servers, the re-
quests they receive have stochastic inter-arrival times, and typically involve downloading or
uploading xed amounts of data, thus leading to requests with a relatively xed duration.
Stochastic Inter-arrival Time, Stochastic Duration
In many personal VEE applications the requests are user-generated, and thus have stochas-
tic inter-arrival times. In addition, there are a wide variety of such requests. As a result,
these requests vary in the amount of data processed and the type of computation performed
which results in stochastic duration times. Examples include private data analytics appli-
cations (described in Chapter 3), VM-backed mobile applications [160], and other similar
applications [109] (discussed in detail in Sections 2.1.4 and 2.1.5).
5.4.4 Metric
In order to compare dierent policies for a request string !, we use the average miss penalty
incurred by any policy , dened as:
Average miss penalty =
P(!)
j!j :
We choose this metric because:
(i) it captures the miss penalty across all VMs in the system,
(ii) it allows us to observe the behavior of any policy while increasing the number of total
VMs, and
(iii) it allows us to easily observe the dierences between reactive and proactive policies.





We now study the eect of increasing VM density on the average miss penalty for dierent
policies. The request string ! in all simulations contains 100 arrivals per VM, that is,
j!j=Total #VMs  100.
In order to simulate stochastic inter-arrival times, we use the request inter-arrival times
from publicly available web trace data [50], since it has been used in evaluating on-demand
VM provisioning in existing work [120]. Similarly in order to simulate stochastic request
durations, we use the web connection duration characterization provided by Newton et
al. [143]. We believe this to be a representative request duration characterization for
personal servers. Lastly, we use the respective mean values from the two datasets for
generating the xed inter-arrival time (of 50 s) and xed duration (of 10 s) workload.
Table 5.2 shows the variability of inter-arrival times and durations for the three cases we
study. Note however that the policies we consider do not utilize request duration and we
defer the design of policies that consider request durations to future work.
In each workload experiment (below), we start the x-axis at 250 VMs since it is the
maximum number of VMs possible in the booted state (and there are no miss penalties
below 250 VMs). We increase VM density to the point that the total number of simul-
taneously active VMs increases above 250 (equal to B0) and cannot be hosted using this
hierarchy. Note that this limit is a result of the current workload (longer idle times would
increase this limit).
Case Inter-arrival times Durations
Mean Standard Min Max Mean Standard Min Max
Inter-arrivals Durations deviation deviation
Fixed Fixed 50.0 s 0.0 s 50.0 s 50.0 s 10.0 s 0.0 s 10.0 s 10.0 s
Stochastic Fixed 50.0 s 160.5 s 10.0 s 941.2 s 10.0 s 0.0 s 10.0 s 10.0 s
Stochastic Stochastic 50.0 s 163.0 s 0.9 s 941.2 s 10.0 s 22.4 s 5.0 ms 120.0 s
Table 5.2: Variation of request inter-arrival times and durations across the three test cases.
5.5.1 Fixed Inter-arrival Time, Fixed Duration Workload
Figure 5.6 shows the average miss penalty versus VM density for dierent policies, for a
request string ! with a xed inter-arrival time of 50 seconds and a xed request duration of
10 seconds. Figure 5.6 also shows the shutdown-to-booted and frozen-to-booted transition
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times for comparison. For each VM, the time at which its rst request is received is chosen
uniformly at random from [0,50 s]. Later in this section, we analyze the behavior of the

























Figure 5.6: Average miss penalty with increasing VM density for xed inter-arrival time
and duration.
We rst explain the behaviour of the reactive policies. We observe that at a VM density
of 250, both reactive policies, LRU and Cascaded Belady's OPT, incur the same average
miss penalty which matches the lower bound. This is because, in this case, all reactive
policies transition each VM into the booted state once its rst request is received and no idle
VMs need to be transitioned out of the booted state thereafter (since VM density equals
B0). As VM density increases further, not all VMs can remain booted. Depending on the
policy, some VMs are transitioned to frozen (when idle) and are transitioned to booted
when their request arrives, which increases the average miss penalty. Similarly, as VM
density increases beyond 550, not all VMs can be in either booted or frozen states. That
is, all other VMs are transitioned to the shutdown state (when idle) and are brought into
the booted state when their request arrives. This contributes to increase the average miss
penalty. Since shutdown-to-booted transition times are signicantly higher than frozen-
to-booted (approximately 800 ms vs. 4 ms), we see a much larger increase in the average
miss penalty at VM density  550 (than at 250 VMs). Note that LRU has a signicantly
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higher average miss penalty than the cascaded Belady's algorithm because LRU has no
knowledge of the future reference string. In the case of LRU, when VM density is greater
than 550, upon the arrival of each request, the target VM is always in the shutdown state
thus incurring the maximum miss penalty. This is because, for this workload, between two
consecutive requests to any VM Vi, there are (v-1) requests for other VMs (i.e., one per
VM). Since LRU evicts the least recently used VM from booted to frozen and frozen to
shutdown, when v > 550, Vi will get transitioned to shutdown after the intermediate (v-1)
requests are serviced.
We now explain the behavior of proactive policies. Due to easily predictable xed re-
quest inter-arrival times and durations, the average miss penalty of SlidingWindow+ARMA
equals that of SlidingWindow+Ground Truth. We observe that both policies incur a sig-
nicantly lower average miss penalty than the reactive policies. This is because whenever a
request whose target VM is not in the booted state is received, in addition to transitioning
that VM to booted, SlidingWindow also transitions other VMs (as many as possible) to
booted and frozen states (as explained in Section 5.2.2). Note that the proactive transi-
tions in the SlidingWindow policies are triggered by a request whose target VM is not in
the booted state. Therefore, as VM density increases up to 550, VMs span the booted
and frozen states and beyond 550, VMs span all the three states. This increases the aver-
age miss penalty (since the shutdown-to-booted transition time is signicantly larger than
the frozen-to-booted time). Moreover, the number of idle VMs that the SlidingWindow
policies can proactively transition to booted, depends on the number of active VMs at
that instant (since the number of active booted + the number of idle booted = 250). As
VM density increases, the number of simultaneously active VMs increases and hence the
number of VMs that can be proactively transitioned to booted decreases. This reduction in
the number of possible proactive transitions also contributes to an increase in the average
miss penalty.
For this workload, comparing the two online (implementable) policies (LRU and Slid-
ingWindow+ARMA), we conclude that SlidingWindow+ARMA incurs the lower average
miss penalty. It increases VM density from 250 to 550 (a factor of more than 2.2), while
keeping average miss penalty under 1 ms, for a xed inter-arrival time of 50 seconds and
xed duration of 10 seconds. Note that each VM is active for 10 seconds, then becomes
idle for 40 seconds before being activated again, that is, a mean duty-cycle of 20%. If the
maximum number of frozen VMs was not limited to 300 by LXC's implementation, for
up to 250 simultaneously active VMs, a maximum of 250
0:2
or 1250 VMs could be hosted
using this state hierarchy while keeping the average miss penalty under 1 ms. Similarly,
for an idle time of 10 seconds and active time of 40 seconds (i.e., a duty cycle of 0.8), the




To generalize, maximum VM density, for an average miss penalty  1 ms with maximum







5.5.2 Stochastic Inter-arrival Time, Fixed Duration Workload
Figure 5.7 shows the average miss penalty versus VM density for dierent policies, for a
request string ! with stochastic inter-arrival time (as described above) and a xed request
duration of 10 seconds. Figure 5.7 also shows the shutdown-to-booted and frozen-to-booted

























Figure 5.7: Average miss penalty with increasing VM density for stochastic inter-arrival
time and xed duration.
We observe that the behaviour of reactive policies in this case is similar to that in the
case of xed inter-arrival xed duration workloads (as described above in Section 5.5.1).
That is, their average miss penalty is equal and lowest at VM density of 250 VMs and
thereafter it increases with VM density (and remains higher than the lower bound). Miss
penalty is signicantly higher at 550 VMs (and higher) than that at 250-550 VMs. This is
because with more than 550 VMs, they span the booted, frozen, and shutdown states and
shutdown-to-booted transition times are signicantly larger than frozen-to-booted times.
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We now explain the behaviour of the proactive policies. Due to reasons explained
above in Section 5.5.1, the average miss penalty of SlidingWindow+Ground Truth in-
creases as VM density increases. The increase is large at VM density of more than 550
VMs due to the shutdown-to-booted transition time being signicantly larger than the
frozen-to-booted transition time. SlidingWindow+ARMA incurs a higher average miss
penalty than SlidingWindow+GroundTruth. This is because SlidingWindow+ARMA uses
the predicted inter-arrival time for each VM to make proactive transition decisions. Thus
errors in prediction cause some VMs to transition to sub-optimal states, which increases
the average miss penalty. We observe signicantly larger average miss penalties as VM
density exceeds 550 VMs. This is observed despite the normalized root mean square er-
ror of the prediction (shown in Figure 5.8) remaining largely constant (at approximately
0.04) with increasing VM density. This is because beyond 550 VMs, they span all three
booted, frozen, shutdown states (as compared to only booted and frozen below 550) and
the shutdown-to-booted, booted-to-shutdown transition times are signicantly higher than
the frozen-to-booted, frozen-to-shutdown transition times respectively. Hence, as the num-
ber of VMs is increased, for a relatively constant degree of mis-predictions, the number
of VMs that get transitioned sub-optimally to the shutdown state due to a mis-predicted
inter-arrival time increases. It is the large transition times to and from the shutdown
state that cause the signicant increase in the average miss penalty. Due to this increase,
the average miss penalty of SlidingWindow+ARMA exceeds that of reactive approaches
(beyond 560 VMs).
For this workload, when comparing the two online policies, LRU and SlidingWin-
dow+ARMA, we conclude that for a desired VM density of up to 550 VMs (2.2  the
density of current solutions), SlidingWindow+ARMA incurs a much lower average miss
penalty (less than 4 ms). However, for all VM density levels larger than 560, LRU out-
performs SlidingWindow+ARMA. At these density levels, some idle VMs need to be in
the shutdown state (which has large transition times) and any error in inter-arrival time
prediction causes a signicant increase in the average miss penalty.
5.5.3 Stochastic Inter-arrival Time, Stochastic Duration Work-
load
Figure 5.9 shows the average miss penalty for a request string ! with stochastic inter-arrival
time and stochastic duration, for dierent policies with increasing VM density. Figure 5.9
also shows the shutdown-to-booted and frozen-to-booted transition times for comparison.
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Figure 5.8: Normalized root mean square error (NMRSE) for the ARMA predictor used
by SlidingWindow+ARMA.
penalty, which is similar to the case of stochastic inter-arrival time and xed duration
(described above in Section 5.5.2). We believe that this is because both the reactive and
proactive policies we study (LRU, Cascaded Belady's algorithm, and SlidingWindow), only
use request inter-arrival time in making their reactive or proactive transition decisions. An
interesting avenue for future work would be to formulate policies which also take into
account the expected request durations. The behaviour of our current policies can be
explained using reasoning similar to that in Section 5.5.2.
5.5.4 Summary of Simulation Results
The key ndings of the simulation-based policy comparison can be summarized as follows:
 Online proactive policies such as SlidingWindow+ARMA are highly sensitive to pre-
diction error. Thus for any given hierarchy, to ensure low miss penalties, such policies
should be used only when the desired VM density is such that all VMs can be accom-


























Figure 5.9: Average miss penalty with increasing VM density for stochastic inter-arrival
time and stochastic duration.
for mis-predictions are relatively small. Under all other conditions (e.g., larger VM
density levels), reactive and stateless policies such as LRU should be used.
 Miss penalties of proactive and reactive (online or oine) policies, which only make
use of request inter-arrival times, are largely unaected by request durations being
xed or stochastic.
 For the given workload, using an online per-VM predictor based proactive policy
results in an increase in VM density by up to a factor of 2.2, with an average miss
penalty of less than 1 ms.
5.6 Characterizing the Policy Space
In Section 5.2, we formulated the idle VEE management problem. Although that problem
formulation allowed us to establish a lower bound on the miss penalties of demand-based
policies, it does not provide insight into nding the optimal policy. We believe that it
is due to the large extent of possible policies that nding the optimal policy is relatively
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dicult. Therefore, in this section, we present an alternate mathematical formulation
of the problem, which provides a mathematical denition for policies, and allows us to
characterize the policy space.
Let V = fV1; V2; : : : Vvg denote the set of v VMs that are multiplexed on a given
physical machine. Each VM is active for certain periods of time, for example, when actively
serving client requests and is idle for other periods of time. We model the active and idle
periods over a given time period T by a reference string of tuples. A reference string
of tuples ! = r1; r2; : : : rT is a string of tuples ri. Each ri is a tuple (Type; ID), where
Type 2 fActivate; Inactivateg and ID 2 V , which denotes the activation (i.e., start of an
active period) or in-activation (i.e., start of an idle period) of the target VM VID.
For any tupled reference string !, for each VM Vx 2 V , if 9 rj = (Inactivate; x),
then 9 ri = (Activate; Vx), where j  i. Moreover, 8 ri; rk 2 ! such that ri = rk =
(Activate; Vx); i < k, there must exist rj = (Inactivate; Vx) where i < j < k.
In addition to the booted and shutdown states (denoted S0 and Sn+1 respectively),
we assume there are n additional inactive states (denoted S1; S2; : : : ; Sn) which can be
used to hold idle VMs. Let V S0 ; V S1 ; : : : V Sn ; V Sn+1  V denote the sets of VMs in states
S0; S1; : : : Sn+1 respectively at a given time instant. We also dene V
A  V S0 , as the
set of VMs that are actively serving clients at that instant. Moreover, the soft bounds
on the maximum number of VMs in states S0; S1; : : : Sn+1 are denoted as B0; B1; : : : Bn+1
respectively. Therefore, 8i 2 f0; 1; : : : ; n+ 1g; jV Sij  Bi, and
Pn+1
i=0 jV Sij = v.
Given this notation, we dene the VM conguration of the system at any instant, as
the tuple C, where
C = (V A; V S0 ; V S1 ; : : : ; V Sn ; V Sn+1):
C denes the state in which each VM is at the particular time instant. Let SC be the set
fCj8i 2 f0; 1; : : : n+ 1g; jV Sij  Bi;
n+1X
i=0
jV Sij = vg:
That is, SC denotes the space of all possible VM congurations for the given state hierarchy.
Any idle VM management policy  is comprised of the tuple (Q, q0, g) where,
(i) Q is the set of control-states of the policy,
(ii) q0 2 Q is its initial control state,
(iii) g : SC Q (V  Type)! SC Q is the allocation function.
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The allocation function has the property that the target VM of any request ri (i.e, Vri:ID)
is in C 0:V A whenever g(C; q; ri) = (C 0; q0) and ri:T ype = Activate. Similarly, Vri:ID is not
in C 0:CA whenever g(C; q; ri) = (C 0; q0) and ri:Type = Inactivate.
Therefore, any VM management policy  can be considered a nite state machine with
SCQ control-states, inputs V Type (i.e., outgoing transitions), and a transition function
g.
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nes the total number of ways of partitioning







 jQj) = O((n+ 2)v  jQj) = O(nv:jQj):
Given  control-states and  inputs, the total number of nite state machines that
can be dened is :() or O(:). This is because each input for each control-state
can cause a transition to one of the  states, and each state can be chosen as the initial
control-state.
Therefore, the total number of possible policies given a control-state space of O(nv:jQj),
and 2 v inputs are O((nv)nv). That is, the size of the policy space is exponential in both
the number of states and the number of VMs multiplexed on a machine (with the exponent
itself comprising of n and v terms). We believe that it is due to this large policy space
that nding the optimal policy is relatively dicult.
5.7 Discussion
Other Virtualization Solutions
Using LXC as our example virtualization solution, we demonstrate that idle VMs can be
multiplexed across inactive states. However, our model formulation and lower bound on
demand-based policies (in Section 5.2) is applicable to any virtualization solution. Sim-
ilarly, our experimental analysis to determine the model parameters (in Section 5.3) can
also be adapted to any virtualization solution. Our simulator can then be re-used (after
encoding the new cost-model), to observe the eect of policies on any VM hierarchy. We
defer such extension of this work to other virtualization solutions (e.g. Xen and KVM) to
future work. Nevertheless, we believe our evaluation of VM density and miss penalties can
benet existing projects [9, 79] which use LXC.
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Extending Policies
We have implemented only a few sample, reactive and proactive policies (i.e., LRU, Cas-
caded Belady's, SlidingWindow, and SlidingWindow+ARMA), using only the personal
VEE workload. The goal of this work was to uncover a new methodology to increase VEE
density by multiplexing VEEs across states, understand and compare the behaviour of
reactive and proactive policies for idle VM management, and to compare reactive policies
with our theoretical lower bound. With our example personal VEE workloads, we provide
valuable insights into the behaviour of a few policies. However, we defer the extension of
this work to a broader range of policies and workloads to future work. Our modular sim-
ulator design, which isolates policies, workloads, cost-models (described in Section 5.4.1),
ensures that a broader analysis can be easily conducted.
We have provided only one online implementation of the SlidingWindow policy (us-
ing the ARMA model). We chose the ARMA predictor since it delivered relatively small
prediction error for the current workload. To use the SlidingWindow policy on other work-
loads other prediction methods may need to be considered, while demand-based policies
such as LRU can be applied directly.
Stochastic Value Analysis of Transition Times
We model the problem by using a mean value analysis of transition times. Hence we de-
rive the model parameters by dening an operating range of state capacities within which
transition times are largely constant. We also assume that dierent VM state transitions
can take place in parallel and that transition times remain unchanged. Stochastic analysis
can be leveraged to model any variations in transition times. However, additional experi-
mental analysis of density and transition times will be required to obtain parameters for
a stochastic value model, which we defer to future work. Additionally, our current experi-
mental analysis of LXC (Section 5.3) identies a number of barriers to state capacities in
LXC, which serve as venues for improving future LXC implementations.
5.8 Chapter Summary
Our proposed personal VEE architecture for data-driven applications requires provisioning
one VEE per user. VM density of traditional consolidation methods is bounded by the
maximum number of VMs that can be co-hosted on a single machine by the underlying
virtualization solution. Provisioning a large number of VMs using existing solutions will
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require un-aordably large amounts of hardware resources. Therefore, we propose a new
methodology that increases VM density for workloads that have relatively large uncorre-
lated active times, such as personal VEE workloads.
In this methodology, idle VMs are multiplexed across a range of inactive states, where
their resource footprint is reduced, at the cost of a small increase in client latency called the
miss penalty. However, due to dierences in their design and resource requirements, dier-
ent inactive states have varying VM activation and deactivation times, and VM capacities.
Consequently, miss penalties for idle VMs in dierent inactive states vary signicantly.
Thus choosing the appropriate policy for multiplexing idle VMs across inactive states is
essential for maximizing the VM density while minimizing the miss penalties. We divide
the policy space into reactive and proactive policies. To understand and guide our policy
selection, we formulate a mathematical model for the problem. This model is used to
derive a lower bound on the miss penalties of reactive policies. We observe some simi-
larities between this problem and the problems of page replacement and multi-level cache
management. We use these similarities to formulate a proactive policy (called SlidingWin-
dow+ARMA) which leverages inter-arrival time prediction to reduce miss penalties.
Our model uses the inactive state capacities and transition times as input parameters.
Therefore, we use microbenchmarks to measure these values to obtain the model parameters
for LXC [22], a widely used OS-level virtualization solution. We then categorize typical
personal VEE workloads and use the measured parameters to evaluate dierent reactive
and proactive policies. Our policy comparison and simulations provide a quantication of
the miss penalties of dierent policies and allow us to draw insights into their behaviour.
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Chapter 6
Towards Tussle Based Operating
Systems
6.1 Introduction
The goal of the personal VEE architecture (described in Chapter 3) was to enable an
ecosystem of data-driven applications that preserves users' data privacy. The basis of our
approach was to prevent application developers from accessing users' data, for example,
by sandboxing native VHome applications or transforming data before it is accessed by
cloud-based applications.
However, both users and application developers benet from providing application de-
velopers with access to users' data. For instance, application developers can use the data
to serve users with advertisements in-exchange for lower application costs. Access to data
would allow application developers to improve their data processing algorithms, leading to
improved utility to users. As a specic example, data can be used to improve occupancy
prediction for home thermostat control applications. On the other hand, as discussed in
Chapter 1, data from smart meters, smartphones, and other sensors, can also be misused
to reveal private information about the user, for example, socio-economic status [52], TV
viewing [93], driving [106, 113, 149], sleep [67, 100], physical activity habits [103, 104] and
other details [131,138].
Application developers and users are thus in a tussle [70] over access to sensor data.
Application developers desire to have unlimited sensor data access, while users wish to
preserve their data privacy. The VHome framework (Chapter 3) always resolves such
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tussles in favour of the user and prevents personal VEE-resident applications from relaying
any data back to application developers. In sharp contrast, smartphone operating systems
(OSes) such as Android, iOS, or Windows Phone, typically resolve data tussles in favour
of application developers and require users to grant all of an application's data requests
at installation time. As a result, many users avoid using smartphone applications that
require access to privacy-sensitive sensor data [68].
In their seminal work, Clark et al. [70] introduced the notion of tussles in cyberspace.
By analogy, we posit that operating systems need to formally recognize tussles and need to
implement mechanisms and policies to resolve them. Providing stakeholders { users and
application developers { with a principled way to express their requirements and ensuring
that the framework resolves tussles according to prescribed policies enables easier under-
standing of system behaviour for both users and applications. Moreover, a tussle-based
abstraction benets users by allowing them to gracefully balance application utility against
data privacy and it benets application developers by allowing for a broader distribution
of applications.
In this chapter, we ask: how can we best extend an operating system1 with a tussle-
based abstraction? We take the rst steps in answering this question by designing a
framework to formalize, detect, and resolve data tussles.
Our work makes the following contributions:
 A tussle abstraction for operating systems.
 An identication of mechanisms and policies that underlie a tussle-based framework.
 An outline of various open problems for instantiating a tussle-based framework and
directions for future work.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We formulate the design goals that a
tussle-based framework should achieve in Section 6.2 and present an outline of the proposed
architecture and its components in Section 6.3. We then derive the abstractions that
allow application developers and users to express their data requirements in Sections 6.4.1
1 We use operating system (OS) to loosely refer to any software that intermediates applications' access to
sensor data and other system resources (Table 6.2). This includes smartphone platforms such as Android,
Windows Phone, iOS, home sensing platforms such as HomeOS [76], our personal VEE framework {
VHome (Chapter 3, [171]), and other OSes running on embedded devices such as the Raspberry-Pi [31],
increasingly deployed in cyber-physical systems.
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and 6.4.2 respectively. We discuss the notion of tussle resolution and the enforcement of
such resolutions in Section 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 respectively. We conclude the chapter with a
discussion of future directions and an overview of related approaches in Section 6.5.
6.2 Design Goals
Our primary design goal is to extend existing OSes with a tussle framework that:
 Provides the stakeholders, that is, users and application developers, with a high-level
abstraction for expressing their resource requirements and constraints.
 Provides a set of mechanisms to detect and resolve tussles and ensures the enforce-
ment of the resolutions.
We believe that an ideal tussle framework should demonstrate the following properties:
Expressiveness
Numerous sensor applications exist today and others are rapidly emerging [34]. Therefore,
the framework should allow applications to freely express their sensing requirements. These
include, the type of sensors the application requires, the frequency at which access is
required, and the level of access. At the same time, the framework should allow the user
to dene acceptable sensor access by applications. This should be provided through a
control interface that is understandable to the users, for example, by allowing them to list
inferences that can or can not be drawn by an application.
Resolution
After the stakeholders have expressed their sensor access constraints, the framework should:
(i) detect conicting requirements (i.e. tussles), and (ii) resolve tussles by balancing the
requirements (with user input, if necessary). The amount of utility the application provides
is likely to be limited by the user's data privacy requirements. This implies that application
utility should degrade gracefully with increasingly strict privacy requirements. Note that
this is a signicant departure from most existing approaches which typically require a user
to accept all of an application's sensor access requests at installation time.
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Robustness
The framework should guarantee that any sensor data access made by an application
respects the tussle resolution. In addition, since many applications rely on the integrity of
sensor readings, the framework should guarantee this integrity. A sample application that
requires trusted readings to be eective is an energy billing application [171].
Extensibility
The framework should be able to support new sensor types, new algorithms that can
draw more sophisticated inferences using existing sensor data, and new ways in which
stakeholders may want to express their requirements.
6.3 Architecture Outline
In light of these design goals, we rst identify the key elements of a tussle-based framework,
and present an outline of its architecture. In the subsequent sections, we describe existing
work and determine the extent to which it can be leveraged to design and implement the
dierent components.
Figure 6.1 provides an overview of the proposed framework aimed at sensor data tus-
sles. Application developers and users are provided with interfaces which they use to
express their sensing requirements and data privacy requirements respectively. Applica-
tion developers express their sensing requirements through timing parameters (labeled
(ts; tw; tp)). Users express their requirements using inferences (labeled I1; I2; I3). Sec-
tions 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 explain these parameters and interfaces in greater detail and their
relation to prior work.
The resolver receives the requirements from the user and application and resolves tussles
by generating an accord. The accord denes the time, level, and scope of sensor access
for the application. To formulate an accord, the resolver leverages the InferenceDB, a
continually-updated cloud-hosted database of existing inference algorithms. Section 6.4.3
describes the resolver, accord, and InferenceDB in detail.
The enforcer, a component of the OS, implements the accord by ensuring that all
applications' sensor accesses respect the accord's restrictions. We discuss the enforcer and
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Figure 6.1: Design overview of a tussle-resolving framework.
6.4 Design Challenges
6.4.1 Applications' Sensor Data Requirements
We observe that applications typically collect sensor data, use it to draw inferences about
users or the environment, and perform actions based on these inferences. For example, the
PreHeat [163] application (described in Section 4.2.1), uses motion sensor data, infers and
predicts home occupancy, and adjusts the thermostat accordingly.
Recent work [144] (including ours [172]) has examined methods for allowing applica-
tions to request their required inferences, through inference-based abstractions, rather than
directly receiving actual sensor values (as in the VHome framework; Chapter 3). This en-
ables applications to accurately describe their requirements, while the framework performs
the required data processing and delivers the requested inferences. However, this method-
ology exhibits several deciencies. Application developers are limited to using inferences
supported by the framework. Using a dierent inference algorithm requires developers to
integrate it into the framework (e.g., building an inference-module in Beam [172]). This
places additional development and maintenance burdens on the developer. Moreover, many
application developers want their techniques to remain proprietary and may be reluctant to
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leverage such frameworks. Lastly, the framework may not incorporate certain application-
specic design optimizations which the developer wants to employ. Given these drawbacks,
we ask: Is it possible to allow developers to directly express their sensing requirements?
We survey a range of applications that use sensors across dierent domains [67, 98,
100, 103, 113, 149, 163]. On analyzing these applications' sensor access, we observe a few
similarities, which we explain in the context of a few example applications. We choose
these example applications because of the diverse categories they represent (healthcare,
safety, and eciency) and because they process private information about their users. The
example applications are:
 SleepMon [100, 103]: This application monitors users' sleep quality using their
smartphones. It uses the microphone to detect \sleep events", which are used to
create a ne-grained sleep prole, compute sleep eciency, and relate irregular sleep
patterns to possible causes.
 DriverMode [113, 149]: This application detects when the user is in a moving ve-
hicle, for example, a car, and activates a driver-mode user experience on the user's
smartphone. It suppresses non-critical notications and informs other users. It uses
the accelerometer to infer the user's transportation mode and records driving periods
for visualization.
 PreHeat [163]: Recall that, as described in Chapter 4, this application infers the
occupancy of a room or a home. The inferred occupancy is then used to adjust the
thermostat to save energy [25,98,163].
By analyzing these applications we observe that their sensing requirements, and those
of many other applications, can be expressed using the following parameters (illustrated
in Figure 6.2).
Sampling rate (ts)
This parameter denes the minimum time granularity for any batch of sensing values read
by the application. For instance, 0.125 ms (or 8 kHz) for the microphone readings used by
SleepMon [100, 103], 500 ms (or 2 Hz) for PreHeat's passive infrared (PIR) readings [98],
and 100 ms (or 10 Hz) in the case of DriverMode [149]. Application developers can tune
the sampling rate to accommodate their inference algorithms and deployment scenarios.
For instance, SleepMon's inference algorithm performs a spectral analysis of the sensor
122
readings using power spectral density. A sampling rate which is too infrequent will prevent
the algorithm from being able to dierentiate between events (such as snoring, coughing,
and moving), thereby impacting its detection of sleep-related events. A sampling rate
which is too high results in resource waste, including CPU and battery energy, because the
application will need to process a larger volume of readings.
Batch size (tw)
Most sensing applications require a batch of continuous sensor readings, which they process
using inference algorithms. The batch size parameter denes the minimum size of any batch
of sensor readings delivered to the application, expressed as a time range. For instance,
SleepMon [100] requires sensor readings with ts=0.125 ms, with a batch size (tw) of 100
ms, that is, 800 readings sampled at 8 kHz. Similarly, PreHeat [98] has a tw of 120 seconds.
Developers tune the batch size to meet the needs of their inference algorithm. An overly
small batch size reduces inference accuracy, for example, lower precision for occupancy,
driving, and sleep detection. Moreover, many algorithms require a given minimum batch
size in order to detect cyclic patterns or other peculiarities in the data. For instance,
inferring if the user is walking using accelerometer readings requires a batch size of at
least 3 seconds [114]. In contrast, an overly large batch size decreases algorithm accuracy
because multiple events may co-exist within a single batch [149]. It may also lower an
algorithm's sensitivity because it increases the number of missed events [149].
Periodicity (tp)
Most sensing applications perform their batch inference computations periodically (with
a period tp), rather than continuously. For instance, because PreHeat [98] is exclusively
interested in inferring occupancy events that last longer than 10 minutes, the occupancy
inference computation (processing a 120 second batch of PIR readings sampled at 2 Hz)
needs to be carried out only once every 10 minutes, meaning tp = 600 seconds. DriverMode
and SleepMon use a tp value of 5 minutes [100, 113]. Unlike the previous parameters, tp
aects the minimum length of events that are to be detected but it does not impact the
underlying inference algorithms' accuracy.
These three parameters allow applications to succinctly express their sensing require-
ments. Note, however, that applications can still provide reduced functionality as long
as the parameter values lie within a range of useful values. As explained above, dierent










Figure 6.2: Data sampling parameters.
ways. Along the same lines, as we explain below, users' requirements also map to a spec-
trum. The challenge then lies in determining parameter values that lie within both the
stakeholders' operating ranges.
6.4.2 Users' Data Privacy Requirements
Many application frameworks provide users with accept-or-deny sensor controls to express
their data privacy requirements. Mobile application platforms such as Android, Windows
Phone, and iOS allow the user to grant or deny an application's access to a sensor either
at application installation time (in Android and Windows Phone) or when the sensor is
rst accessed at runtime (in Android M and iOS). Existing work has shown that per-
sensor permission models provide very limited insight to the user [84, 152, 153]. Users
have little understanding of which sensors an application should access and why. User-
prompts are disruptive, cause \prompt fatigue", and condition users to simply grant all of
an application's requests [153].
Other work has focused on alleviating this problem by enabling users to express their
data privacy requirements as a set of rules [63, 191]. Users specify a set of privacy rules
which the OS enforces. Rules can be of the form \block sensor S for a given applica-
tion" [191], or can be tuples, (C, S, A), where C species the context under which a given
sensor S is accessed, and A species an action (such as perturbation) which needs to be
performed on the sensor data before providing it to an application [63]. Although this
approach provides greater access control, it burdens the user with the task of updating
the rules as the number of sensors and applications increases and with the evolution of
inference algorithms that can be misused to reveal private information.
Chakraborty et al. [63] propose an approach where users are provided with high-level
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inference abstractions to express their requirements. Users specify two prioritized lists of
inferences, comprised of inferences that are acceptable and unacceptable to them respec-
tively. The priority value indicates the importance the user assigns to an inference. An
a priori mapping of sensors (and their combinations) to inferences (and inference accura-
cies) that incorporates all known inference algorithms is assumed. Given the two inference
lists, the framework generates a list of sensors an application can access. It computes
an optimal sensor assignment for applications, maximizing the accuracy of the acceptable
inferences, and minimizing the accuracy of the unacceptable inferences. This approach
provides users with an understandable, low-overhead, high-level interface, but it suers
from some shortcomings that we discuss in detail in Section 6.5.2.
Inference-based interfaces are intuitive, however, they lack interpretability : for instance,
an application that infers user occupancy at a time granularity of one minute gains more
information about the user than an application with a granularity of one hour, even though
both applications use the same inference. Therefore, we envision a user interface where
users not only list their acceptable and unacceptable inferences, but, for each acceptable
inference, are provided with high-level interpretable controls. One example would allow
the user to specify the acceptable time granularity at which applications are able to infer
his or her occupancy (such as one hour) and to also control the granularity of occupancy
events the application can capture (such as occupancy events longer than 10 minutes).
6.4.3 Tussle Resolution
As described above, users express their requirements using an inference-based control in-
terface, whereas applications express their requirements using a formal description, such as
(ts; tw; tp) tuples, for sensing requirements. The resolver (shown in Figure 6.1) is a service
that processes a given set of applications' sensing requirements and a set of user's data
privacy requirements to produce the tussle resolution, referred to as the accord.
Since users express their requirements through inferences, the resolver contains a re-
quirements interpreter which interfaces with the InferenceDB. The requirements interpreter
maps the user's requirements to resource-specic parameters such as sensor-specic bounds
on parameters tw and tp. The InferenceDB is a service which provides the requirements
interpreter with a mapping of inference types and accuracies to sensor types and sensing
rates. For instance, it would map \Occupancy inferences with 100% accuracy" to the re-
quired motion sensor sampling rates. We envision that the InferenceDB would be hosted
by trusted third-party providers, for example, as public-facing web services in exchange for
user payments (or perhaps, freely from trusted open-source providers). These third parties
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would be responsible for updating their respective InferenceDBs with existing and newly
discovered inference algorithms.
After the user's requirements are converted by the requirements interpreter, they are
provided to the adjudicator. The adjudicator balances the user's and application's re-
quirements and resolves any conicting requirements using a policy. The policy species
parameters that map dierent levels of sensing to dierent levels of application utility and
functionalities. This allows the user to interpret the impact of privacy requirements on
application experience.
For some users, the process of ne-tuning privacy requirements may be too complicated
or time consuming. A possible solution is to provide users with access to an open-source
catalog of trusted, common privacy proles, from which a user may select a desired set
of policies. This is akin to \battery proles" commonly found on smartphone and tablet
OSes. Alternatively, another method could rely on asking users a small number of high-
level, privacy-related questions, in order to automatically build a customized privacy prole
tailored to the user's needs.
As sensors and inference algorithms evolve, both the requirements interpreter and ad-
judicator may need to perform signicant amounts of computation, as they are essentially
solving an optimization problem. Therefore, we envision hosting the resolver in the cloud,
either with a trusted third party provider, or on a user's personal VEE (Chapter 3).
Applications present their requirements to the OS at the time of instantiation, that is,
at the time of initialization. Similarly, the user presents his or her preferences to the OS
via a suitable user interface periodically, or at the time of application installation. Both
sets of requirements are then forwarded to the resolver. Figure 6.3 illustrates a sample
request sent from the OS to the resolver.
User: Occupancy - 10 min, Activity - 30 min, Sleep - 1 hr
App-1: Mic: (8 kHz, 0.125 ms, 1800 s)
App-2: Accelerometer : (10 Hz, 120 s, 300 s)
App-3: PIR: (2 Hz, 60 s, 600 s)
Figure 6.3: Example resolver request.
We assume a two-way encrypted channel of communication between the resolver and
the OS. The resolver responds with the corresponding accord along with integrity metadata
MDint. MDint is computed as follows:
MDint = SigKResolverpriv (H[Request]jjH[Accord]):
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As described in Table 6.1, MDint is a signed hash of the request and the corresponding
accord. MDint ensures integrity of the accord, prevents replay attacks, and allows the
device OS to determine if an accord matches the last issued resolver request. This design
allows the resolver to be stateless, ensuring easy scalability for a large number of devices
and users, which is neccessary if the resolver is to be hosted as a trusted third party service.
H[x]: Cryptographic hash of x
SigK [x]: Digital signature of x with the key K
Kownerpub , K
owner




After an accord has been formulated, the OS needs to ensure that it is obeyed. The enforcer
(shown in Figure 6.1) is an OS component that ensures that any resource access by any
application conforms to the accord generated by the resolver.
Upon receiving an accord from the resolver, the enforcer rst veries if the accord
matches the current resolution request issued by the OS (Figure 6.3). It then decodes and
stores the accord in memory. To ensure that application resource accesses respect the ac-
cord, the enforcer maintains bookkeeping information. For instance, for sensor data tussles,
the enforcer records the types, levels, and extents of sensor data accesses by applications.
If the OS runs on a user-device such as a smartphone or PC, the enforcer also handles
sensor interrupts. Upon receipt of an interrupt, the enforcer consults its bookkeeping
information and any accords, and determines the set of applications to which the data
can be permissibly delivered, for example, through an asynchronous callback. If the OS





Clark et al. [70] recognize tussles between stakeholders in the networking space and outline
solutions to resolve them. Likewise, we propose recognizing tussles among stakeholders
on operating systems on commodity devices and outline mechanisms to detect and resolve
them.
Existing work has proposed several additions to existing OSes to handle sensors and
actuators. Many systems have focused on either detecting overprivileged applications on
smartphones [83, 187], or tracking the ow of data to applications to detect malicious ap-
plications [80]. Spahn et al. [175] design an OS service that discovers application-level data
objects, for example, emails and documents, and provides users with unied object man-
agement. Santos et al. [158] propose a lease-based allocation of resources on smartphone
OSes to enable veriable application behaviour. These approaches are complementary
to ours. They focus on providing mechanisms to address various relevant sub-problems,
however, they do not recognize tussles between stakeholders, which are the main cause of
these problems. We propose a framework to recognize, detect, and resolve these tussles,
which can be further enriched by incorporating these existing mechanisms. Haddadi et
al. [97] propose a trusted arbitrator for allowing users to control applications' access to
historical data. We provide a framework for stakeholders to express their resource access
requirements, that can be used to view historical data as a resource.
Prior work has made several attempts to manage data tussles [46,54,63,126,141,191] but
when compared to a tussle-based framework, they suer from several shortcomings: their
allocation of sensing capabilities to applications is unveriable, they overlook balancing
application utility and data privacy, do not guarantee authenticity of sensor data, and
require constant device software updates to handle new sensors and inference algorithms.
6.5.2 Open Problems
Resource Tussles
We provide a way for application developers and users to express their sensor data re-
quirements, but these stakeholders often also enter into tussles over access to other system
resources. For instance, concurrent applications compete to access computational resources
such as CPU time, memory, and network bandwidth. Users often want to exercise some
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control over resource allocation, to understand the system behaviour, and prioritize dif-
ferent applications [130]. Table 6.2 lists some of the key system resources present today
on user devices, including computational resources, sensors, actuators, and even software
resources, such as user-generated content (e.g., photos and videos), network ports, and le
descriptors. Therefore, we require a way to enable applications to express their resource
requirements.
Resource Examples
Traditional CPU, RAM, disk space, disk and network bandwidth
Sensors Microphone, camera, GPS, accelerometer
Actuators Electrical switch, thermostat, lock, display
Data Sensor data streams, user-generated content (contacts, images, etc.)
Table 6.2: System resources.
Applications must also express the durations for which they require access to a resource,
and the size of their requirements, such as, the required slice of CPU time or the amount
of memory. This implies that the interface between the application and the OS (usually
the process abstraction) may need to be altered to give the OS a non-black box view into
the application's consumption of resources. Many modern smartphone OSes, including
Android and Windows Phone, have adopted this approach, with applications divided into
UI-intensive components (e.g., Android activities [5]) and computation-intensive compo-
nents (e.g., Android services [5]). Unfortunately, these abstractions only help to implement
specic static policies dened by the OS-provider, such as maximizing battery life. For de-
signing a tussle-based framework, existing unied resource abstractions such as Fence [130]
may be leveraged. However, they need to be supplemented with: (i) a language to allow
applications to freely express their resource requirements, and (ii) policies that resolve any
and all resource tussles. This will allow users to control and reason about resource tus-
sles in the same manner as data tussles. We envision that for resolving resource tussles,
the enforcer would need to be suitably enriched to encompass a CPU scheduler, memory
manager, a disk manager, and a network manager.
User-Controlled Data Privacy
As discussed in Section 6.4.2, we require a mechanism that allows users to express their
data privacy requirements in an interpretable way and then maps those requirements to
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appropriate constraints on sensor access levels. However, the amount of information re-
vealed by sampling a sensor at two dierent sampling granularities can vary signicantly.
For instance, an application that accesses the accelerometer to infer if the user is in motion
requires a much smaller time granularity than another application that infers the user's
physical activity. Similarly, an application accessing GPS at a time granularity of one
minute and a space granularity of ten meters can infer signicantly dierent user informa-
tion than an application with respective time and space granularities of one hour and ten
kilometers. As discussed in Section 6.4.2, the ipShield [63] approach provides users with an
understandable, low-overhead, high-level interface for managing data privacy but it does
not take sensor sampling granularity into consideration. Moreover, ipShield's [63] opti-
mization objective function minimizes the inference accuracy of unacceptable inferences
but it does not provide the user with any interpretable metric that conveys the amount of
private information revealed. Nevertheless, it serves as a good starting point for building
other user-understandable and quantiable approaches to handle sensor data privacy.
Trusted Readings
Our current work assumes that the OS is trusted and does not tamper with sensor read-
ings. Trusted readings are required in many applications such as billing [171] and geo-
fencing [132]. However, in practice, it may be dicult to guarantee that a particular OS is
trusted. Moreover, the user may want to provide readings that are perturbed or otherwise
modied, for example to spoof readings during development or replay previous GPS traces
to shield their current location [63]. Therefore, perturbations to sensor readings by the
user and the requirement of unperturbed readings by applications can also be viewed as a
tussle. A possible solution is to include a noise coecient with sensor requests, 0  tn  1.
A coecient of zero corresponds to unperturbed readings, whereas a coecient of one
could correspond to entirely fabricated readings. The resolver can then balance an ap-
plication's requested noise coecient against the user's privacy requirements, while the
enforcer ensures that readings delivered to applications are perturbed to the agreed upon
level.
Existing work has shown that trusted readings can be provided despite an untrusted OS
by securing appropriate components, such as by using a secure execution mode in modern
CPUs [132]. However, this approach [132] requires sensor drivers to be a part of the Trusted
Computing Base (TCB), and thus increases its size and hence its vulnerabilities [159]. A
potential solution is to partition sensor drivers' functionality so that only their security-
critical components contribute to the TCB.
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Tussles on a Cloud-Hosted OS
Applications such as Nest [25] use sensors deployed in users' homes and backhaul data to
Nest servers in the cloud which host the application logic. This is problematic in two ways.
First, users' sensor data needs to be transferred to the application developer's server, even
though data processing can be hosted on users' personal VEE. Second, the cloud server
hosting the application logic has no means to allow users to express their data privacy
requirements.
What is needed, therefore, is an instantiation of a tussle-based framework on the device
such as Nest [25]. This framework may coordinate with instantiations on other user devices
and the application developers' cloud servers. The challenge, therefore, lies in designing a
tussle-based framework for such IoT devices.
Veriable OS Implementation
A potential direction for building tussle-oriented operating system frameworks is to use
a Unikernel [133]. In this approach, the OS kernel is specialized to support only a pre-
specied set of applications. Moreover, the entire kernel is written in a strongly-typed
language (OCaml) that allows the OS's correctness to be formally proved, in the sense of
always obeying certain high-level assertions. We believe that tussle accords can be formally
expressed in terms of these assertions, thus a Unikernel that implements a tussle accord
can be trusted to enforce the accord.
6.6 Chapter Summary
We observe that application developers and users often have mutually conicting objec-
tives with regards to accessing sensor data. Application developers desire free access to
sensor data to advance their data processing algorithms and techniques. On the other
hand, users are often weary of unwarranted private information being leaked through their
sensor data and hence wish to preserve their data privacy. This situation results in a tussle
over sensor data access between the two stakeholders { users and application developers.
Moreover, such tussles also occur when stakeholders access many other system resources.
We advocate that operating systems need to recognize these conicts and provide suitable
mechanisms and policies to detect and resolve them. We outline the design of a framework
which: provides applications and users with high-level interfaces to express their sensor
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data requirements, detects conicting requirements, resolves them, and ensures the imple-
mentation of the resolution. We identity various open problems that need to be solved to
extend existing operating systems with a tussle-based framework.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter concludes the dissertation. In Section 7.1, we summarize the main contri-
butions of our work. We outline directions for future work in Section 7.2 and present
concluding remarks in Section 7.3.
7.1 Summary and Contributions
Due to a sharp decrease in hardware costs and form factor in recent years, sensors have
become ubiquitous. A variety of sensors are being embedded into user devices such as
smartphones, tablets, and wearable devices. Our homes, buildings, and automobiles are
also being increasingly outtted with sensors. On one hand, data collected from sensors
is used to fuel a variety of applications including those for energy eciency, safety, and
healthcare. On the other hand, sensor data can be processed to reveal unwarranted private
information about the user. As a result, many users avoid using such applications that
require access to private sensor data to protect their privacy. It is therefore imperative to
preserve data privacy while enabling a rich ecosystem of applications that process users'
private sensor data.
The focus of this dissertation has been on building a system that enables data-driven
applications while preserving data privacy, without burdening users with the tasks of pro-
visioning durable data storage and computational resources for the applications. Our pro-
posed approach leverages users' personal virtual execution environments (VEEs) hosted in
the cloud to create an ecosystem of privacy-preserving applications that process personal
data. We examine the feasibility of the proposed architecture by providing a proof-of-
concept instantiation targeting home energy as an example use case. We observe that
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applications have specic data storage and retrieval requirements for sensor data. Con-
sequently, we build a data management system for time-series sensor data to meet these
requirements while leveraging commodity storage service providers. We also observe that
our approach provides each user with a personal VEE and will require provisioning a large
numbers of personal VEEs for supporting large numbers of users. Therefore, we develop
a new methodology to provision a large number of VEEs with low-duty cycle workloads
on a single machine. We formulate the theoretical foundations of the methodology and
demonstrate its application to an example virtualization solution.
The key insight underlying our proposed architecture is that allocating appropriate
levels of commodity services oered by modern clouds directly to users (rather than ap-
plication developers) enables users to host both their data and their desired data-driven
applications within their connes; thus enabling a large ecosystem of data-driven applica-
tions and preserving users' data privacy. Our work has to been on designing and imple-
menting the mechanisms, techniques, and methodologies to realize this vision. The key
contributions of each chapter are now summarized.
As justied in Chapter 3, the initial focus of our proposed architecture is home energy
data. Our main contributions in that chapter are as follows.
 We present the architecture of a system that allows users to own and control access
to their home energy consumption data and freely use data-driven applications of
their choice.
 We demonstrate the feasibility of the architecture by building a prototype implemen-
tation using commodity cloud computing platforms.
 We present a qualitative evaluation of the prototype implementation with respect to
data privacy and data use and describe how it meets our design goals.
The main architectural components that we design and implement include, (i) an in-home
gateway for relaying sensor data and control commands to the personal VEE, (ii) a personal
VEE framework which warehouses home energy data, exposes it to third-party applications
via APIs, and provides data access control, and (iii) sample home energy applications that
run within an instance of VHome. Our personal VEE framework also enables applications
to securely and privately control some home appliances.
As described in Chapter 4, existing sensor data storage systems (including our proto-
type implementation in Chapter 3) do not meet all the data management requirements of
applications. Our work in Chapter 4 addresses this problem by designing a storage system
for sensor data and makes the following contributions.
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 We survey a wide range of data-driven applications and present a formulation of their
data management requirements.
 We describe the design and implementation of Bolt, a system for storage, retrieval,
and sharing of in-home sensor data that meets the applications' requirements.
 We present a performance evaluation of Bolt using three sample applications. We
demonstrate that, when compared with OpenTSB [27], Bolt's use of chunking, seg-
mentation, and index-DataLog separation techniques leads to a decrease in data
retrieval time of up to a factor of 40, and a 3-5 times reduction in storage space.
Moreover, Bolt provides applications with programming abstractions for storage, range-
query based retrieval, and sharing of sensor data, thus simplifying application development.
As described in Chapter 5, we argue that there is, or will soon be, a need for hosting
large numbers of personal VEEs on a single machine. We hypothesize that this may be
accomplished in an ecient way by multiplexing VEEs across multiple inactive states.
Our insight is that many workloads executed on personal VEEs would exhibit frequent,
often long, and uncorrelated idle periods. Therefore, existing work on inactive states for
reducing the resource footprint of idle VMs can be leveraged to maximize the number of
VMs hosted on a machine at the cost of a small latency penalty for client requests (called
the miss penalty). Our work in Chapter 5 explores this design alternative and makes the
following key contributions:
 We present a formal model for policies for managing idle VMs across inactive states
and derive a lower bound on the miss penalty of reactive policies.
 We present a measurement of model parameters using microbenchmarks with LXC [22]
as our example virtualization solution.
 We present a study of a few representative idle VM management policies, quantify
their miss penalties, and draw insights into their behaviour.
We design and implement a simulator for studying the behaviour of the idle VM manage-
ment policies. Our simulator is extensible to other policies, to other types of workloads,
and to inactive state hierarchies of other virtualization solutions.
As described in Chapter 6, we argue that application developers and users are in a
constant tussle over access to sensor data. Therefore, we posit that device operating
systems need to formally recognize tussles and need to implement mechanisms and policies
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to resolve them. Our work in Chapter 6 outlines the design of tussle-based framework, the
abstractions, mechanisms, and policies it requires, and identies various open problems in
instantiating it.
In summary, the architecture, techniques, mechanisms, and methodologies proposed in
this dissertation present a viable solution to achieve the seemingly conicting requirements
of enabling data privacy and data use.
7.2 Future Work
In addition to the topic-specic future work directions presented in Sections 3.5, 4.7,
and 5.7, we present the following avenues for future work.
7.2.1 Tussle Framework for IoT
In Chapter 6, we outline a tussle framework for a single device. However, in many pervasive
sensing environments, sensor data from dierent devices can not only be correlated to draw
inferences about a given user but also about a larger number of users, for example, co-
workers in an oce. Moreover, the data privacy requirements and the acceptable loss of
data privacy across dierent users may vary signicantly. What is needed, therefore, is a
tussle framework that allows the stakeholders to express their data privacy requirements
and their acceptable application utility in this broader context. The framework then bears
the onus for interfacing with sensors embedded across multiple devices and physical spaces,
as well as detecting and resolving the tussles in keeping with the stakeholders' specied
requirements.
7.2.2 Virtualization for High Density Hosting
In Chapter 5, we formulate the theoretical foundations for state-based multiplexing of low
duty-cycle VMs and study the behaviour of dierent policies. An open design challenge
lies in building a practical low-overhead virtualization solution that not only implements
multiple inactive states but also supports easy extension for incorporating idle VM man-
agement policies. The behaviour of dierent policies can then be observed in practice and
compared with the expected behaviour (derived in Chapter 5) to identify any discrepan-
cies and performance bottlenecks. Similarly, suitable mechanisms need to be designed to
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handle cases where the assumed low duty-cycles of personal VEEs co-hosted on a single
machine are violated. We believe that in such scenarios, where personal VEEs hosted on
a given machine become active together, load balancing can be used to migrate VEEs to
other under-utilized machines, for example, those that host personal VEEs for users from
a dierent time zone. Alternatively, personal VEEs can be co-hosted on a single machine
while ensuring adequate diversity in their active and idle times. Therefore, suitable analysis
methodologies and supplementary mechanisms will need to be designed.
7.2.3 Storage Cost Optimization for Time-Series Data
Our storage system in Chapter 4 provides policy-driven storage across providers, that is,
allowing applications to dene which parts of a given stream of data should be stored with
a given provider such as local disk, Windows Azure [37], or Amazon S3 [4]. However,
dierent storage providers have varying pricing schemes depending on the location of the
datacenter used and the type of underlying storage medium used (e.g., disk versus solid
state drives). Moreover, some applications may require the retrieval of certain parts of
data more frequently than other parts. For example, Preheat [163] prioritizes using a
recent window of occupancy data over older data, while DNW [57] may issue repeated
retrievals of a given time segment where the majority of suspicious activity was recorded.
In such cases, it is cumbersome for the application developer to optimize storage costs given
the variation in prices and retrievals. However, it may be possible to enrich the dierent
retrieval queries (such as those provided by Bolt in Chapter 4) with cost optimization
models. Applications can then specify if they prioritize retrieval time over storage cost (or
vice versa). The system would bear the onus for computing the optimal storage strategy
and updating the cost models accordingly.
7.2.4 Control Architecture for IoT
Many data-driven applications make use of actuators such as in-home switches, locks, and
thermostats, while many (or all) components of the applications may be hosted in the
cloud. In such scenarios, it is imperative to ensure that appliance control remains within
certain user-dened safety limits even in the presence of faults. Example faults include
home network outages, misconguration or malfunction of the sensing or actuating devices,
and user overrides. What is needed, therefore, is a cascading control architecture, where
an application's control logic is partitioned into a lightweight fail-safe component and a
core data-based component. We believe that, similar to our data framework (described
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in Chapters 3 and 6), it is possible to design a control framework that interfaces with
data-driven applications to facilitate and regulate device actuations.
7.2.5 Semantic Isolation of Applications
Pervasive sensing in homes can give rise to many complexities leading to unintended conse-
quences. This problem is exacerbated by data-driven applications that use sensor data to
trigger actuations and alerts. For instance, consider an application that uses home energy
consumption to deduce occupancy [117], which is then used to control other appliances or
trigger user alerts. In such scenarios, a malfunctioning energy sensor can cause erroneous
occupancy inferences, cascading into erroneous appliance actuations of false user alerts.
Similarly, in another scenario, consider two applications, one which uses an IR sensor to
trigger room lighting and another which infers occupancy from lighting to control home
heating (in turn aecting IR levels), thus aecting each other's operations. The two ap-
plications thus do not operate in complete semantic isolation. What is needed, therefore,
is a mechanism that can detect such conicts among applications (possibly at installation
time) and can alert the user and hence prevent such consequences.
7.3 Concluding Remarks
Today most data-driven applications are being built in a service provider-centric way where
users are required to transfer their data to the application service providers in order to use
the provided applications. We seek to ease this situation by proposing our personal VEE
approach where application executables are transferred to user controlled environments
and run within the users' connes. This enables an ecosystem of privacy-preserving data-
driven applications, and unlike the service provider based approaches, does not lead to
private data of thousands of users being stored under one administrative domain where it
may susceptible to large scale breaches. This work addresses the design of mechanisms,
techniques, and methodologies to overcome the barriers to the feasibility and adoption of
the personal VEE approach by large numbers of users.
The ongoing evolution of new sensors, sensing capabilities, and data-processing algo-
rithms requires extending software systems to provide users with data privacy and control.
As a starting point, our work has focused on in-home sensors. However, we believe all
systems that collect, archive, and process data concerning users need to recognize users as
stakeholders and need to allow them to freely choose their data control policies. This in-
cludes sensor systems in oce and commercial buildings, public spaces, automobiles, public
138
transportation, and in other environments likely to be outtted with sensors in the future.
The insights we draw through our work are equally applicable to such other domains.
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